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Abstract
T h e office o f  Speaker has generally been seen as h avin g an alm ost 
accidental origin (in the British H ouse o f  Com m ons) and non-deliberate 
design and developm ent Save for the simple dichotom y m ade betw een the 
U S -sty le  Speaker and the British Speakership, little detailed analysis o f  
this office has been undertaken
This w ork looks at the office form the perspective o f  rational choice new  
institutionalism Our em pirical focus is on the Irish Speaker (Ceann  
Com hairle) H aving justified the new  institutionalist approach, w e develop  
a rational choice account o f  the office From  this account w e then postulate 
a series o f  em pirically testable hypotheses U sin g data collected from  
parliamentary records and other sources, it is shown that, far from  being a  
neutral arbiter, the presiding officer is an asset o f  the governing parties
T h e research explores m any issues at the core o f  legislative politics  
including the m otivation o f  political actors, the origin and developm ent o f  
institutional arrangements and the consequences o f  particular institutional 
types A s  such, the research provides novel and em pirically tested  
argum ents that challenge m uch o f  the conventional w isdom  regarding both  
political actors in the legislative arena and the paradigm s used to 
understand them
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Chapter I: Introduction
i A tale of two Speakers
O n W ednesday, 12 July 2000 B etty Boothroyd, Speaker o f  the British H ouse  
o f  Com m ons, gave notice to the cham ber o f  her intention to retire 1 A s  the 
1 5 1 st Speaker she had been first elected eight years earlier in a manner not 
unlike how  vacan cies in the office  had been filled  for generations She  
em erged victorious against one other candidate, Peter Brooke N either  
individual cam paigned pu blicly for the support o f  colleagues, there were no 
electoral statements or m anifestos, no prom ises o f  specific actions i f  elected  
Party leaders kept their usual distance, not expressing any preference as to 
h ow  their ow n front or backbenchers should vote 3
G iven  the h ea vy hand o f  tradition w hich surrounds m uch o f  the practices and 
procedures at W estm inster, and the office o f  Speaker m  particular, one w ould  
be forgiven for thinking that the selection o f  Boothroyd's successor, set for 
Septem ber 2000, w ould be as uneventful as previous ones B ut the election o f  
the 1 52nd Speaker turned into a race quite unlike anything seen before
1 Hansard , 3rd Series, Vol 353, Col 869
2 Within the House o f Commons it is conventional not to use the term candidate when 
referring to those individuals who put their names forward for consideration as Speaker
1
T o  begin w ith there were tw elve candidates - the largest recorded number in 
the history o f  the Speakership. T h e dramatic increase in the proportion o f  
m embers putting their names forward for the position can be accounted for, 
partly at least, by the fact that some were running to prom ote specific  
grievances.4 Exam ples o f  such grievances included the calls for a more 
fam ily-friendly Com m ons, w ith prom ises for better facilities for children and 
childcare and an end to the anti-social hours w hich m em bers are expected to 
work at W estm inster.5 Seven candidates broke n ew  ground b y  issuing  
electoral statements. Previously the idea o f  there being an open contest w as  
frow ned upon; now  some were issuing what were effe ctively  m anifestos.6 
Som e resorted to creating w eb sites to com m unicate their positions on various  
issues (invariably parliamentary reform) and to list what they saw  as their 
qualifications for the position. E ven the m ost silent proclaim ed the need for 
the w inds o f  change to sweep through the corridors and cham ber o f  the Palace  
o f  W estm inster.7
3 Routledge (1995) provides a more detailed account in his biography o f Boothroyd.
4 Except where otherwise mentioned this account is based on newspaper reports from The 
Guardian (especially 19 October 2000, 20 October 2000, 23 October 2000 and 24 October 
2000). Further information was obtained from a special report in the Guardian Unlimited 
(available HTTP at www.guardian.co.uk/speakery
5 Three o f the Labour candidates (David Clark, Gwyneth Dunwoody and John Mcwilliam) 
stressed childcare and reduced working hours as issues they would address directly if  elected.
6 The six candidates running for the Speaker's job who issued statements explaining why they 
should be elected were: David Clark (Labour), Sir Patrick Cormack (Conservative), Gwyneth 
Dunwoody (Labour), Michael Lord (Conservative), John McWilliam (Labour) and Nicholas 
Winterton (Conservative).
7 One candidate, Sir Patrick Cormack (Conservative), was less supportive o f what he termed 
'modernisation' which he saw as the discarding o f traditions only for the sake of change. But 
even he emphasised the need for improvements in how the House operates.
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W ith all the talk o f  the need for reform that w as bein g generated b y  the 
candidates, their supporters and m em bers more generally, som e o f  the m edia  
jo in ed  the debate on the role o f  the Speaker There were calls for a 
m odernised Speakership that w ould pave the w a y for greater scrutiny o f  the 
governm ent, m ake the H ouse m ore efficient and effective in its operations and 
procedures and overall help rebalance the relationship betw een governm ent 
and parliament It w as argued that a modernising, reform -oriented Speaker 
could assist greatly in bringing the legislature back to prom inence w ithin the 
British political system , a prom inence w hich seem ed lost under the w eight o f  
cabinet governm ent, party w hips and antiquated parliamentary procedures 8
Then there w as the alleged involvem ent o f  the Labour leadership and, in 
particular, Prim e M inister T o n y Blair Backbenchers have traditionally fought 
to ensure that the h eavy hand o f  the party w hip does not enter the selection o f  
Speaker - that the party hierarchies refrain from givin g instruction or guidance  
to ordinary m embers on w hom  to support A s  on previous occasions no w hip  
w as im posed but m  the run-up to the election it w as reported in the m edia that 
the Labour leadership w as in volvin g itse lf b y  suggesting that it w ou ld  not be 
in the interest o f  the party to ’w in ’ the contest In off-the-record remarks it 
w as indicated that public opinion m ight be tarnished i f  Labour M em bers o f
8 On the role and impact o f  parliam ent in the British system see N orton (1993), for a more 
com parative perspective on executive dom inance see Longley et al (2000) It is worth noting
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Parliament were seen to be greedily seeking the prize that is the Speakership  
Through unofficial channels the party leadership let it be know n that they did  
not want a Labour m em ber to succeed Boothroyd to do so w ould look as i f  
the party w as behaving m a self-serving and partisan manner
M an y Labour backbenchers were, according to m edia reports, apparently 
unhappy w ith w hat one newspaper labelled the 'inadvertent control freakery’ 
o f  10 D o w n in g Street 9 Backbenchers felt that the long-standing tradition o f  
leavin g the decision on selecting a Speaker com pletely and freely in the hands 
o f  the w hole H ouse w as being undermined It is the height o f  irony that the 
Labour leadership w ould behave m such a partisan manner in an attempt to 
portray an im age o f  non-partisanship
B ut partisanship w as not confined to the governm ent side o f  the H ouse The  
O fficial O pposition signalled its distaste w ith o n ly eleven Conservative  
m em bers voting m  a cross-party manner during the final, sym bolic vote  
M eanw hile Labour M inisters voted overw helm ingly for the leading  
Conservative candidate T h e house had divided m ainly, i f  not com pletely, 
along party lines
that in the literature, the office o f  Speaker is rarely, i f  ever, identified as a  possible agent for 
strengthening the role o f parliam ent
9 The Guardian, O ctober 23 2000
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A sid e from the cam paign, the m echanism  b y  w hich the Speaker is elected  
caused a storm o f  protest with a number o f  m embers dem anding a change to 
the process by w h ich  the Speaker is selected The system  o f  paring o f f  tw o  
candidates against each other sequentially until one winner fin ally em erges 
w as view ed  b y m any as a h ighly cum bersom e w a y  to run an election w ith  
tw elve  candidates M an y urged that the arcane electoral system  be scrapped in 
favour o f  a more efficient paper ballot For these m embers, retaining the 
electoral system  w as all too typical o f  the underlying problem  o f  havin g to 
abide by cum bersom e, outdated procedures B u t the father o f  the House, T ed  
Heath, refused to deviate from the existing rules and procedures 10 T o  do so, 
he suggested, w ould only confuse members W riting o f  the election, one 
parliamentary comm entator concluded that the election w as, akin to a 'Piss-up  
in a brew ery7 This lot couldn't organise an orgy in a m assage parlour ,n
F o llow in g a marathon tw elve hours o f  voting, M ich ael M artin, a m em ber o f  
the Labour Party, w as elected Speaker Had the cam paigning and election not 
produced such candour and forthrightness his selection m ay w ell have been  
remem bered for bein g the first tim e a person o f  the R om an C atholic faith w as  
chosen to hold the position since the R eform ation For m any o f  those w ishin g  
to see parliamentary reforms his appointm ent w as greeted w ith  som e hope,
10 U nder Standing O rder N um ber One the longest serving m em ber o f  the House, referred to  as 
the 'Father o f  the H ouse1, oversees the election o f  Speaker (House o f  Com m ons, 2000)
11 Sim on H oggart w riting in The Guardian 24 O ctober 2000
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and a desire that he w ould be a different Speaker It w as expected that he 
w ould at least attempt to deal with a number o f  the issues raised m the w eeks  
leading up to his election In the final act o f  the election, and m arking another 
radical departure for a new  Speaker, M artin called a press conference where 
he signalled his intent to proceed with reform o f  the w a y  parliam ent works 
The office o f  Speaker, it seem ed, w ould never be the sam e again
This story illum inated the increasing importance that is attached to selecting a 
Speaker in the British Parliament Our second tale is o f  a parliamentary crisis 
brought about b y  attempts to rem ove one For this account w e turn to the 
rather m ore exotic location o f  Port o f  Spam , capital o f  Trinidad and T o b ago  
Form erly part o f  the British Em pire, Trinidad and T o b a go  is a dem ocratic  
sovereign state, w ith m any o f  its political institutions and processes  
resem bling those o f  its former colonial master 12
In early 1995 the H on O ccah  Seapaul, Speaker o f  the H ouse o f  
R epresentatives, becam e em broiled in controversy over her private business 
affairs It w as alleged in a criminal case before the courts, in w hich she w as  
the leading prosecution witness, that she w as involved in attempts to defraud a 
com m ercial bank b y  m aking false claim s about the intended use o f  m on ey  
w h ich  w as bein g sought b y  w a y  o f  bank loan A lth ou gh  the case w as
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dism issed, the cabinet decided that her position as Speaker w as untenable and 
it gave written notice on 7 July 1995 o f  a vote o f  no-confidence m  the 
Speaker
W hen, three days later, the m otion cam e before the House, the Speaker ruled 
it out o f  order She rejected calls for the suspension o f  Standing Orders so that 
the issue could be discussed and steadfastly maintained her absolute right to 
continue m  office D espite m ounting pressure, she refused to resign arguing  
that her private and public affairs were separate and furthermore, that there 
was no constitutional or institutional provision for her dism issal or rem oval
The Governm ent decided that a constitutional am endment allow ing for the 
rem oval o f  the Speaker w ould be the m ost expedient w a y to deal with the 
increasingly embarrassing issue T h ey tabled an amendment that, am ong other 
things, provided for the tem porary suspension o f  the Speaker from the Chair  
and put in place a process for im peachm ent W hen the B ill cam e to the floor  
o f  the cham ber it w as ruled out o f  order b y  the Speaker, in a fashion sim ilar to 
h ow  she had dealt w ith the vote o f  no confidence F o llo w in g a verbal 
altercation w ith  the Leader o f  the H ouse (a m em ber o f  the governing party), 
she ordered his suspension for six months, w ithout follow in g, it should be  
noted, any o f  the normal procedures for suspending a m em ber
12 Inform ation is drawn from the detailed account o f  the crisis provided by Ghany (1997) 
Ghany (1997) also details the historical link and resem blance m parliam entary institutions
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O n the eve o f  the second attempt to consider the constitutional am endment the 
Governm ent im posed a state o f  em ergency around the parliament building and 
placed the Speaker under house arrest. The Governm ent sought to ju stify  its 
actions, in part, b y  reference to the inappropriate and possibly illegal 
behaviour o f  the Speaker w hile chairing recent sessions o f  the House. It also  
claim ed to have evidence that the Speaker had entered into a conspiracy, w ith  
the opposition, to suspend or expel governm ent deputies from the House, w ith  
the intention o f  changing the balance o f  pow er betw een the governm ent and 
opposition block. The aim o f  this, according to the governm ent, w as to enable  
the opposition to w in a vote o f  no-confidence in the governm ent, forcing an 
early general election or change o f  government.
O n  7 A ugust, w ith the D eputy Speaker presiding, Speaker O ccah  Seapaul w as  
suspended from office b y  w a y o f  a parliamentary resolution and the process o f  
im peachm ent w as put in place and im m ediately initiated. T h e suspension  
continued in force up until the (early) dissolution o f  parliament the fo llow in g  
October. The dissolution brought to an end a very traumatic period in the 
parliamentary affairs o f  a relatively new  parliamentary dem ocracy. The crisis 
had a profound im pact upon the wider political system  and played a m ajor 
part in the floundering fortunes o f  the governing party.
between Westminster and Port of Spain.
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The tw o stories above, w hile individually fascinating, raise w ider issues and 
themes, w hich should be o f  enormous interest to legislative scholars m  
particular as w ell as those interested in politics more generally L et us explore  
briefly what w e consider to be the wider issues illum inated b y  these tw o tales
Perhaps the first them e to em erge from the three cases is that the Speaker is an 
important institution within the legislature T h e presiding officer, and his or 
her election and behaviour w hile in office, is important to the w orking o f  the 
legislature and the w ider political system  13 It has allocative and distributional 
powers, w hich gives the officeholder influences on h ow  the parliament w orks  
and, am ong other things, the nature o f  executive-legislative relations In the 
U nited K ingdom  backbenchers unhappy with the dom inance o f  the legislature 
b y  the executive and m alcontent with being used as 'lobby fodder' b y  the party 
w hips looked to a n ew  Speaker to restore the greatness o f  p a rlia m en t14
In the second case, that o f  the Parliament o f  Trinidad and T ob ago, w e are left 
w ith no doubt about the seriousness o f  having an 'out o f  control’ Speaker - 
m aking the life o f  a governm ent so difficult that they are forced to declare a
13 Thus far w e have talked o f  the Speaker A look at other parliam ents and assem blies 
indicates that the person perform ing the role and function o f  presiding officer is know n by 
different titles such as Presiding Officer, Chairman or President (o f  the parliam ent or 
cham ber) Except where we are referring to a particular legislature we use the term s Speaker, 
Presiding Officer, Chan- and President interchangeably during the rem ainder o f  this w ork The 
Irish Speaker, as we w ill see, is referred to as the Ceann Comhairle Translated from the Irish 
language the term  m eans head o f  the agency or organisation
14 On the topic o f  British M Ps role and behaviour see Norton (1997) and, specifically on the 
nature and extent o f  British party  cohesion, see Cowley & N orton (1998) and Crowe (1986)
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state o f  em ergen cy I f  nothing else, each case should draw attention to the fact 
that in the real world the Speakership is, at least occasionally, a politically  
important and significant institution
T h e tw o tales allude also to what w e could characterise as the different types  
o f  Speakerships In particular the nature o f  the relationship betw een the 
Speaker and the w hole house, versus his or her relationship w ith one faction  
(such as one political party) w as an important aspect in each instance D oes  
the Speaker represent, or more norm atively, is he or she expected to represent, 
the interests o f  the entire H ouse7 In the United K in gdom  w e observed how  
backbenchers were lookin g increasingly for a Speaker who w ould not be 
bullied by the governm ent In Trinidad and Tobago the behaviour o f  the 
Speaker w as partisan m  the opposite direction, favouring as it did the 
opposition over the governm ent The degree to w hich speakers are neutral 
servants o f  the w hole chamber, partisan servants o f  the governm ent or some 
other faction, or sim ply self-serving politicians, is an interesting question for 
our w ider understanding o f  legislatures In particular, and as w e w ill argue 
later in greater depth, the nature o f  the Speakership sheds light on w h y the 
legislature w orks as it does and the pow er and role it has in the w ider political 
system
10
Com bined, these tw o accounts allude to a set o f  issues w h ich  should be o f  
particular interest to com parative scholars the w a y  in w h ich  the sam e 
institution (in this case the O ffice  o f  Speaker) in a different polity are, on the 
surface, very similar and at the sam e time very different W e are told b y  
G han y (19 9 7) that each o f  the Speakerships are very sim ilar - the Speaker o f  
Tn m dad and T obago being m oulded in the shape o f  the British Speakership  
Trinidad and T ob ago, not unlike Ireland, w as at one tim e part o f  the B n tish  
Em pire and on leavin g took with them m any o f  the basic parliamentary 
features at W estm inster 15 Y et, despite being 'hatched from the sam e egg,' 
there is today m uch institutional discrepancy 16 For exam ple, what happened  
in Trinidad and T o b a go  w ould be unthinkable in the United K in gdom  W hat 
accounts for this situation is a fascinating question and one o f  the central 
puzzles surrounding the office o f  Speaker and indeed the organisation o f  
legislatures more generally
W e can then take at least three important points that em erge from our b rief  
tale firstly that the Speakership is, or can be, a significant political office, 
secon dly that the nature and role o f  the office  m ay differ and thirdly, the 
question as to w h y the office takes the particular shape that it does in any
15 On the origin o f  the Speaker in Trinidad and Tobago Ghany (1997 113) writes ’it is w ithout 
doubt clearly established that the Office o f  Speaker in Com m onwealth Parliam ents has been 
adopted from the Parliam ent at W estm inster ’ On the transfer o f  British political institutions 
and culture to the independent Irish State see, am ong others, Garvin (1996) and M itchell 
(1995)
11
given  setting It is these them es that w ill shape our exploration o f  the office  o f  
Speaker B efore w e begin our inquiry let us take a look at w h y the 
Speakership has been neglected as a subject o f  research, given  that w e  
consider it to be an important institution worth investigating
u A rarely studied institution
D espite the potential importance o f  the office and the m any fascinating  
questions raised by it, the office o f  Speaker has received very little scholarly  
attention This is perhaps best exem plified by the fact that the last book-length  
study conducted on the British Speaker w as published in 1964 17 In the case o f  
Ireland no book length or substantive academ ic w ork has ever appeared on the 
Ceann Com hairle V e r y  few  journal articles can be located on the topic o f  the 
Speaker with no articles on the Irish case T h e only exception to this general 
rule is the w ork on the Speaker o f  the U S  H ouse o f  R epresentatives Later w e  
w ill take a close look at w hat has been written, but before this it is worth  
exploring w h y the speaker has been ignored, abandoned or at the very least 
sidelined by political scientists
16 This discrepancy in design and organisation goes beyond the Speakership, to other features 
such as, for exam ple, the com m ittee system or voting procedures w ithin the cham ber For a 
com parative overview  see Olson (1994)
17 Laundy (1964)
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T h e m ost im m ediate explanation o f  w h y the Speaker has been given  such little 
attention is to point to the general lack o f  notice given  to parliaments b y  the 
academ y E ver since the influential work by B ryce (19 2 1), w ho concluded  
that parliament w as in decline, it has been assumed that legislatures are no 
longer institutions central to the political process E xecu tive dom inance has 
been seen to place parliaments behind institutions such as the cabinet and civil 
service in terms o f  political importance W ithin North A m erica congressional 
scholarship remains strong but this is not the case in m ost o f  the countries o f  
W estern Europe where parliaments seem  to be relatively under-studied 18
H ow ever it w ould be untrue to suggest that parliaments have been totally  
ignored There exists an extensive range o f  books on the British Parliament, 
both general volum es and ones dealing with specific topics 19 This suggests  
that it is less a case o f  parliaments being totally ignored and m ore a 
phenomenon o f  legislative scholars opting not to look, too often at least, at the 
office o f  Speaker Those w ho have looked inside parliament have tended to 
focus on other questions, in particular execu tive-legislative relations or the 
voting behaviour o f  parliamentarians In terms o f  institutional design, 
com m ittees have been a dominant focus o f  interest, perhaps in keeping w ith
18 For a bibhom etrical-based account o f  the developm ent o f  legislative studies in the U nited 
States and Europe see M artin (2000)
19 Exam ples include Giddmgs (1994), Franklin & N orton (1993), N orton & W ood (1993)
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the often-quoted opinion over by W oodrow  W ilson (1885) w ho com pared
20
governm ent in congress to governm ent by com m ittees
A s  further evidence o f  the unw illingness o f  scholars to focus on the presiding  
officer, it is worth noting that the seminal w ork on the British Speaker is 
written not b y  an academ ic but by a parliamentary administrator T h e sam e 
administrator is responsible for one o f  the only com parative volum es 21 A n
em ployee o f  the U nited States Congress likew ise authored one o f  only tw o
22
com parative articles on the topic
Perhaps more than anything else it w as the behavioural revolution in the study  
o f  Am erican politics that ensured the Speaker w ould never be at the forefront 
o f  the research agenda That revolution, with its focus on scientific m ethods 
rather than reliance on the more thick-descriptive accounts, created a 
m ethodological bias against studying the Speaker and towards topics such as 
votin g and roll-call analysis V o tin g behaviour could be observed, recorded, 
studied, hypothesised w ith subsequent validation or rejection with the use o f  
m athem atical and econom etric tools The office o f  Speaker is seen as
20 Exam ples o f  influential works focusing on com mittees include Strom (1990), Stram  (1998) 
and the volum e edited by Longley et al (1997)
21 Philip Laundy is a parliam entary librarian and author o f  two book-Iength studies o f  the 
Speaker (Laundy 1964, 1984)
22 Back (1999) is an em ployee o f  the Congressional Research Services at the United States 
Library o f  Congress The other article we are referring to here is Clucas (2001) and is 
different m  that the com parative focus is on US state legislatures rather than cross-national 
institutions
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revolvin g more around an individual - understanding the Speaker is seen as 
requiring understanding o f  the individual at a social-p sychological level - and 
such unobservable or unquantifiable variables were and are not in vogu e 23
In Europe, where the behavioural revolution did not take hold as strongly as in 
the U nited States, Parliaments were sim ply out o f  favour for m ost o f  the last 
century 24 A dm ittedly one o f  the areas o f  m ost focus for European scholars 
w as and continues to be the study o f  governm ent formation W ho gets into 
governm ent determines p o licy  outcom es and this is regarded as o f  real 
interest The com position o f  the governm ent, and its success in office w as not 
seen as havin g very m uch to do w ith the institutional design o f  parliament, 
including the nature o f  the Speakership
W hatever the explanation for the lack o f  attention w e w ant to begin to rem edy  
the situation in this w ork In the next section w e provide more detail on what 
w e w ish to do in this work
23 For a more detailed account o f the disciplines paradigm atic roots see Susser (1991)
24 This is a personal opinion although evidence backing this up can be gleaned from data in 
M artin (2001)
25 There are exceptions to this general point Strom  (1990), for exam ple, m akes the link 
betw een com m ittee structure and willingness o f  political parties to stay out o f  governm ent
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Iin The subject of this work
G iven  the small amount o f  existing work, and in particular the atheoretical 
nature o f  nearly all o f  that work, it w ould be tem pting to define this w ork as 
an assessm ent rather than a reassessment This w ould be w rong given  that 
some research exists already on Speakers m other countries Indeed, w e  
dedicate a chapter to review ing the existing b o d y o f  know ledge In this 
existing literature there is a very hom ogeneous understanding o f  the nature 
and origin o f  the office This work challenges directly that hom ogeneity, what 
w e w ill term the conventional w isdom  o f  the Speakership B riefly, this 
conventional w isdom  stresses the uniqueness o f  the Speakership as a political 
institution and the neutral, non-partisan nature o f  the m odem  office
A dditionally, although w e w ill ponder this issue in greater depth later, the 
unsophisticated, atheoretical nature o f  the existing research should itse lf be a 
cause for concern Com bined, the conclusions in the literature and the 
m ethods used to arrive at them are troubling Indeed, even what present 
material exists leaves the m odem  scholar o f  political science and the observer 
o f  real-world politics with more questions than there are answers for
W e are as interested in finding a generally applicable theory to help us 
understand the institution o f  presiding officer and, indeed, the nature o f  sub­
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legislative institutions more generally, as in providing a detailed account o f  
any one Speakership This, initially at least, is o f  more interest to us than a 
detailed em pirical account o f  the Irish case
Substantively this is a w ork on the Speaker A s  w e have alluded to, a number 
o f  com m on conclusions have em erged about the Speaker W e feel that given  
the nature o f  the works, w hich lead to these conclusions, each o f  the accepted  
pillars m ay demand reappraisal W hat w e hope to do is to look beyond the 
often sim plistic assumptions in the literature and think about the office in a 
fresh w a y
The key argument w hich w ill be put forward is that m uch o f  our current 
understanding o f  the O ffice  o f  Speaker is blatantly w rong T h e attitude o f  
reverence and deference to the Speakership, so dominant in the literature, is 
m isleading In particular w e attack head on the notion that the Speaker is non­
partisan and assert our v ie w  that the speaker is a servant-like asset o f  one or 
m ore parliamentary faction The O ffice  o f  Speaker can be understood like  
m ost other political office It is not as 'high’ as m any w ould have us suspect 
A gain , although the evidence presented is based around the Irish case, the 
results should help illum inate the office o f  Speaker more generally Our first 
question then revolves around an exam ination the nature o f  the m odem  office
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W h y  the office o f  Speaker looks the w a y at does w ill also be o f  concern to us 
A s  w e w ill explore in greater detail later, the origin o f  the Speaker is traced to 
a particular period and event in British parliamentary history Scholars claim  it 
is that period w hich gave the Speakership the shape w hich it still enjoys today  
- w ith the exception o f  som e cases, m ost notably, the U nited States H ow ever  
even that exceptional nature o f  the Speaker o f  the U nited States C ongress is 
sim ilarly explained by reference to a set o f  local and unique historical events  
Y e t this reverence to historical origins, as an explanation for the nature o f  the 
m odem  office, m ay be as unsound as the well-trodden line o f  non-partisanship  
and neutrality
These substantive questions, o f  institutional nature and institutional origin  
lead us to the theoretical foundation o f  this study W e search for a useful 
fram ew ork or general theory to help us illum inate the substantive questions 
posed A n  obvious place to start such a search is w ith new  institutionalism  A s  
a paradigm , n ew  institutionalism , or what is often referred to as neo  
institutionalism , has as its core assumption or b e lie f that institutions matter, 
that their design has consequences 26 A s  a project the school has revolved  
around tw o questions firstly what are the consequences o f  particular 
institutional form ats7 Secondly, h ow  do w e explain the em ergence and
26 W e will provide a more detailed review  o f  new institutional theory in Chapter Two A 
general introduction to the field is provided by Peters (1999)
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evolution (or lack o f  change) in political institutions7 B oth  questions are o f  
great importance to our substantive topic The question o f  institutional 
consequences, at least at a theoretical level, has received m uch scholarly  
attention and, w hile m uch progress is still to be m ade, it is safe to say that our
understanding o f  institutional design consequences has advanced m  recent
28
years
L ess advanced, how ever, is our understanding o f  w h y institutions take the 
shape they do A t  a theoretical level there is no com m only accepted point o f  
departure for answering the question o f  w h y institutions em erge the w a y they  
do It is far from hyperbole to suggest, as w e do later, that new  
institutionalism  is undergoing an internal battle on this very question A t  one 
extrem e are theories dominated b y  historical analysis and the sociological 
approach A t  the other extrem e is the econom ic school, w hich takes it that
90
institutions have their origins m  the strategic choices o f  players
T h e need for theory deploym ent, i f  not already obvious, w ill becom e clearer 
w hen w e provide a fuller review  o f  the existing and atheoretical conventional
27 This project is best exem plified by the Cam bridge U niversity Press series on Political 
Econom y o f  Institutions and D ecisions under the guidance o f  Jam es A lt and Douglas North 
w hich have addressed the questions o f institutional origin and consequence from  a new- 
m stitutional perspective
28 As w ill becom e clear in later chapters we are som ewhat cautious about the new 
institutionalist paradigm  The dom inant approach which we em ploy is rational choice theory 
For us good  rational choice theory takes account o f  institutions
97
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w isdom  about the institution o f  Speaker' O ne o f  our am bitions in this w ork is 
to deploy rational choice institutionalism  in a w a y that is capable o f  helping us 
understand and explaining the com plexity o f  the O ffice  o f  Speaker There is 
good reason w h y any such theory should be capable o f  a more general 
application G iven  that various theoretical tools are available, and our 
approach m ay be far from  being universally acceptable, w e w ill spend som e  
tim e explaining and prom ote the rational choice approach
T h e reader m ay h ave noticed a certain carelessness thus far W e have  
interchangeably spoken o f  the need to find (1) a theory o f  institutional origin  
and (2) a theory w h ich  explains the current institutional design B u t the origin  
and current design o f  an institution often differ quiet substantially It is not 
uncom m on for institutions to change The question o f  institutional change or 
continuity has received a certain amount o f  attention, but w e w ill argue that 
the existing explanations are very w eak A  theory that can take on board 
origin and evolution w ill be far m ore useful than one that can o n ly explain the 
initial shape o f  the institution In sum mary then this w ork sets out with tw o  
m ajor goals
(1) A  depiction o f  the Irish Speaker, w ith particular reference to the 
nature o f  the office  This w e think w ill entail m ovin g beyond the
29 W e can see imm ediately that the historical school has been the one w hich scholars o f  the 
Speaker have tended to align them selves with, even i f  they do not use the language o f  theories
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current conventional w isdom  surrounding such roles that w e  have  
picked up from the existing international literature
(2) A  theoretically informed understanding o f  w h y the Irish Speaker  
looks as it does T o  assist us with this question w e w ill have to seek  
answers to general questions o f  w h y institutions take on the shape 
they do
Before w e m ove on to an outlm e o f  our plan to achieve these objectives it m ay  
be useful to consider briefly tw o questions T h e first revolves around w h y  w e  
have opted to focus on the Irish Speaker, as distinct from  the Speakership in 
any other legislature or undertaking a more com parative, cross-country, 
approach The second set o f  issues w e want to address at this stage relates to 
the m ethodological approach taken m  this study
iv  The focus on Ireland
A n  obvious question is w h y the focus on the Irish case9 A n y  answer m ust deal 
w ith tw o separate but interrelated issues firstly, the reason for selecting only  
one country rather than undertaking a com parative study, and, secondly, the 
reason for sp ecifically  targeting the Irish Speaker T h e first question is
such as institutionalism
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primarily a methodological issue and we will return to why we opted for an 
in-depth case method rather than a large n study in the proceeding section on 
methodology For now we explain the choice of Ireland
One motive is the absence of research on the Irish parliament in general and 
on the Ceann Comhairle in particular By any account the Oireachtas is a 
poorly investigated body The dearth of research is evident by the fact that the 
only book-length study on the modem institution is almost half a century in 
print (McCracken 1958) Since then, no book-length research project has been 
undertaken with the exception of historical works tracing the parliaments early 
origin (Mitchell 1995) Research papers have equally been scant with only a 
handful being published 30 If we look at descriptions and analysis of the 
institutional characteristics we are left with an even deeper void In general, 
the almost total absence of research and analysis on Irish parliamentary 
institutions leave a major void to be filled
If, as is often claimed, little is known about the British Speaker even less is 
known his or her Irish counterpart The Ceann Comhairle seems to have been 
the subject of no scholarly research, or at least scholarly output In one of the 
leading textbooks on Irish politics the Ceann Comhairle is mentioned only 
three times, and on each occasion receives very little attention (Coakley & 
Gallagher 1999) In addition, the office receives little attention in other works,
such as constitutional law or administrative law texts What is known about 
the Irish speaker is, thus, very little and is based on contemporary journalistic 
accounts or what we observe from the televised proceedings of the chamber31
The one study to shed some light on the Ceann Comhairle is the comparative 
work of Jenny and Muller (1995) Using a cross-national method, they 
analysed the office of presiding officer m 18 European parliaments, including 
Ireland, as well as the looking at the President of the European Parliament 
The quantitative data used was collected as part of the Dormg project on 
parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe (Doring 1995) However, as 
we will see later, it would appear that at least some of the Irish data is 
incorrect - either because the original data was incorrect or because the coding
of the data - the quantification of what was essentially qualitative data -proved
>
too difficult a task Thus, in focusing on the Irish Speaker there is little danger 
of simply repeating what is already known - because so little is known and 
what has been written suffers from inaccuracies
In addition to filling a gap, the selection of Ireland as the focus is interesting 
because of one of the qualities of the Irish political system the fact that it 
emerged from and was essentially a copy of the Westminster model The
30 Some of the few examples include Ward (1974), O’Halpin (1985) and Arkms (1988)
311 am referring here to works such as Morgan (1997), Doolan (1994) and Casey (1992) The 
most authorative up to date work is a book chapter by Gallagher (1999)
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Republic of Ireland separated from what was the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland in 1921 following a bitter war of independence The 
particular historical events need not detain us here, save to point to the fact 
that the young state copied very closely the institutional design of the United 
Kingdom
The point here is that the Irish Speakership would seem to have its origin in 
the British Speakership Indeed, institutionally, it was to be expected that the 
offices were uniquely alike when the post-independence Irish parliament 
began its life When we collect and analyse information on how the Insh 
Speaker has evolved since then, it will make for interesting comparison with 
the modem British Speaker It provides an opportunity to understand how the 
same institution, in potentially different environments and subjected to 
potentially different stimuli, will alter, develop along similar lines or follow 
different evolutionary paths Selecting Ireland gives a unique opportunity to 
permit a form of quasi-expenmental research that should shed some light as to 
how and why institutions evolve or remain the same
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v A note on methodology
There are three major methodological issues that the reader should be aware 
of before we proceed further The first revolves around the current 
methodological orientations of legislative scholarship, the second is related to 
the type of methodology adopted in this study A third methodological issue 
concerns the specific problems of conducting empirical research on the Insh 
Speaker, although similar problems may well exist with research in other 
settings
Legislative research has a recent history of dividing into what I have 
elsewhere described as two houses one theoretical, one empirical (Martin 
2000) The theoretical approach to legislative scholarship is most evident in 
research on the United States Congress Work by political scientists such as 
Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Wemgast employs often highly abstract deductive 
modelling, seeking answers to questions such as the existence, or not, of 
majority cycles (Shepsle & Wemgast 1981) The work by these and other 
scholars, often referred to as positive political economy, is most often 
grounded m a rational-choice assumption of human behaviour This form of 
methodological individualism has become increasingly technical with 
advanced mathematical models often taking centre stage Perhaps, above all 
else, the defining feature of this approach, and the major criticism of it, is a
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lack of empirical content In other words, theories are postulated but are rarely
32subjected to any type of empirical scrutiny
On the other side of the coin is what we might think of the European political 
science tradition of legislative scholarship The defining feature here is the use 
of an inductive approach with a reliance on m-depth case description Even 
today, a large number of European scholars appear to have preference for 
what we might term 'thick descriptive' work write in detail about a case and 
on the basis of that detail reach one or more conclusions about the 
phenomenon being examined A weakness of this method is that there is often 
little descriptive, let alone causal, inference Theoiy validation is as unlikely 
as with the US school While there are certainly numerous examples of good 
legislative scholarship, the criticism of the two traditions is commonly well 
founded 33
This methodological orientation of this work builds on the strengths of both 
traditions, with an emphasis on theory building and conclusions capable of 
being generalised beyond a particular case and, in addition, the collection and 
analysis of data to inform such theory Theory-building, while perhaps never
32 For example, Green & Shapiro (1994) have attacked rational choice scholarship on the 
basis of the perceived lack of empirical success
33 In fairness it should be pointed out that this division is not limited to legislative scholarship 
and the description of the two approaches is a simplification of the reality of legislative 
scholarship Moreover evidence exists that at least some formal theorists are paymg 
increasing attention to empirical matters -I am thinking for example of the work by Cox and 
McCubbins (1993)
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totally useless, is not as valuable unless the output has been or is capable of 
being subjected to empirical scrutiny34 Equally, descriptively rich work 
should not be the end game Social scientists must be capable of extracting 
generalisations form their work This study adopts such an approach, seeking 
a proper relationship between theory advancement and empirical scrutiny
Having outlined our general attitude to methodology we turn our attention to 
the precise methods employed in this work, m particular the disadvantages 
and advantages of a single-country case study over either multiple in-depth 
case studies or large-n studies For empiricists the sophistication and validity 
of the quantitative statistical approach, usually involving causal explanation in 
the form of regression analysis, over the qualitative case method has long 
been a source of division m the social sciences Given that we employ a case 
method to test our theory, it is worth making a number of points in favour of 
this approach
It is becoming increasingly obvious that the difference between quantitative 
data and the more qualitative-type data is not, or at least need not be, as great 
as had previously been thought King et al (1994) have shown that both 
quantitative and qualitative work are capable of having the same logic of
34 As will become evident in this work we believe strongly m the need to assess empirically 
theoretical propositions However, like Cox (1999), we do acknowledge that theory- 
development m itself may have a role in progressing knowledge
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inference The difference is one of style and technique rather than anything 
more fundamental Their argument sits well, even if many of the requirements
35they prescribe to the qualitative method are unattainable But the underlying 
point remains qualitative work done properly is equally as valid, and often
36more valid, than large-n statistical studies
The approach adopted here to ensure our evidence and conclusions are as 
valid as possible is to set out empirically testable hypotheses based on our 
theory In this set of hypotheses we set out as many consequences of our 
theory as we can We try to avoid making theoretical arguments that are 
unsusceptible to the scrutiny of data Our method is less the 'soaking and 
poking’ of people like Fenno (1978), and more in keeping with scientific
t
attempts to test clearly defined arguments In summary, we review the 
existing knowledge and attempt, in the Lakatosian tradition, to improve upon 
the existing stock by developing a theoretical framework, from this deriving a 
set of empirically testable hypotheses and finally testing the hypothesis using 
unbiased data37
35 For example they seem to claim that both approaches should be capable of providing the 
same level of replication
36 Of course quantitative leaning scholars are slow to realise that even this process has a 
number of qualitative decision making points which are as likely to cause misleading 
conclusions
37 For Lakatos (1972) a theory was only useful and an advancement on knowledge if it 
explained everything that a previous theory explained plus something more
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A final methodological point relates to the hazards of collecting information 
on the Irish Speaker, an issue that may very easily extend to research on any 
other Speakership Certainly, sources such the official proceedings of Dail 
Eireann (Dail Debates) proved an excellent source of data However, a 
number of potentially interesting written and unwritten sources remain off 
limits A good example of this is the haphazard way in which the minutes of 
the Committee on Procedures and Privileges (CPP) are not available for a
38number of years
Attempts to obtain to the private papers and/or, in the case of living Ceann 
Comhairle, their own thoughts proved more mixed The private papers of the 
first Ceann Comhairle are accessible, but, for a reason unknown, little of the 
otherwise impressive collection relates to his time as Speaker39
The current officeholder, Ceann Comhairle Seamus Pattison, was good 
enough to give of his time, as were a number of parliamentarians who were 
willing to talk of their contact with and opinions of the office of Ceann 
Comhairle Although a number of these interviews yielded valuable 
information and insights, many interviewees were somewhat cautious to 
express opinions on the natures and qualities of various officeholders
38 The CPP is a parliamentary committee chaired by the Ceann Comhairle and charged with 
various matters such as amending Standing Orders, and disciplining members In Ireland 
many of its meetmgs are held in private and mmutes either not kept or not released to 
researchers
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vi The Plan of Campaign
In the second chapter we explore new-mstitutionahsm in the expectation that 
it will help us with our core question an understanding of the nature of the 
Speakership We look at the divergence between the historical/sociological 
approaches and the economic (rational-choice) approach, as well as recent 
attempts to weld the two approaches into a unified school of institutionalism 
We explain our selection of rational choice as the theoretical foundation of 
this work Then, using rational choice institutionalism as the tool of analysis, 
we develop a theory of the Speaker - our argument revolving around the 
notion of the Speakership as an asset of the majonty rather than a neutral 
arbiter
To show how this rational choice account of the Speakership differs from the 
existing understanding of the Speaker our third chapter addresses the current 
stock of comparative literature on the nature of the modem office We probe 
in detail three of the key premises m the literature the symbolic nature of the 
office, the non-partisanship of the officeholder and finally the exceptionalism 
of the American Speaker Combined, these three characteristics form what 
term the conventional wisdom surrounding the modem office We criticise 
this approach as being over simplistic, too focused on particular legislatures
39 The papers of Michael Hayes, the first Speaker of the post-independent Dail are available at 
the Archives Department, University College Dublin
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and suffering from methodological sophistication We continue to explore the 
literature with an emphasis on the origin and evolution of the institution The 
emphasis on and the key role given to historical analysis and particular 
historical events is explored and scrutinised Here again, it becomes apparent 
that something of a conventional wisdom has emerged with various authors 
concluding not just that history is important but that particular historical 
events are the explanation of why the office looks as it does Even in the case 
of American exceptionalism, specific historical events is used exclusively to 
explain the contemporary shape of the office
Chapter four sees us moving forward with our account of the Speakership We 
set out a series of hypotheses to be used to test the predictive accuracy of our 
theory These hypotheses revolve around quantifiable indicators such as the 
election of Speaker, the observed voting behaviour as well as more qualitative 
indicators of the relationship between the Speaker and the government on the 
one hand and the Speaker and opposition members on the other
Chapters five and six present and use data collected on the Irish Speaker to 
test the hypotheses Chapter five deals with the nature of the selection and 
appointment process How are the Irish Speakers elected7 Is it seen as a 
political office7 Does it enjoy the respect of all members7 In Chapter six we 
move to the performance of the Speaker once elected and examine variables
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such as their voting behaviour, evidence of partisanship in the chamber and 
post-office partisanship
In chapter seven we review our mam empirical findings and judge the success 
of our theory of the institution of Speakership We explain what we consider 
to be the most novel and interesting findings of the research We also set out 
what we consider to be the contnbutions to the field of legislative studies The 
wider implications of our findings are explored at this point These include 
what we have learnt about the motivations of politicians (potentially useful for 
exploring the assumptions m coalition theory in particular) and how the re- 
evaluation of the Speaker may help our currently weak understanding of the 
executive dominance of the legislature Finally, we look to the future and need 
for further theoretically-informed comparative research on the Speaker and on 
legislative institutions more generally
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Chapter II: A Rational Choice Institutionalism Framework
i Introduction
While it was not always the case, contemporary political science is laden with 
research on institutions The research addresses questions such as the origin of 
institutions, the causes of change or stability over time, and an understanding of their 
consequences The pre-eminent theoretical approach used to explore such questions is 
new institutionalism As a paradigm, new institutionalism has taken political science 
by storm m recent years, and the intensity of interest m the approach shown little sign 
of abating (Lane & Ersson 2000) Given that our interest is in an institution (the office 
of Speaker), it seems sensible to explore how the new institutionalist theory could aid 
our exploration of the office
The goal of this chapter is to see if, and hopefully how, a new institutionalist 
framework can help us understand better the institution of Speaker It is a validation 
of this account that will occupy our attention in most of the subsequent chapters But 
the new institutionalist approach has its critics Indeed, new institutionalists 
themselves are frequently divided on a number of issues These divisions are so 
strong that it is perhaps more accurate to speak of new institutionalism as little more
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than an umbrella for, at least, two very different and competmg schools 1 For reasons 
explained later we will favour the use of the rational choice strand over what could be 
termed the more historical-sociological wing of new institutionalism Consequently 
our account of the Speaker will follow what we might term a rational-choice 
institutionalist perspective However, here again, it would be wrong to suggest that 
the utilisation of this approach is unproblematic As we will see, challenging the 
approach we use here has been something of a growth industry in the social sciences 
in recent years Within political science rational-choice (institutionalism) is the 
subject of much, and occasionally profound, debate A defence of the paradigm must 
preface any use of the rational choice institutionalist approach
This chapter proceeds as follows In section one we describe the new institutionalist 
turn in political science In section two we set out our reasons for employing a 
rational choice framework which must include a defence of rational choice new 
institutionalism This will include an exploration of and response to the main 
criticisms of the approach that have been made by others This enables us to move in 
part three to our elaboration of a rational choice account of the Speaker
1 Peters (1999) provides a fairly comprehensive introduction to the area of new institutional theory For 
general introductions and surveys, see also, Lane & Ersson (2000), Goodin (1996) and Cortell & 
Peterson (2001) Seminal works spanning the main areas include, March & Olsen (1996) Shepsle 
(1989) and Steinmo et al (1992) Williamson (2000), Gills (2001) and Hodgson (2001) provide an 
interesting review of new institutional economics
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ii The institutionalist turn
Most disciplines and adventures in knowledge advancement have a biography and the 
study of politics is no different Within political science the story of the changing 
attitudes towards institutions would form a large part of any such biography 
Institutions, as focuses of attention, were rising high as the discipline developed up to 
and including the first half of the twentieth century but dipping almost to the point of 
non-existence with the development of behavioural revolution The last two decades 
has seen interest in institutions rise to all-time highs with their ’rediscovery', 
conventionally dated as beginning sometime m the mid-1980s
Understanding our appreciation of, and attitude towards, institutions requires an 
understanding of the shifting paradigms within political science While somewhat 
over-simplistic, the study of politics has its origins in two very different camps one 
moral philosophy, the second a more legalistic/constitutionalist tradition A large 
proportion of the study of politics (whether or not it deserved to have the word 
science included in its title) was about rules and regulations The 
legalistic/constitutionalist tradition was primarily concerned with the study of such 
formal institutions and rules In such studies an account and understanding of history 
played a crucial part In terms of methods little divided historians from scholars of 
politics What we might now refer to as old-institutionalism was the bedrock of the
2 The account provided here is based on Susser (1991)
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discipline and the work of scholars was to describe (often in great detail) the 
institutional features that they observed
The behavioural revolution which hit the discipline in the 1960s, m the aftermath of 
the second world war, and affected the US discipline most strongly of all was 
essentially a revolt against the idea that an understanding of the formal institutions 
and rules equated to an understand the political system In the behavioural era politics 
was seen as being about human behaviour as much as about institutions and 
constitutions But the behavioural revolution was as much about methodological 
changes as it was about dropping the interest in institutions The way to make the 
study of politics more scientific was to borrow methods from the natural sciences At 
the forefront of this transition was the idea of methodological individualism This 
shift gravitated attention to the individual as the unit of analysis Human behaviour 
became the focus of interest and m so doing sidelined interest in institutions to the 
point where they were essentially ignored
Behaviourism however was later subjected to much the same criticism as old 
institutionalism and these criticisms eventually saw the emergence of the rational 
choice approach as an alternative paradigm As Elster (2000) notes, rational choice 
theory yet again revolutionised the study of politics, particularly American politics It 
has taken much longer for this paradigm to spread outside the Umted States Modem 
political science continues to be divided on the merits of the approach It could be
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contended that much of the criticism (and indeed some of the praise) stems from a 
lack of understanding of what constitutes rational choice theory or what rational 
choice theory claims to achieve.
At a basic level all rational choice scholarship revolves around a specific assumption 
of human behaviour: namely that individuals act rationally. As to what is meant by 
rationality there is much confusion and often little agreement. While various 
definitions of rationality abound, Zafirovski (2000) captures the crucial point:
in a nutshell, the rational choice model is premised on 
the idea of social agents as rational utility optimisers, 
for it takes as its central core the idea that persons act 
rationally to satisfy preferences, or to maximise utility.
Applied to research arenas such as legislatures, the aim of this approach is to 
understand and explain the behaviour of individuals. Their motivations and actions 
were studied by a generation of rational choice scholars interested in understanding 
how the United States Congress worked. Scholars such as William Riker convinced a 
generation of the benefit of an economic approach and the application of economic 
reasoning to political processes and political outcomes.3 In such rational choice
3 Rational choice political science is seen as having its origins in the transfer of economic methodology 
to the study of politics. Although subtle differences exist rational choice within political science is 
often referred to by such terms as public choice, positive political theory or the economic approach to
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accounts institutions were seen as playing no role and to all intents and purposes were 
ignored
Yet the application of social choice theory to political phenomenon such as voting in 
the legislative arena proved extremely problematic Kenneth Arrow's impossibility 
theorem, which won for him the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, was a central 
puzzle Arrow found that majorities cycled and consequently majorities were 
inherently unstable (Arrow, 1963) For any hypothetical policy position there exists a 
set of alternatives that command a majority of votes against it This outcome, far from 
being a once off or unique occurrence, was proven to be a general case under certain 
simple assumptions But here was the paradox within legislatures majority rule was 
common The deductive theory seemed to fail to account for what was easily 
observable in the legislatures of the world Majority rule existed and proved highly 
stable over time This was easily gleaned from the floor and in the committee rooms 
of the US Congress (Shepsle 1989)
Today scholars realise that the missing element was the role and impact of 
institutions Yet in a research tradition which ignored institutions it took almost a 
generation to recognise that institutional arrangements had consequences Kenneth 
Shepsle and Barry Weingast (1982) were among the first to link the existence of
politics Likewise rational choice new institutionalism is closely associated with NIE (new institutional 
economics) On the impact of William Riker, see Amadae & Bueno de Mesquita (1999)
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majority stability to the institutional and organisational characteristics of the US 
Congress
The key insight which we elaborate is that majority 
rule is not self-implementmg - there is no 'majority rule 
machine' into which we feed preferences and out of 
which comes outcomes Rather, there is a complex 
series of institutional arrangements underpinning the 
operation of majority rule legislatures4
Such discoveries heralded the arrival of what we now refer to as new institutionalism 
rational choice 5 Like rational choice before it, new-institutionalism mirrored turns in 
economic sciences in particular and m the social sciences more generally 6
Our account of the emergence of new institutionalism gives the impression that 
political science is a unified discipline - but this is not so The preceding account of 
the discipline is heavily geared towards the North American discipline The 
intellectual history of European political science is very different Although 
somewhat of a simplification it is certainly plausible to suggest that European 
political science never lost sight of institutions, but neither did it embrace fully the 
many positive features of the behaviour revolution or the theoretical rigour brought 
by the rational choice approach
4 Shepsle & Weingast (1982 367)
5 The rise of new institutionalism more generally is associated with the work of March & Olson 
(1994) which pre-dates the rise of rational choice institutionalism
6 At least we were lead to believe by Shepsle’s (1989) quoting of the President of the Royal Economic 
Society that by 1986 ’the economics of institutions has become one of the liveliest areas of our 
discipline' (Matthews, 1986, 903) But as Williamson (2000 595) has recently pomted out 'such a 
pronouncement was a surprise to most of the profession'
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Even today, the approach many European scholars take to the study politics bears a 
remarkable resemblance to old institutionalism Accounts of a thick-descriptive nature 
are frequently the order of the day While many European-based scholars could be 
rightly identified as belonging to the new institutionalist school, equally as many are 
followers of the old-institutionalist questions and methods 7 Despite such transatlantic 
differences in focus and method, we are nevertheless all institutionalists now But 
what exactly is the new institutionalism of the 1990s7
Whether in the United States or Europe new institutionalism shares with what I have 
previously termed old institutionalism a fundamental belief that institutions matter 
They matter because far from being neutral they affect outcomes They have, in the 
language of economics, distributive consequences
Some, but certainly not all, forms of new institutionalism have a preference for 
formal deductive methods often involving mathematical modelling This is in sharp 
contrast to the descriptive basis of old institutionalism The aim is to generalise 
beyond single cases or institutions rather than provide a detailed account and 
description of specific institutional features
A more fundamental divide exists within new institutionalism Any understanding of 
the new-institutionalist approach must come to terms with the divide that exists
7 This is a controversial point and is based on the idea that the real division between old and new 
institutionalism is a methodological one For some evidence to support this see Martin (2000)
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between the economic/rational choice strand and what we might think of as the 
historical/sociological strand. Despite recent attempts to marry the two, they 
nevertheless continue to exist as quiet separate ways of seeing the world, even if both 
agree that institutions matter.8 We do advocate the rational-based perspective on 
institutional analysis. However, and in particular given the attempt to marry the two 
approaches, it is important to say something about the historical/sociological strands.
At the core of historical institutionalism is the idea that institutions are historical 
creatures and, consequently, are best explained as the product of specific historical 
phenomena. This brand of institutionalism is heavily influenced by the Durkheim 
tradition in sociology, and in particular the idea of socialisation. People are best 
understood not as individuals, but as socialised animals whose world is a social 
construct. Our understanding of the world and the institutions which shape it are 
learned and embraced - actors are conditioned over time rather than being 
independent utility maximisers, as the rational choice scholars would have us believe. 
Terms such as roles and routines are the backbone of this approach. Because of this, 
institutions are understood as being little more than patterns of behaviour. These 
patterns are determined by sociological and cultural factors. Historical/sociological 
institutionalism focuses on the question of institutional origin and continuity as 
explained by reference to group norms and the power of socialisation. 
Methodologically, the thinking is inductive rather than deductive and case studies are
8 A good example of a recent attempt to show how the two approaches can be combined is the work of 
N0rgaard (1996).
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seen as the best way to understand institutional origin and consequence There is no 
grand theory of institutional consequence 9
Rational Choice Institutionalism is, at its most basic, the marriage of two 
assumptions the first that institutions matter, the second that individuals are rational 
in their decision making Unlike the historical and sociological strands the rational 
choice tradition rejects the idea that institutions have cultural or sociological bases 
Rather, institutions are the consequence of strategic decisions by players Once 
established they determine, constrain and generally structure preferences Rational 
choice institutionalism can be seen, not as an alternative to the rational paradigm, but 
as an obvious next-step in the process of understanding the choice behaviour of 
individuals At a minimum rational actors are bounded by institutions, ultimately we 
may have to look to the choice of actors to explain the origin, continuity and 
contemporary nature of an institution 10
Consequently we regard rational choice institutionalism as being a by-product, or 
development, of classical rational choice and for this reason we need to explore more 
closely rational choice theory 11 In the rational choice new institutionalist framework, 
it is the former (the economic basis) rather than the latter (institutions matter) that
9 A good example of this approach within legislative studies is the work of Searing (1994)
10 To clarify we perceive the difference between rational-choice theory and rational choice 
institutionalism as being an acknowledgement by the former that institutions matter
11 For these reasons the reader might wonder why we do not use the term rational choice rather than 
rational choice new institutionalism While we agree it may be more appropriate to stick with the 
general term rational choice we follow the convention m the discipline of using the term rational
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seems to be more frequently questioned. Let us look at and respond to such criticism, 
remembering that we are justifying rational choice to allow us use it as a framework 
to understand better the office of Speaker.
iii. In defence of rational choice (new institutionalism)
Rational Choice is deeply controversial and consequently its merits and flaws 
continue to be the subject of much debates. Criticisms are numerous but tend to 
revolve around three inter-related issues. The first is that the basic assumption that 
people behave in a rational manner is flawed. The second point, and one which may 
or may not be seen as a direct consequence of the first, is that rational choice theory 
lacks empirical content. The third contention is that rational-choice theorists are 
overly eager to indulge in what we might think of as a form of post-hoc theorising, in 
an attempt to’ correct’ the empirical shortcomings of the theory. Proponents argue that 
each of these three criticisms is unfounded and further justify the use of rational 
choice because they argue it is the best tool currently available. We will consider each 
in turn starting with the attack on the very notion of rationality.
Are people rational?
choice new institutionalism to describe the theory formed by a bringing together of rational choice and 
institutionalism.
43
The idea of economic man is borrowed from neo-classical economic thinking and has 
enjoyed a somewhat uneasy ride within political science The assumption is simple 
people make choices in line with their preferences Many believe that such an 
assumption is flawed and argue that people do not abide by such requirements when 
making decisions Put simply if I prefer apples over oranges and am offered an apple 
or orange, then, other things being equal, I will choose an apple To do otherwise 
would be irrrational Three requirements are attached that of completeness, 
transitivity, and probability distribution Completeness requires that the various 
options from which I am selecting should be comparable One could not, for example, 
be expected to make a rational choice between attending a football match or 
achieving world peace The second assumption of transitivity requires that if I prefer 
A to B and B to C then I must prefer A to C The third requirement of efficient 
probability distribution comes into play when we encounter uncertainty about the 
effective of our decisions Our actions are related to outcomes by a set of probabilities 
and rationality requires that such probabilities form part of our calculations in 
reaching a decision Although each of these assumptions is open to criticism, they are 
generally accepted and have not been the source of criticism from the anti-rational 
choice camp
The above definition of rationality is sometimes criticised as being too soft Some 
proponents of rational choice apply a more difficult or stronger criteria for behaviour 
to be rational They argue that choices must be objectively rational, by which they
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mean that the ranking of preferences must have meaning There must be some reason 
for a person to prefer tea to coffee However, whatever definition of rationality we 
use, the bottom line is that opponents argue that people are not rational They point 
less to the definitional requirements for rationality and more to the observed 
behaviour of individuals As we already mentioned this point is closely tied up with 
the problem of empirical content
The empirical success of rational choice theories
An obvious source of pleasure for those who do not share the cornerstone assumption 
of the rational school is the poor empirical performance of rational choice theories 
across a broad range of applications The publication of Pathologies of Rational 
Choice Theory, a book deeply critical of the whole approach, claims to be full of 
examples of how few of the new propositions which rational choice claims to have 
introduced to the study of politics has stood the test of data 12 In particular Green and 
Shapiro (1994), like many others, focus on what Fiorina (1989) called the 'paradox 
that ate rational choice ' The paradox is worth considering because it is highlighted, 
not just as a case of rational choice performing weakly, but as an example of the third 
problem (namely what people see as the inappropriateness of methods used by 
rational scholars to save the theory)
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The key questions revolved around the question of whether a rational voter will ever 
vote7 The most basic economic models of voting behaviour can be reduced to a cost- 
benefit analysis if the benefit of voting exceeds the costs of voting then a voter will 
vote If it does not then a voter will not choose not to vote On most accounts the 
costs of voting are low and can be accounted for under headings such as time taken to 
physically attend at and cast a vote, having to do research to find out which candidate 
or party to support and so on However, seen in such a way, the rational benefit of 
voting seems extremely weak One can think of the rational benefit of voting to be the 
benefit to oneself of having one candidate or party win an election But we must 
include in any equation the likelihood that ones' participation in the voting will 
change the election And this probability is extremely low
Laver (1997) points out that he is not aware of any general election, the result of 
which has hinged on one vote Even m the 2000 US Presidential Election, where the 
result was considered very close, it was never claimed that just one vote could make a 
difference Because the probability of your vote making a difference to the outcome, 
even if that outcome would be of consequences for you, the benefit of voting is seen 
as minuscule Thus, the clear prediction of classical rational choice theory is that 
people will not vote Yet in every general election we observe people voting The
12 Donald Green and Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory was published in 1994 and 
has since become something of compulsory reading for both proponents and opponents of the choice 
approach
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theory, no matter how mathematically well defined and logically consistent is not 
validated by what we observe in real life
The reaction of the red-faced rational choice camp does little to aid their quest for 
respect among the doubters The mam criticism of the latter in this regard is the 
willingness of the choice camp to indulge in what we might think of as post-hoc 
theorising having tested the theory and found the theory faulty, play around with the 
parameters of the model until it fits the data Those opposing rational choice often 
claim that this regrettable practice is exactly what rational choice scholars have done 
And it is certainly true that in the case of the voter turnout model the various attempts 
to correct the model have been based on adjusting the benefits, and to a lesser degree 
the costs of voting, until the expected utility of voting change from a negative to a 
positive 13
Cox (1999) criticises what he considers to be Green and Shapiro’s focus on the 
rational choice models which are either notonously theoretical or well established as 
being the worst examples of an empirically successful rational choice Cox further 
replies to the argument that rational choice lacks empirical content by pomting to 
other areas where the theory has both contributed novel ideas and has been 
empirically successful Within legislative studies examples of successful and good 
research practice include, but are not limited to, the work by Cox and McCubbins 
(1993) on a party-model of congress, Huber (1996) on the institutional mechanisms
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of the legisalture under the French Fifth Republic and the work by Tsebelis and 
Money (1997) using the theory of the core to better understand the nature of 
bicameralism Far from lacking empirical content rational choice theory has advanced 
a number of novel and empirically successful middle-range theories of politics
This raises a crucial point Modem rational choice scholarship is capable of accepting 
that not all aspects of politics is capable of being understood from a rational 
perspective But this is not to say that many areas of politics cannot be Rational 
choice theory has become less a universal theory capable of explaining every aspect 
of human behaviour and more a middle-level theory useful for explaining certain 
political phenomena Consequently it may be useful to think of the rational choice 
approach as consisting of a way of viewing the world which acts as a tool for an 
exploration of part of that world
Moving from criticisms of rational choice, proponents of this approach argue that, 
whatever its empirical limitations, rational choice theory is the most successful 
hypothetico-deductive theory As Cox (1999 160) points out in defence of the 
approach
Theories are conventionally valued not just for their 
ability to generate predictions that survive empirical 
testing but also for their parsimony, rigor and 
generality
13 Such attempts include Overbye (1995) and Bufacchi (2001)
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Shepsle (1995) m his reply to criticisms of rational choice has pointed to this fact, f 
claiming that rational choice is, while certainly not perfect, the best available theory 
of human behaviour For all the criticism no other theory approaches the predictive 
ability while maintaining the same or near levels of rigour and generalisability This 
defence of rational choice theory Shepsle calls the 'first law of wmg walking' - don’t 
let go of what you have until you find something better to hold onto (Shepsle 1995 
217) Cox (1999) makes the same point about rational choice, relying on the 
Lakatosian notion of advancement in scientific knowledge 14
In concluding our defence of rational choice framework we accept that a large 
proportion of the discipline feel somewhat uneasy with the method As we said, 
rational choice theory is not, and should not be sold as being, a universal theory of 
human behaviour It is however a useful tool to provide a middle-range theory of 
certain political phenomenon On that basis alone we feel comfortable using the 
choice framework
There is a second and entirely different justification for using rational-choice 
institutionalism as the framework or tool with which to analysis the Speaker As we 
will see in Chapter Three the methods used to derive the existing stock of knowledge 
of the Speaker can be most clearly associated with the old institutionalist approach
14 For Lakatos (1970) a theory was validated only when it explained everything that has been explained 
by an existing theory and in addition adding explaining something extra
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Our rational choice institutionalist framework is therefore a novel approach to the 
Speakership Employing a very different approach could be considered beneficial in 
itself, regardless of the empirical success that it bnngs Certainly we hope and expect 
to achieve a positive empirical assessment of our rational choice approach, but 
regardless, we are happy in the knowledge that we have attempted to progress by 
employing a very different approach than used previously Armed with our 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the rational choice tool we now 
proceed to examine the office of Speaker from that perspective
vn A theory of the Speaker
In this section we develop a rational choice interpretation of the office of Speaker 
We first identify a set of players and their motivations These motivations are taken 
from existing research in the area of legislative studies on the preferences of political 
actors We then show how these goals and preferences can be related to the office of 
Speaker What emerges is the suggestion that, given the motivations of political 
actors, and our observations on the distributional consequences of controlling the 
Speakership, the office can be viewed as an asset - either for the governing party, 
opposition and/or the individual who holds the post
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Identifying actors & goals
Our first task is to identify different players and their motivations In game theory 
these are related usually to each other and indeed we identify the various actors on the 
basis of their motivations While there are numerous actors who are involved with, or 
impacted by, the Office of Speaker, we limit our analysis to three groups the 
government, the opposition and the individual who holds the position of Speaker 
These groups are defined quiet broadly The government is taken to be the party or 
coalition of parties who form what is generally recognised as the executive The 
opposition comprises the party or parties who are not m government Given that the 
party composition of government tends to revolve, even in dominant party systems, it 
is worth pointing out that the goals of a political party will differ, depending on 
whether or not they are in government This should not cause us too many problems 
as the timeframe is best thought of as being the lifetime of a parliament between 
general elections It should be noted however, that in a dominant party system, the 
timeframe could, and perhaps should, be considered to be longer given that the 
opposition party knows it is less likely to be in office after any subsequent general 
election
A second point of clarification is that two of the players (the government and 
opposition) are not unitary actors They are composed of individuals who 
collectively, through some predetermined and well-established process, reach binding 
decisions However the motivation of the various members may vary, a backbencher
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may, for example, have a different set of preferences to the party leadership Here we 
follow the approach of Laver & Schofield (1990) who m dealing with the motivations 
of parties note that even if political parties are not unitary actors they behave as if 
they are
Let us comment on the goals that could be ascribed to each of these players Here we 
draw on a well-developed set of writing on the motivation of political parties and 
individual parliamentarians
We assume that parliamentarians and political parties are motivated in part by a 
desire to make public policy and m party by a desire to gam and retain office The 
latter of these is generally referred to as the office-seeking thesis and makes the 
assumption that the mam goal of politicians is to retain elected office (re-election) 
and once elected to be the party of government rather than the party of opposition 
Office is seen as bringing with it very tangible benefits such as a higher salary, certain 
side benefits such as a ministerial car and m addition a certain prestige or power 
associated with political office The office-seeking thesis would claim that politicians 
are not particularly interested m changing public policy
On the other hand the policy-seeking thesis emphasises that politicians are motivated 
above all else by a desire to effect such change It is argued that those holding 
political office are interested in office not as a means in itself but as a tool and 
mechanism with which to influence policy While gaining office is an important goal
52
in the policy-seeking thesis, the key point is that this is not an end in itself. Getting 
into office is instrumental; it is used to achieve a greater goal, namely influencing 
public policy.
While scholars continue to debate which of these two thesis is the most accurate, 
most have now came to an acceptance that parliamentarians and political parties have 
multiple goals which incorporates elements of both the office-seeking and the policy- 
seeking thesis.15 Thankfully for us we can proceed while agreeing that the 
motivations of the players can have elements of both policy, office for policy and a 
simpler desire to be in office. We can simply say that each political party is interested 
in (1) getting into and staying in government (2) effecting public policy. Individual 
parliamentarians are interested in (1) being re-elected (2) holding high office (3) 
contributing to changing public policy.
How these motivations will express themselves will differ on the basis of whether or 
not the political party is in Government. For the Government parties the motivation is 
to stay in office, for the opposition parties it is to ensure they are in office as soon as 
possible. The government is interested in its legislative agenda, the opposition party is 
interested in opposing the government's legislative agenda and performance and in 
championing its own policies to the embarrassment of the government.
15 For the original analysis of different models of party motivation see Riker (1962) on the office- 
seeking party and Axelrod (1970) on the policy-motivated party. More recently, it has been argued that 
policy motivation should be seem as a complement to office-seeking motivation (see, for example 
Smith & Remington, 2000).
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The legislative arena is an important forum for the playing out of these motivations It 
is not just the institutions where the government is formed, it also controls the success 
of the executive's legislative agenda, the success of the opposition's attempts to 
oppose and ultimately it can determine the life span of the government and influence 
the decision of the electorate m a general election
The Speaker as a prized Office
The Office of Speaker, although being held m high regard, is rarely seen as a prize in 
the literature 16 While much of coalition theory discusses the practical benefits 
bestowed on a member who becomes a junior or cabinet minister, the Speakership is 
rarely seen in such light But there seems little reason to consider the office of 
Speaker as being any less attractive than a cabinet post in terms of pure office-seeking 
benefits In Ireland, for example, the Ceann Comhairle draws the same salary as a 
cabinet minister and enjoys the same benefits-in-kmd such as a state car and driver 17
In many ways the Speaker receives many more benefits from his office than a cabinet 
minister does His tenure is much more secure than that of a cabinet minister 
Speakers are rarely changed during the life of a parliament Even where governments
16 This will be come evident in Chapter Three
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change during a parliament (as happened in Ireland in 1994) the Ceann Comhairle 
continues in office If one wants a secure office then the Speakership offers greater 
security
This point becomes even stronger in the Irish case where the Constitution provides 
for the Ceann Comhairle to be automatically returned as a Member of Parliament at 
the subsequent general election The Ceann Comhairle then is not only secure in his 
own office but is secure in the knowledge that he will be a member even after a 
general election Given that re-election is seen as the first priority of any 
parliamentarian one cannot underestimate the practical benefit of automatic re- 
election
In addition to this the position, which the Speaker must undertake, would appear, at 
least to the casual observer, to be less demanding than the role of a government 
mimster While cabinet ministers must come to terms with their new portfolio and 
withstand the attacks from the opposition parties and other groups the Ceann 
Comhairle enjoys a more relaxed lifestyle While the work of the latter may be more 
daunting than we would imagine it nevertheless is relatively peaceful For the Ceann
17 Interview with Ceann Comhairle Pattison
18 Article 16 6 of the Constitution states that 'Provision shall be made by law to enable the member of 
Dciil Eireann who is the Chairman immediately before a dissolution of Dail Eireann to be deemed 
without any actual election to be elected a member of D&il Eireann at the ensuing general election' 
This is a rather unique arrangement by international standards with most Speakers having to seek re- 
election as a member of parliament
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Comhairle a typical week consists of four days 19 During those four days he will 
usually be present to preside over the house, although he shares this task with his 
deputy The working day of the current Ceann Comhairle commences around 9am 
when he is briefed by his private secretary and Clerk of the Dail on any important 
issues His morning is kept free to deal with constituency issues and to meet any 
international visiting delegations to the Irish Parliament From approximately 11 am 
the Ceann Comhairle presides over the plenary session The practice is for the Ceann 
Comhairle and Leas Ceann Comhairle to rotate every one-hour An attempt no doubt 
to relieve the frequently bormg nature of parliamentary debate The administrative 
activities of the legislature are taken care of by a team of officials and the Ceann 
Comhairle, more often than not, simply signs what his trusted officials put before 
him The only strain is the unsociable hours that the Ceann Comhairle usually keeps 
when the House is sitting late The workload is not burdening enough, for example, to 
ever activate the panel of assistant chairmen that the Standing Orders allow for These 
are reserved for cases when the Ceann Comhairle and Leas Ceann Comhairle are 
unavailable
Our point here is simple It would seem that from an office-seeking perspective the 
Speakership is highly appealing The Ceann Comhairle receives practically all the 
'perks1 of a minister with greater job security and the benefit of automatic re-election 
These benefits come with few of the costs associated with being a minister - in
19 Again the information on the Ceann Comhairle m this section comes from an interview with Ceann 
Comhairle Pattison
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particular the heavy workload and long working day often associated with being a 
cabinet minister
Our key proposition which we take from all this is that we would expect parties and 
individual parliamentarians to covet the Speakership for the benefits it bestows upon 
the holder
The Speaker as an asset of government
Such benefits as described above are bestowed upon one individual - the Member of 
Parliament fortunate enough to be elected Speaker If we think of political parties as 
agents attempting to win such offices for their elite it is possible to equate a similar 
motivation to the political party In other words a political party will, cetens paribus, 
prefer to see one of its members achieving the benefits of the office
However, political parties may be interested in the office for other and, to them, 
potentially more important reason This reason is that the office of Speaker has what 
we might term distributional consequences that may assist or hinder political parties 
in the achieving of their goals Such distributional consequences impact on the ability 
of the government to govern and the ease with which the opposition can oppose Let
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us look at some examples with particular reference to the Irish case, but drawing upon 
the powers and influence that most Speakers have over their respective legislatures
Although the office is often regarded as having a primarily symbolic role (more on 
this in Chapter three), our argument is that the Speaker, far from being an irrelevance, 
can be of great assistance to either of the two players, the government or the 
opposition
The Speaker is not just not just presiding officer of the chamber but also frequently 
serves as the administrative head of the legislature Although day-to-day management 
of the affairs of parliament may be delegated to an administrative team the Speaker 
nonetheless frequently retain overall control of the organisation and its sub­
departments The Speaker may well have control over the budget and the allocation of 
it to various sections Such allocations may effect the effectiveness of the legislature 
We have only to compare the well-resourced research resources and staff available to 
some legislatures to the almost total absence of such resources at the disposal of Irish 
parliamentarians It would seem not over presumptuous to suggest that the greater the 
resources available to individual parliamentarians the better will such 
parliamentarians be able to hold the government to account We can see here an 
immediate interest that a government would have in ensuring that the resources 
available to legislatures are limited
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As presiding officer, the Speaker is responsible for the conduct of debate As anyone 
who ever attended a meeting is likely to testify, having a chairperson who is 
favourable to one side over another can be a great advantage While a chair is often
i
expected and indeed required to be neutral, it is only human nature to expect that their 
preferences and beliefs may partly guide their reaction to what is unfolding in front of 
them The Speaker may well have enough leeway to allow, for example, the 
discussion of certain matters, or may choose to rule such discussions inappropriate 
For a government eager to appear competent and effective and shying away from 
criticism the decision of the Speaker on what to allow be debates is very crucial A 
sympathetic Speaker can make the life of the government easier by maintaining the 
debate in such a way as to render absolutely futile attempts by the opposition parties 
to question it
The possibility of the Speaker impacting on the government and opposition seems to 
be evident m practice The observer of the daily order of business in the Irish 
Parliament will attest to this The opposition parties will try to embarrass the 
government Frequently such attempts are ruled out of order by the Ceann Comhairle, 
thus saving the Government from embarrassment As one Member of Parliament 
describes it
The Ceann Comhairle protects the Government, the
opposition can only hope to embarrass the Ceann
20 Under Standing Orders the opposition parties can question the Taoiseach on matters of proposed 
legislation during the daily order of business
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Comhairle into allowing them make their point or 
alternatively create a row and [ensure] chaos so that the 
media will broadcast the whole debacle Even so 
ordinary people frequently dislike such shows and the 
government comes out the winner 21
On a whole range of issues the Speaker has leeway in deciding matters that are of 
crucial importance to the balance of power between the government and opposition 
Other such examples include the prerogative of the Speaker to close debate when they 
feel an appropriate amount of debate has occurred This often has the effect of 
preventing in Westminster-type legislatures the phenomenon, which has become 
known as filibustering on the US Congress While the Speaker may not control the 
agenda or the time allocated to members speeches he or she can prevent usually a 
member speaking if they deem the member's speech to be irrelevant to the subject 
under discussion (Back 1999)
The net effect is that the Speaker has sufficient leeway within the Standing Orders, 
precedents and rules of debate to make the life of the government easier or more 
difficult Directly related to this of course is the impact that the opposition is allowed
As with the office-seeking hypothesis, our argument here is simple We would expect 
that each side would want to own or control the Speakership because such control
21 Anon interview No 1
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would ensure certain benefits While such benefits might be subtle, they are over time 
and in certain circumstances very beneficial
Our rational choice perspective leads us to one prediction and that is that the political 
parties will seek the office of Speaker for themselves They will do so for two 
reasons the first is that they value the material benefit of the office and will use it to 
reward one of their members The second and perhaps greater benefit is that the 
Speakership is an asset for the party of coalition of parties that control the house The 
Speaker has the powers and capacity to help or hmder the government For this 
reason it is best to think of the Speaker less as a neutral officer and more as a political 
position not unlike others
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vil Conclusion
In this chapter we have suggested that new institutionalism and, in particular, what 
we might think of as rational choice institutionalism can provide a useful tool with 
which to analyse the office of Speaker Given the, often-hvely, debate about the 
appropriateness of the rational paradigm we have spent a good deal of time dealing 
with the perceived weaknesses of the rational approach, while also highlighting the 
benefits that the approach brings Rational choice, we accept, may not be a suitable 
starting point for a grand theory of human behaviour For us, the ability to set out new 
and clear expectations about the Speakership, by using rational choice theory as a 
research tool, outweighed the criticisms and weaknesses of the method
Having explained and justified our use of the rational paradigm, we then proceeded to 
developing a rational choice framework for the office of Speaker The key aspect 
which the theory enabled us to develop, that it is possible to identify interested 
players and their often-differing motivations, allowed us to view the office from a 
very different perspective Having established a possible link between such 
motivations and the benefits brought about by ownership of the Office, we concluded 
that the Speaker is an asset, which we would expect each of the various players to 
strive to obtain and keep control of
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We may have presented a simple model of the institution of Speaker, but our task 
now will be to test the empincal accuracy of such claims To do this we have 
developed a set of empirically testable hypotheses which we present in the next 
chapter and proceed to scrutinise empirically in subsequent chapters
i
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Chapter Three: The Conventional Wisdom
i Introduction
In the preceding chapter we set out our thinking on how new institutionalism, 
and m particular its rational choice strand, can help us understand better the 
office of Speaker We claimed that deploying such a theoretical orientation 
would lead to a reconsideration of much of the conventional wisdom 
surrounding the office But what is the conventional wisdom*? Without an 
examination of the current body of research and writing it would be wrong to 
claim, as we do, that our view of the Speaker is somehow new or novel In 
this chapter we provide a picture of the existing comparative research and 
scholarship on the Speaker This picture forms what we call the conventional 
wisdom We also present the reader with an overview of the historical 
development of the Irish Speakership
The sections that follow explore the work of the handful of academics, 
politicians and legislative officials who have written about the office, 
invariably in an attempt to explore the origin, development, nature or 
importance of the office As we will see this disparate group appear to be in 
broad agreement on a number of issues These commonly shared conclusions,
64
and themes running across the various works, form what one could think of as 
the current theory of the office But, because of the atheoretical nature of this 
work, we believe it more fitting to refer to the existing slate of knowledge as 
forming a conventional wisdom rather than a theory Given this claim, it 
seems only appropriate to address the methodological orientation and 
sophistication of research before getting to grips with the various themes and 
conclusions that together form the conventional wisdom in the literature We 
begin with a brief word on the focus and style of research, and progress to an 
examination of the mam pillars of the conventional wisdom, namely, the 
emphasis on the historical origin of the office, the importance of symbolism in 
the role and function of the Speaker, the neutrality thesis and the 
exceptionalism of the American case
11 The Focus and Style o f Research
At the outset it is useful to differentiate between the different perspectives 
from which people have approach the topic The vast majority of the literature 
on the Speaker has tended to follow a similar method of investigation and has 
reached similar conclusions The only exception to this has been the work on
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the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives and to a lesser 
degree work on Speaker of some United States state legislatures 1
The subject has been approached mamly from the perspective of highly 
descriptive, country-specific case studies One cannot but be impressed with 
the level of detail presented by many of the authors A good example is the 
voluminous work by Laundy (1964) on the British Speakership He provides a 
chronological description of continuity and change m the office making often- 
lengthy reference to each of the individual officeholders over a period of some 
500 years
This focus on historical detail comes at the expense of an almost total absence 
of explanatory rigour The quest to describe developments in the office does 
not lead to any general explanation of why the office developed as it did The 
nature of the work also limits the ability to generalise beyond a limited period 
of time The dedication to historical detail also ensures that institution-specific 
cases stay just that and are not developed into a comparative theory
Our knowledge of the office in particular countries at particular times often 
relies on a second source of information, the biographies or autobiographies or 
the Speakers themselves Particularly in the United Kingdom, it has becoming
1 Outside of American cases, Jenny & Muller (1995) come closest to providmg a theoretical 
underpinning to the Speakership
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increasingly common to see a biography-type volume on modem Speakers 
Such works are more interested m exploring the legacy of an individual than 
providing anything resembling an account of the office itself The picture 
painted is of the great office that previous speakers have moulded and handed 
down being taken up and carefully respected and maintained by the 
individual Such accounts in turn become a source for the academic who often 
relies on them for information and to support their own views
Both the academic works and the biographical-type material have the same 
principal advantage and disadvantage The advantage being the depth and 
richness of historic detail, the disadvantages being the over reliance on the 
authors' personal opinion, the use of anecdotal evidence and an unwillingness 
to attempt valid inference using the presented detail As we will see, the 
analysis rarely moves beyond providing a list of stylised facts based on value 
judgements more than evidence Explanatory rigour is hardly the order of the 
day The use of theory as a tool to advance our understanding of the office is 
rare to the point of being almost non-existent
From a methodological point of view, what is most sinking, and 
consequentially most alarming, is the reverential disposition held by those 
undertaking research on the office of Speaker, particularly but not exclusively
2 See, for example, Routledge (1995) on Speaker Boothroyd and the autobiography of 
Speaker Lloyd (Lloyd 1976)
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in the case of the British Speaker The office is seen as being high, above the 
normal status of competitive politics (Laundy 1984 1964) While we cannot 
be certain, this reverential disposition often appears to be ex ante - the author 
having formed his or her judgement of the office before beginning to conduct 
research on it This approach must surely cast doubt on the validity of many 
of the descriptions and conclusions that are made
The exception to this 'high-respect' is the stated belief in what we call 
'American exceptionalism'4 Scholars of the United States House of 
Representatives have a very different view of the Speaker, departing radically 
from the notion of independence from politics much attested to by European 
scholars On the occasions when other scholars have reported on the American 
Speaker, they have often done so with an element of disgust and disrespect 
bordering on the fanatic 5
Thankfully, then, we might expect the US literature to be at least impartial 
But when we explore this literature we will see a number of methodological 
problems continue, not the least of which is the focus on the personal
3 This point was made to me by a British scholar who, although not wishing to be publicly 
associated with his own comments, described much of the work on the UK Speaker as havmg 
bemg undertaken by 'pillars of society’ incapable of independent reflection
4 My apologies to those other countries that form the continent of America Here, as 
elsewhere, American Exceptional refers to the exceptionalism of the United States to the 
exclusion of countries such as Canada or Mexico
5 Singh Yadav (1982 59) for example, writes that 'under the British model the Speaker is 
expected to be apolitical - but, unfortunately this is not he case in the United States or 
Communist Countries'
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characteristics of individuals, rather than an attempt to build a solid base from 
which to set the US experience in a comparative context
From a purely methodological point of view, we are entitled to have cause for 
concern The focus on description, the failure to deploy theory or to generalise 
beyond a specific case, and the importance of personal opinion place a 
question mark over whatever it is that these studies may or may not conclude 
What will emerge below is a picture of research in need of greater 
generalisation and explanatory rigour We will see how normative-based 
thinking and perception-based analysis leaves a lot to be desired
The descriptive studies, which we must rely on for an understanding of the 
office, do seem to reach a number of commonly shared conclusions and it is to 
these that we now turn In particular, three themes dominate the literature 
firstly the focus on historical ongm Secondly the 'high' nature and 
characteristics of the modem office including an account of the role and 
functions of the Speaker The third theme to emerge from the existing 
literature is that of American exceptionalism We will deal with each of these 
themes in turn
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in For King or Parliament The Historical Origin
Although the British House of Commons is predated in age by other 
legislatures, it is seen as being the mother of all Parliaments and, perhaps 
more importantly for us, the parliament seen as responsible for the office of 
Speaker A number of works have drawn attention to the early origin of the 
Office and claim, implicitly or explicitly, that the events of this period are 
crucial to understanding the current office While the origin may be of interest 
in and of itself, a greater significance is the fact that this early history is seen 
as having shaped the modem office To appreciate this we are taken back to a 
period in British History where the King of England and the Commoners (a 
body of men who were wealthy taxpayers) were embroiled in a fight for 
executive control6 The King wanted to retain his authority but was financially 
dependent on the Commoners The Commoners on the other hand were 
attempting to wrestle power away from the monarchy and towards their own 
assembly
It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly a representative of the Commoners 
emerged in any recognisable form Some argue that the office can be traced as 
far back as 1258 The year 1376 is recognised as an important date m the 
emergence of a Speaker among the Commoners In that year it was recorded
6 Except where otherwise stated this well recognised account is taken from Laundy (1964) 
and Marsden (1979)
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that one of the commoners, Sir Peter de la Mere, was given a presiding role 
over the debates and a role in communicating with outside bodies
Because the said Sir Peter de la Mere had 
spoken so well and had so wisely repeated the 
arguments and opinions of his colleagues, and 
because he had told them much that they did not 
know, they begged him to take responsibility for 
expressing their wishes in the great Parliament 
before the said Lords 7
Other parliamentary historians identify the emergence of the British Speaker 
with the appointment of Sir Thomas Hungerford, chosen in 1377 Hungerford 
was certainly the first to hold the title ’Speaker' Even if they are the subject of 
scholarly debate, the precise dates are not of great interest to us here What is 
more interesting is an understanding of the role and function played by the 
first Speakers
The original function of the Speaker seems to have been as the mouthpiece of
the Commons before the King It was not appropriate for the King and
assembly of Commoners ever to meet and consequently the need for a 
messenger developed It is generally agreed that initially the Speaker's role 
was to communicate with the King on behalf of the Commons rather than vice 
versa Such communication would have comprised resolutions of the
7 Quoted m Bailey (1964 61)
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emerging parliament as well as expressions of grievances to the King In 
every imaginable way then, the Speaker was the servant of the House, not the 
servant of the King However, this was to change with the shifting balances of 
power between King and Parliament over the subsequent years
The first signs of a change in the role of Speaker from representative of the 
Parliament before the King to the representative of the King in Parliament 
came as early as the late 1300s when Speaker Bussy declared himself a 
servant of King Richard II The records show how he made no secret of his 
desire or belief that the Commons should be subservient to the Monarchy 
However, the impact of individual Speakers during this time must take 
account of the short tenure that most enjoyed The term of office was set at 
one year, but few even made it this far8 It is not difficult to understand why 
the Speaker shifted his loyalty to the monarchy when we recall how most 
individual parliamentarians deferred to the King and consequently to the type 
of Speaker which the King favoured
For those earlier Commoners were obsequious 
to a degree unimaginable today, constantly on 
their knees in the presence of royalty, insisting 
on their utter inferiority and choosing as their
8 Indeed the job was considered so dangerous as many members desired not to undertake the 
role The still existing tradition of a newly elected Speaker being dragged to the chan- by a 
handful of members is rooted in history where on more than one occasion a new Speaker 
struggled agamst being forced into the chan*
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’mouth1 a man who could express better than his 
fellows the kind of grovelling sycophancy that 
kept bloodthirsty kings quiet and reasonably 
happy 9
The Speaker was not alone a fearful agent of the Parliament but potentially a 
fearful agent of the King, given the responsibilities of managing the affairs of 
the Monarch in Parliament For the sake of his mortality, the Speaker had to 
walk a very fine line between upsetting the Commoners (who had the power 
to remove him) and the King (who could have him charged with treason, an 
offence which brought with it the certainty of execution)
The most significant events in the early development of the Speaker came 
during the English Civil War King Charles I, like so many of his 
predecessors, found himself engaged in a struggle with parliament During his 
reign, two particular events are seen as re-establishing the Speaker as a 
servant of the parliament rather than as a master of it on behalf of the 
monarchy
The first is when Charles ordered Speaker Sir John Finch (Speaker from 1627- 
1628) to adjourn Parliament in an attempt to render it temporarily inoperable 
The decision to adjourn is a matter for the House following a motion being put 
by the Speaker On putting the motion, members shouted ’No' and
9 Marsden (1979 95)
73
consequently the motion to adjourn should have been lost But Charles had 
ordered Finch to leave the chair if any attempt was made to continue with 
business When Finch signalled his intent to stand down, a number of 
members rushed forward and restrained him form rising from the chair It was 
demanded that he put a number of motions to the House, something he did 
even if much to his disagreement ?I will not say I will not, but I dare not' 
Laundy (1964) hold this particular event as marking the beginning of a 
process that would culminate in the Speaker emerging as a servant of the 
House rather than any other interest
A second and more celebrated occurrence that is seen as breaking the link 
between the King and Speaker occurred under Speaker William Lenthall 
Faced with increasing demands for higher taxes from the King and attempts to 
usurp their powers, a number of members rebelled against Charles In an 
attempt to end the revolt, Charles marched on Parliament with some 400 
soldiers and demanded that the ringleaders be handed over Charles forced his 
way into the Chamber and addressing the Speaker shouted 'By your leave, 
Mr Speaker, I must borrow your chair a little' Without waiting for a reply, 
Charles took the Chair and demanded to know if the leaders of the rebellion 
were present To a silent chamber the King then turned to the Speaker, whom 
he regarded as his servant, and asked "Is Mr Pym here' The apparently brave
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Speaker replied that he could not be of assistance, his words becoming part of 
British Constitutional history
May it please your Majesty, I have neither eyes 
to see, nor tongue to speak m this place, but as 
the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant 
I am here, and I humbly beg your Majesty's 
pardon that I cannot give any other answer than 
this to what your majesty is pleased to demand
r 10of me
These words are quoted to this day as signalling the emergence of a Speaker 
dedicated to the House rather than to political interests Lenthall succeeded in 
facing down Charles and prevented the arrest of the conspirators The longer- 
term consequence was a recognition by the Monarchy that the Speaker was no 
longer solely its agent As the power of the Monarchy gave way to cabinet 
government, this tradition of independence from the Monarchy grew
If much of the literature is dedicated to understanding the early origins of the 
office, an equal amount has been dedicated to a descriptive account of the 
role, function and duties which the Speaker now performs It is to this work 
that we now turn
10 Quoted in Bailey (1964 62) It may interest the reader to note that it was this event which 
gave rise to the tradition still followed that, except for disciplinary matters, members are 
addressed on the basis of their constituency rather than their name, and that no Monarch since 
Charles I has ever been allowed into the House
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lv The role, function and duties of the Speaker
Most writers differentiate between three roles or functions performed by the 
Speaker in the Westminster tradition firstly the function of presiding over 
meetings of the chamber, secondly the Speaker is seen as being the 
administrative head of the assembly The third role consists of symbolic and 
ceremonial duties, either within or outside parliament
As the presiding officer
Perhaps the most obvious and certainly most visible function of the Speaker is 
to preside over debates when the chamber is m plenary session It is unknown 
for a chamber of parliament not to have a presiding officer This is 
understandable given the need for some form of chairmanship for such vast 
bodies Relying on the observation that few if any democratic legislatures are 
without one, writers feel confident enough to express the opinion that the 
Speaker must play a crucial role in managing the plenary business Within this 
role the various authors have paid attention to four different areas
The primary role of the Speaker in the Chair is to call members to speak Both 
precedent and the rules of the chamber in this regard determine the actual
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powers of the chair 11 In some cases the Speaker is free to call whoever he or 
she wishes and to set time limits In other cases it is decided in advance by 
representatives of the political parties who shall speak and for how long - 
usually proportional to the strengths of the various parties in parliament In 
either case the Speaker has a duty to ensure that the agenda is adhered to, 
regardless of whether they had a role in setting it
A second role while in the Chair, and one that cannot be underestimated given 
the frequently acrimonious nature of parliamentary life, is the power given to 
the Speaker to maintain order Particularly where proceedings are televised, 
the parliamentary chamber is frequently treated as a circus ring in which the 
opposition and government parties fight a war of words Such clashes may be 
as real as plastic surgery but regardless they do need to be contained Indeed, 
it is not uncommon to find Standing Orders empowering the Speaker to 
sanction individuals who are acting in an unparliamentary manner Such 
behaviour includes refusing to be silenced or sit down, using unparliamentary 
language, or being unparliamentary m making certain hearsay accusations 
against other members or breaching the rules of sub judice 12
The literature makes it clear that the interpretation of what constitutes good 
order and how a Speaker pursues order is very much a matter of personal style
11 The rules are usually codified into Standing Orders
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and must take account of the wishes (or mood) of the whole House Penalties 
available to the Speaker can range from rebuking a member to the more 
serious punishment of naming a member - which result in a parliamentarian 
being suspended for a set period of time In the event of greater disorder the 
device available to the Speaker may be an adjournment In many cases the 
ultimate decision on punishment for those causing disorder may be at the 
discretion of the House itself, for example the Speaker may not be able to 
suspend a member without a vote, or a member may be able to appeal a 
suspension, either to the whole House or to a specialist committee
The power of the Speaker to close a debate is perhaps one of the most 
controversial Closure, defined as the ability of the Speaker to cut short debate 
and call for a vote or move onto other business, originated in the British 
House of Commons in the 1880s It came about following attempts by Irish 
separatist members to obstruct the business of the parliament by protracting 
debate The Standing Orders were revised to allow the Speaker conclude 
debate after a reasonable time The motivation behind closure is that it 
prevents what we might now consider to be filibuster, or the talking out of a 
bill or amendment by protracting debate until time runs out
12 An item is sub judice if under judicial consideration and therefore prohibited from public 
discussion
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A fourth role of the Speaker in the chair revolves around occasions when the 
house is equally split on a vote In such cases the Speaker is given the option 
of, and m some legislatures is required to, break a tie We will see below that 
precedent plays a large role in determining the actions of the Speaker in such 
circumstances We would expect that in larger legislatures the probability of 
such ties arising would be quite low and consequently most Speakers would 
rarely if ever exercise this role While this may be accurate, and we do not 
have the comparative empirical evidence to know, it is worth considenng that 
the role of the Speaker m breaking a tie is likely to be very controversial 
and/or receive much scrutiny
Overall then, the picture is one of the Speaker presiding over orderly debate in 
keeping with the Standing Orders that the Chamber has given itself Most 
authors stress the importance of the personal characteristics, sensitivity and 
experience of the Speaker m managing debate and all importantly sensing the 
mood of the House As Laundy (1964 67) notes when it comes to acting in 
the Chair the Speaker
is the servant of the house, not its master, and 
the authority which the house vests in him is its 
own authority, which he exercises in accordance 
with the interests and wishes of the house
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However, as implied by the above observation, the Speaker is not simply a 
person who applies his or her encyclopaedic knowledge of the Standing 
Orders to every eventuality. The reason for this is that not every eventuality is 
covered by the written rules. While Standing Orders may set down to various 
degrees the rules of the Chamber, no set of rules can be sufficiently detailed 
and complete to provide for each and every procedural contingency that may 
arise. Hence the Speaker is left to fill in the gaps or to rely on custom. The 
decisions of the Speaker are considered to be precedent setting and end up 
being part of the rules - even if unwritten. As a report on the British Speaker 
by the National Democratic Institute has noted:
The decisions made and rules followed by the 
Speaker during the course of the Speaker's 
tenure are precedent setting. The Speaker's 
rulings are significant; the Speaker interprets 
and applies the House of Common's standing 
orders and establishes precedents on matters 
such as whether a member's speech is relevant 
to the subject under discussion, whether 
amendments proposed to a draft law conform to 
the rules and are 'in order' and whether certain 
issues can be properly raised during a 
Parliamentary Question.13
13 NDI (1996). The NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) has 
produced a paper in their Legislative Research Series comparing the various models of 
Speakers and Presidents of parliament.
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In most countries the Speaker has a further important role as the individual 
vetted with the responsibility for the overall management of the parliament. 
This includes such functions as the allocation of offices and the running of 
ancillary services such as research services for members and committees or 
the production of transcripts of parliamentary debates.
Given the vast range of tasks, it not surprising that the Speaker is assisted by a 
committee and/or by a public servant who has day-to-day managerial 
responsibility. For example the British Speaker chairs the House of Commons 
Commission which has overall responsibility for each of the five 
administrative departments.14 Although the day-to-day bureaucratic function 
may be delegated to a manger, the Speaker still retains considerable flexibility 
in such matters as setting organisational priorities or allocating funds from the 
parliament's Budget. Writing on the allocative powers of Speakers in general 
and on the US Speaker in particular, Bach (1999: 211) explores the potential 
benefits which this power can bring:
The Speaker can exercise significant influence 
over the assembly's facilities - buildings, staff, 
information resources and so on. In part as a 
consequence, the Speaker may be intimately 
involved in setting and allocating the assembly's 
budget. These powers enable the Speaker to
As the administrative head of the Parliament
14 These five departments are Department of the Clerks of the House; Speakers Office; 
Department of Sergeant-at-Arms, Department of the Library; Department of official Records.
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affect the well being of the assembly and its 
individual members who, m anticipation or as a 
result, can become beholden to him In ways 
sometimes obvious and sometimes subtle, a 
clever Speaker who is so enclined can translate 
administrative responsibility into political 
influence
Symbolic/Ceremonial function
Even casual observers of the British House of Commons cannot but be aware 
of at least some of the pomp and ceremony which surrounds the Speaker Yet 
behind this lies the fact that the Speaker is the symbolic head of the 
Parliament As Laundy (1964, 47) notes 'the Speaker represents the 
Commons in all their external relationships and, in its relationship with the 
House of Lords ' In a bicameral setting, the Speaker's role in communicating 
with the other chamber may be the result of procedural necessity as much as 
ceremomal right
The symbolic role of the office is further evident in the standing of the 
Speaker in the official protocol of the Country The British Speaker ranks 
seventh in the official order of precedent15 And so it is m other countries with 
the Office being taken as a symbol of parliament and the respect to be 
accredited to the institution Functionally, the symbolic role requires that the
1S By order of Council made on 30 May 1919 Prior to this the Speaker was ranked as the first 
commoner (Laundy 1964 8)
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Speaker represents the Parliament, at home and abroad, and be the voice of 
the parliament more generally
Although frequently sidelined or completely ignored m the literature, it is 
important to note that in many countries the Speaker is often given extra­
parliamentary responsibilities arising from the representative role He or she 
may, for example, act as a replacement for the Head of State when that office­
holder is out of the state or otherwise unavailable Alternatively, the Speaker 
may be a member of a council or committee which replaces the head of state 
in similar circumstances
There are other roles that see the Speaker represent the parliament The British 
Speaker is a member of the Boundary Commission, the body charged by 
parliament with drawing up the constituency boundaries for subsequent 
general elections Many of these roles, perhaps crucial to the smooth running 
of the wider political system, have long been ignored It might not be too far­
fetched to suggest that such appointments come about because of the 
presumed nature of the office as much from the symbolic role of the Speaker 
We now move away from the functions of the Speaker to the behaviour of the 
Speaker as encapsulated by the presumed nature of the Office
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v The nature of the office neutrality
Perhaps more than anything else, the theme found again and again in the 
literature on Speakers is that of their impartiality, neutrality and utter non- 
partisanship Outside the US case, there is universal agreement that m those 
parliaments in the Westminster tradition the Speaker is above party politics 
Indeed, the literature leaves no room for any assertion to the contrary As Sir 
Bernard Cocks, Clerk to the House of Commons, writes m his preface to 
Laundy's seminal work ‘above all, he is completely impartial’ Laundy (1964 
xi) This section will depict the picture painted by such authors and the 
criticisms already made of this view I have divided the review into four 
sections, although as we will see m the literature some areas are more written 
about than others The four areas we will concentrate on are what is meant by 
neutrality, how it is demonstrated (in other words the proof put forward by the 
various authors for its existence), where it comes from and what are its 
consequences
W hat is meant by Neutrality9
The first problem we encounter is that no one clearly specifies what is meant 
by neutrality Few provide a definition, which indicates that they are relying
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on a common-usage definition such as 'supporting neither of two opposite 
sides' The issue of what is meant is further clarified (or is that complicated) 
by the introduction of other terms such as 'non-partisanship' But here again 
the meaning of the word is understandable enough What is less 
understandable is the meaning of these words applied to behaviour within the 
parliamentary context
What the authors seem to have in mind are two different levels that frequently 
overlap The first level is impartial, not taking sides, being a neutral 
chairperson The second and one that goes beyond the first is non- 
partisanship Non partisanship requires that a partisan (and most 
parliamentarians are or have been at some stage a partisan) breaks his or her 
ties with the party or at the very least refrains from active participation We 
can see, however, that we are falling into the danger of definition by 
observation We define the term by the behaviour we observe
One interesting contribution in this area comes from a 'practitioner' Dale 
Lovick, Speaker of the British Columbia Legislative Assembly, argues that a 
Speaker can be impartial but cannot be neutral (Lovick 1996) His argument is 
that no individual can relinquish the visceral beliefs of a lifetime, which 
partisanship often is simply by donning the robes of office His argument 
entails further that a Speaker can still be impartial As he writes 'the idea that
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membership in or connection with a political party renders one incapable of 
impartiality is a non sequitur' (Lovick 1996 4)
However, Lovick is a lonely voice on this issue as the dominant belief is that a 
Speaker must not only be impartial but must be seen to be impartial The 
assumption, sometimes made quite explicit, is that, unless a person 
permanently revokes his or her partisan ties or partisan sympathies, then they 
will never be seen to be non-partisan even if he or she is behaving as a non­
partisan Continued partisanship, or any link with an individual political party, 
is seen as a most fundamental ethical breach
Thus, we are left with a picture of an individual devoted not to a political 
party, ideology or belief but solely to the wellbeing of the House which he or 
she now serves Anything else is simply not possible As Laundy (1964 125) 
writes
Once in the chair the Speaker becomes in the 
true sense a House of Commons man He sheds 
all his party affiliations and dedicates himself 
exclusively to the impartial discharge of his 
functions It is inconceivably today that any 
Speaker would be consciously partisan
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What allows for such an extraordinary transition within a few hours from a 
party political hack to a non-partisan9 No one even hazards a guess However, 
one quality which is written a lot about is the digmty and antiquity of the 
individual in the chair It is as if on entering the Chair the individual 
undergoes a metamorphosis The weakness of this argument should be self 
evident to all Scholars have felt able to by-pass this issue by overcoming us 
with examples of neutrality in action It is to these demonstrations of 
impartiality that we now turn
How it is expressed
Various writers on the Speakership leave no room for doubt from before the 
Speaker is selected until he/she dies they behave in, and are treated by others, 
in a non-partisan way Laundy is typical of this approach providing proof of 
the neutrality of the office by examining each of the stages of the Speaker's 
career from the moment he or she becomes a candidate and providing a 
detailed account of their behaviour in conducting the business set them
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In how he or she is selected and appointed7
Invariably Speakers are elected from among the membership of the chamber 
As a general rule, the greater the threshold to election the more likely it is that 
the individual elected will be by-partisan In their essay, Jenny and Muller 
(1995) note that it may still be necessary to maintain a majority principle so as 
to ensure a Speaker can be elected They show that in 19 European 
parliaments nearly all have some requirement for a qualified majority
Yet the threshold required to reach election is only one element of the story 
The selection of candidates may tell more than the formal rule of election The 
key difference is between a culture where the party caucus has the effective 
say in selecting the Speaker or a system where the political parties leave the 
decision to the backbenchers There is little systematic evidence on this point, 
although a number of examples do highlight the differences between 
countries In the United Kingdom, for example, the right of the entire House 
to select the Speaker, free from the usually heeded opinions of party 
managers, is closely guarded Indeed, the party leaders usually shy away from 
giving any indication of preference as to candidates form within their party or 
between various parties, including their own As Laundy (1964 15) argues
on no account is a candidate for the
Speakership ever proposed from the front
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bench, a farther token of the Speaker's 
immunity form ministerial or even shadow- 
ministerial control
The assumption is that as a necessity the Speaker must be seen to be the first 
choice of the backbench mass of the House The selection of Speaker is thus 
not an issue for parties but for the House as a whole No party puts forward a 
candidate and no member is expected to vote along party lines
Having said this, we must confess that some evidence suggests it is quite 
typical for the Speaker to come from the party with a controlling majority in 
the Chamber Outside the UK this is common and indeed generally accepted 
that the nomination is a party one Jenny and Muller (1995) provide a number 
of examples of countries where this is the accepted norm In Austria and 
Germany the Speaker comes from the largest parliamentary party Moreover 
in some countries, particularly Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal, 
the filling of the office is part and parcel of the bargaining leading to the 
emergence of a coalition agreement16 Thus, party interference is believed not 
to exist, but knowing the strengths of the various parties in the chamber and/or 
in coalition bargaining is likely to give a clear indication of the party from 
which the Speaker will come These partisan activities are cloaked because of
16 To clarify, this is the claim of Jenny & Muller (1995) Evidence, which we will present 
later for Ireland, will show that, perhaps surprisingly, the selection of Ceann Comhairle has 
not been part of the coalition bargaining process
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an understanding, what Jenny and Muller (1995 344) refer to as ’informal 
norms ruling candidate selection ' In other words the Speakership is decided 
not by backbench members voting but by an understanding between the party 
elite and usually a silent understanding aimed at preserving the dignity and 
perception of non-partisanship of the office
Even in the British tradition, the façade of non-partisan involvement in the 
selection of a Speaker occasionally breaks down Take, for example, the 
selection of Selwyn Lloyd in 1971 It is quite clear from his autobiographical 
account that the leadership of each party approached individuals to ask them 
to consider running (Lloyd 1976) In the case of Lloyd it was the Chairman of 
the Conservative 1922 Committee In accepting the offer to stand, Lloyd had 
the assurances of not just his own party leadership but also of the Chief Whip 
of the Labour Party Lloyd admits, of course, that a storm broke out because 
backbenchers on both sides felt that they had not been consulted and that a 
decision by the two front benches in a matter essentially for the whole house 
was being thrust down their throats Nevertheless, Lloyd was elected and went 
on to serve a period in office with some distinction
The account above highlights how fickle the argument can be that party 
leaders do not get involved While the Prime Minister showing his or her 
neutrality by not voting in the election may be put forward as proof, it
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becomes less persuasive when we consider the behind-door activities of the 
party whips and parliamentary party leaders
Neutrality the type o f person elected
A second source of evidence used by proponents of the neutrality thesis is the 
characteristics looked for in selecting the Speaker Laundy (1964) himself 
notes the tendency to favour individuals with a legal qualification or a career 
in a judicial or quasi-judicial role The thinking being that a judicial 
background is excellent training for a impartial role, given that judges are fine 
examples of people who must put their personal biases and opinions on hold 
in performing the functions of their office However, a judicial background is 
not a requirement for the job More often the characteristic of a worthy 
candidate will revolve around being a long-serving backbencher Long- 
serving means the individual will be acquainted with the workings of the 
House and, moreover, will have observed a number of different Speakers 
performing their duties Being a backbencher implies that the individual will 
not have held a highly partisan role for at least some time At a mimmum the 
individual will not come directly from the front benches of the party where 
they would have been concerned with either opposing the policies of other 
parties or promoting their own The transition from party-man to Speaker is
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all the easier when you have been retired on the backbenches for a number of
years
At best the ideal candidate will never have served in Government at all In 
most cases the Speaker at Westminster has been a lifelong backbencher Lloyd 
himself points to the benefit of having had ministerial experience before 
taking up the Speakership
I believe it is of benefit to the Speaker to have 
been a Minister He knows how Departments 
work, and, so far from yielding to the 
blandishments of Ministers, he is better able to 
withstand them But there should be this period 
of quarantine or detachment from the front 
bench, whether Government or opposition 17
To some degree the frontbencher-backbencher argument is more related to the 
perception of impartiality than the reality It may be more difficult to be seen 
to undergo the transformation from party spokesperson/minister to neutral 
Speaker Hence the need for a period of partisan-cleansing, or even better, not 
having ever entered the cut-throat business of ministerial office
17 Lloyd (1976 24-25)
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Regardless of how non-political a Speaker is, this is likely to be tested when 
he or she faces re-election as a Member of Parliament Modem campaigning 
and electioneering is invariably highly partisan and political This creates an 
obvious dilemma for a Speaker how can they campaign without reference to 
events during the time they were neutral7
This issue has been of concern to not just academic thinking but also to 
constitutional scholars and practitioners in different countries who have 
sought remedies In 1938 a committee of the House of Commons investigated 
what could be done According to Laundy (1964 112-113) the various options 
considered included 1 Creation of a fictitious constituency 2 To make his a 
two-member constituency, 3 Transfer him to a 'safe' constituency 4 Prohibit 
contest by law Each of these options was rejected because they were seen as 
being outside the norm of British parliamentarism The situation of the 
Speaker seeking re-election thus continues to this day
The recent custom in the United Kingdom has been for the Speaker to 
overcome this problem by running, not as an individual, but as The Speaker 
By not standing as an individual candidate the Speaker is able to conduct his 
or her campaign without becoming openly partisan or making any reference to 
national politics And this seems to have worked as no constituency whose
Electoral campaigns
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member is the Speaker has elected an alternative Thus, what Laundy (1964 
112) calls ’the disadvantage at being precluded from conducting a campaign' 
has never had a negative consequence for the electoral fortunes of the 
Speaker
Moreover, a tradition has also emerged among the other parties that they 
either do not select a candidate for that constituency or if they do that the 
campaign be run along lines that do not involve national politics This 
arrangement further insulates the Speaker from the possibility of having to be 
openly partisan
Having gained re-election to the Chamber in as non-political a manner as 
possible, the next test of non-partisanship is the re-selection of the Speaker to 
that office for the lifetime of the new parliament Again the choices are 
obvious if the Speaker decides to allow him or herself be nominated again 
will they be successful at holding onto the office? This is an especially 
pertinent question when the balance of power between political parties has 
shifted as a result of the election Recall that it is accepted that the majority 
party will have a call on the office (see above), then what happens to the 
Speaker?
i
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The answer appears to uphold the principal of impartiality because ?it is 
customary to re-elect the former Speaker without dissent should he be 
returned as a member' (Laundy, 1964 14) A Speaker re-elected to parliament 
can expect to be re-elected to the Chair regardless of any shift m political 
power Indeed, in the British case we must look back to 1885 to find a new 
majority dispensing with the incumbent Speaker in favour of another member 
The case m other countries is not as clear cut and the lack of empincal studies 
makes reaching any conclusion difficult All in all, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the House will show a certain degree of respect to the existing 
Speaker Whether or not this is evidence of the Speaker being neutral or not is 
a matter of opinion
On one occasion more than any other while presiding, the impartiality of the 
Speaker may come under scrutiny, and that is when he or she is called upon to 
cast a vote Indeed, this is seen as one of the few occasions that may give rise 
to the Speaker showing their political colours However, m a number of cases 
the Speaker is not entitled to vote save in the circumstances where the 
chamber is split In such cases, the Speaker may be called upon to make a 
casting vote, sometimes this is optional, in other cases it is required
Within the Westminster model a number of procedures have been established 
to guide the Speaker in deciding how to vote The guiding rule seems to be
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that the Speaker will never use his own personal opinions or political 
judgement m deciding how to vote As Laundy (1964 88) writes ’it has 
become a firmly established practice that he does not use it for the purpose of 
expressing his personal view as to the issue under consideration' If he/she 
does not use his personal judgement what do they rely on? The principle first 
explained by Speaker Addington in 1796 is that he should vote in such a way 
as to keep the matter concerned under review Consequently, the House will 
have an opportunity if it so wishes to consider the issue at a later time The 
guiding aim is, therefore, not to pass the vote and thus maintain the status quo 
'he will avoid using it to effect a change in the law' (Laundy 1964 96) This 
principle, in effect, calls for a no vote on matters of legislation or government
1 Xformation and a yes vote on matters of government survival
Rarely, however, is the castmg vote used, although where a parliament is hung 
the power to accept or reject the motion is not inconsequential The principle 
within the Westminster model would seem to indicate that the Speaker would 
not be a facilitator of such activities as each goes against the principle of 
maintaining the status quo
Withdrawal from contact with the Political Party
An important element in the neutrality hypothesis is that the Speaker not only 
be impartial but that he or she be seen to be impartial Proof of this is gleaned
18 This is my interpretation
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from the steps a newly appointed Speaker takes to distance him or herself 
from not just the party caucus but from association with individual 
parliamentarians and any association or organisation which may have political 
affiliations or tendencies
The Speaker immediately resigns as a member of the political party of which 
he or she was a member and as a consequence no longer attend parliamentary 
party meetings, votes in leadership elections or has any role in the formation 
of party policy Put simply the British Speaker renounce any ties to the 
political party of which she or he is a member A new Speaker will also break 
any association with cross-party groups m the Parliament or any lobbies 
he/she has been a member of They are, to put it mildly, out in the cold in 
terms of party politics
Secondly, the Speaker puts on hold any personal friendship he or she has 
enjoyed with individual members or groups of members A Speaker will no 
longer dine in the MPs Restaurant, take coffee with fellow members or enjoy 
a drink with any individual In short, a Speaker can only be m attendance at 
functions or events where there is a cross-party representation and then must 
be careful not to have his or her time monopolised by any individual member 
Regardless of how close the relationship with another member before election
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a Speaker may no longer keep such ties, as to do so might imply bias towards 
one or more members
In addition, the Speaker refrains from any activity outside the parliament 
which may indicate any partisan preference If a member of a club with 
partisan leanings, such as the Conservative Carlton Club, he or she withdraws 
from membership
Overall, one cannot but be struck by the enormous lengths to which a Speaker 
is expected to go to give the impression of impartiality and the enormity of the 
consequential life style change he or she must endure the isolation from (one­
time) colleagues
These arrangements do not prevent the Speaker socialising with members, just 
the conditions under which this is allowed An account by Lloyd (1976 123) 
of how he got to know new members and kept in contact with longer serving 
ones in a good example of the measures taken to ensure that no bias can be 
inferred from such gatherings
I started off with the idea of having all members 
to lunch In my first two Parliaments, I 
entertained about five hundred in this way 
Eight of us would sit down, myself and seven 
others I would have three from each of the two 
major parties, one new comer, one with several
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years experience of the House and one old 
timer The seventh would be a Liberal or 
Independent Member or an Official
When a Speaker decides to retire two things usually happen The first is that 
he or she is voted a pension, which like the salary for a Speaker comes from 
the consolidates funds, thus ensuring that the Government can bring no 
pressure to bear on the Speaker by offering or withhold current or future 
financial reward
The second thing that happens is that the Speaker is honoured by the 
Government with the title of Viscount He therefore moves from the 
Commons to the House of Lords where he sits as a non-partisan crossbencher 
This has been the tradition since 1807 and is done m recognition of his 
services to the House Of course perhaps equally important is the fact that it 
removes the embarrassment of having to take a seat on either side of the 
House As Laundy (1964 9) notes 'it is a strictly observed convention that no 
ex-Speaker remains in the Lower House after vacating the chair’ To do so 
would mean returning to the ranks of which as Speaker he or she was meant to 
be a neutral arbitrator
On leaving the Office
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Both traditions leave the Speaker little room to return to active politics 
Indeed, one has to look to the very beginning of the 1800s to find a Speaker 
taking political office again On that occasion, in 1801, Speaker Henry 
Addington became Prime Minister Today, however, former Speakers 'retire* 
to the Lords where they rarely if ever become involved in political 
controversy Neither do they return to party politics outside the chamber In 
retirement, as in office, the Speaker must maintain the same appearance of 
aloofness from party politics
Why is the Speaker neutral7
Aside from the methodological weakness of the descriptive accounts outlined 
above, the major weakness of this literature is its failure to even postulate a 
reason for the impartial nature it has described One can, however, point to 
two competing schools of thought that are as much implied as expressly set 
out as an argument
The first explaination is that the Speakership can only function if it is neutral, 
thus by necessity it is neutral The Speaker relies on the good will of members 
rather than any strict procedural powers he or she may have If the Speaker is 
seen to be using their position of power to favour one side, then the other side
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is likely to ’rebel,’ thus weakening the office Speakers therefore follows a 
careful line, attempting never to offend large sections of interest This is best 
done, and Speakers are best insulated from attack, when they give the 
impression of being neutral arbiters
A second possible explanation of why the Speaker is neutral is based on the 
assumption that impartiality is the result of the historical origins and 
development of the office Each Speaker, on taking the chair, is aware of the 
historical role they are performing and of the need to maintain the dignity of 
the position that stretched back to the Civil War This thinking, which could 
be categorised as being m keeping with a sociological/historical account of 
institutional design, is very dominant m the literature, not least in the depth of 
histoncal detail which various authors feel is necessary to explain the modem 
office
We are left with the clear picture that the office is a non-partisan one The 
explanation is that the neutrality stems either from an obvious need to be 
neutral, either normatively or for more practical reasons A second underlying 
explanation advances the history of the office as the explanation for its current 
nature Beyond these two approaches no attempt has been made to 
systematically understand the phenomenon
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What are the consequences9
If scholars have thought very little about why the office is shaped the way it 
is, they have been equally remiss in attempting to understand the 
consequences of neutrality The focus on descriptive historical accounts of the 
emergence and development of the Speakership has left little space for the 'so 
what?' question regarding neutrality The only real consequence of the 
neutrality argument has been put forward by Bach (1999) He argues that the 
more neutral the Speaker the more likely they are to have freedom vis-a-vis 
procedures In the US case (as we will see below) the absence of neutrality 
means the Speaker is less powerful m the quality and quantity of decision­
making power he or she enjoys As Bach (1999 218) writes
Presumably because of the House's confidence 
in her impartiality, its standing orders give her 
significant discretionary powers over the 
conduct of legislative business, powers that 
have important effects on the ability of its 
members to participate m the assembly's 
proceedings
But as he himself notes this is only a presumption and the thesis has not been 
subjected to much, if any, systematic analysis (Bach 1999 219)
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vi Another case of American exceptionalism9
In the comparative study of political systems, the United States is generally 
seen as having an unusual and exceptional set of political institutions and 
designs, and the office of Speaker appears to have not been immune to this 
exceptionalism If the neutrality of the Speaker in the Westminster tradition is 
the major focus of enquiry for many scholars, then it is closely followed by 
what can be termed American exceptionalism Put simply the Speaker of the 
US House is seen as being very different from the Speaker described thus far 
In this section we will take a closer look at how the US case is different, 
explanations of why it is different and briefly review what scholars have to 
say about the consequences of its difference
The key difference between the US House and the British model of 
Speakership can be summed up in one sentence The Speaker of the US House 
of Representatives is not, and is not perceived as being, neutral There are two 
key pieces of evidence used to justify this universally accepted notion The 
first is that the Speaker's job, in addition to being the presiding officer, is to be 
leader of the majority party The second piece of evidence, which we will 
examine later, is that the Speaker openly uses his or her office for partisan 
advantage Both are not only empirical facts, they are, m a normative sense,
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considered to be part and parcel of the American political system (Davidson & 
Oleszek 1988)
The US Speaker is not just an active member of his political party but a leader 
of the party in Congress Textbooks on the US legislature will typically note 
that no other member of Congress possesses the visibility and authority of the 
Speaker of the House Although, and unlike European political parties, it is 
notonously difficult to attach the label 'leader' to a US political parties, it is 
generally recognised that the Speaker serves as leader of the legislative party, 
and dependent on the unified or divided nature of the government he may 
even function as the effective leader of the political party
We are in danger here of getting the order wrong it is not the case that upon 
becoming Speaker the person m question is raised to the position and profile 
while it may help, it is more the case that the person selected by the party 
Caucus as its leader is the person then selected by the House as Speaker As 
Davidson & Oleszk (1998 155) point out, it is deemed both natural and 
proper for a majority party to choose its leader to occupy the mam position of 
power and authority in the body which it controls The office is seen as a 
forum for party leadership Its role is to bestow some degree of authority and 
profile to assist the party leader in performing his mam tasks, as determined 
by him and his party colleagues
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The most cogent example, at least in recent years, of the Speaker acting as the 
effective leader of one of the national parties is provided by Speaker Newt 
Gingrich Gingrich rose to prominence m the Republican Party over many 
years, but his impact and national profile rocketed in 1995 when the 
Republican party regain majority control of the House 19 The electoral 
platform, m a country where elections are notoriously candidate rather than 
party-centred, ensured him a strong role as leader of the legislative party 
Moreover, his platform, titled A Contract with America, and his ability to 
mould party discipline in voting on the floor and m committees meant he 
became an effective rival to the White House in setting policy agendas and 
passing legislation He was in effect the shadow President
Things are not quite as clear cut as this Something of a debate exists among 
congressional scholars as to whether the Speaker is the most powerful player 
in Congress, or whether the real influence is diffused to committees and in 
particular committee chairs 20 For many years, and particularly within the 
positive political theory camp, committees and committee chairmen were seen 
as having real power More recent research has cast doubt on this claiming
19 We rely on Davidson & Oleszk (1998 155-156) for our account of Speaker Gingrich
20 The 'party thesis' is generally associated with the work by Cox and McCubbins (1993) On 
the debate over the 'party thesis' and ’committee thesis' within positive political theory see Alt 
& Shepsle (1990)
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that parties are important The link between Speaker and Party is such as to
21enable the two institutions to be treated as being the same
Is it plausible to suggest that the Speaker could be both partisan and 
(occasionally) neutral? It could be the case that the Speaker would be 
procedurally neutral Speaker while still being a partisan-active policy leader 
However this is not the case The Speaker can, and is almost expected to, use 
all the procedures at his disposal to further his partisan interests (Sinclair 
2000) The Speaker’s powers are primarily procedural and revolve around 
his/her role in determining the composition of committees and in setting the 
agenda
However, there is one role where the principle of neutrality seems untainted 
and that is when the Speaker is acting as the presiding officer of a plenary 
session This is in keeping with the understanding that the Speaker should not 
openly take sides in debate or allow his/her views to interfere with the rights 
of the minority There is a desire and belief in fair play when it comes to the 
floor of the House, the belief being that some degree of equity among 
members is absolutely necessary
21 As Sinclair (2000) has observed selection of Speaker, because it is seen as endowing 
benefits on the majority party, is one o f the occasions when parties are at their strongest
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To a lesser degree the Speaker also has the prerogative of using his role as 
administrative chief to the advantage of whomever he so chooses Such 
matters include the budgets for use by members in employing researchers and 
other ’staffers', office space and a whole host of other benefits he or she could 
use to bestow rewards on fellow members of his party or even use as a tool of 
reward or punishment for the party However, m reality, as Bach (1999) notes, 
the Speaker is left with little role over such day-to-day maters which are 
delegated to the management of the house and m any event are governed by 
rules and regulations that the Speaker would try to interfere with at his or her 
peril
The Speaker has the potentially enormous power to decide by himself which 
bills will be considered under which procedures His power over what bills 
and amendments are debated and for how long ensures that he can make the 
passage of favoured bills and amendments very easy, while making life 
virtually impossible for minority party attempts to stumble a majority party 
agenda or successfully propose an alternative Moreover, these powers are 
exercised in conjunct with his fellow leaders in the majority party
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Why is the Speaker not neutral9
In an area of research increasingly dominated by deductive research, and 
attempts to theorise the origin and cause of observed phenomenon, it is a little 
surprising that no such understanding of the nature of the office of Speaker 
has been posited On the contrary, our understanding of why the US 
Speakership is shaped like it is relies on a mixture of biographical accounts 
and reference to a number of historical facts concerning the early development 
of the office In other words the conceived wisdom is of a Speakership that 
was shaped by a unique set of historical events that were subsequently 
remoulded, even if not fundamentally changed, under the impact of individual 
office holders We will examine each of these claims, starting with the early 
origin of the office as an explanation as to why it is different
The unique set of historical events which shaped the original office was the 
revolutionary war fought between the States of the Umon and the United 
Kingdom 22 Faced with the need for strong political opposition to the British, 
the assemblies became the focus of such leadership and within each the 
Speaker was the leader of the opposition to British rule - a very political role 
This highly parsimonious theory of the political nature of the Office is widely
22 Our account is based on the seminal account provided by Peters (1997) This account seems 
to  be generally accepted in the literature, or at least is rarely challenged
I
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shared and summarised concisely by the National Democratic Institute (1996 
7) research paper
the history of the American colonial period, in
which the colonial assemblies often acted in
direct opposition to the mandates of the royal
governors, produced the unique concept of a n
Speaker as not only the arbiter of debate but as a
leader of the opposition against the crown
When the war ended eventually, the assembly Speaker continued to hold a 
central role, both within and outside the assembly Allied to the weakness 
(indeed absence) of political parties, there was no other obvious position 
capable of assuming the political role that the Speaker had performed 
Consequently, even in 'settled times/ the Speaker continued to act less as a 
neutral presiding officer and more as a champion of causes and ideologies
Peters (1997) believes it was crucial that by the time the Constitution was 
written there was no tradition of a neutral Speaker The Speakership - as only 
one of four offices mentioned m the Constitution - quickly became the subject 
of political bargaining The State of Philadelphia, in the choice of Frederick 
A C Muhlenberg, was rewarded with the office, having failed to get either 
the Presidency, Vice-Presidency or Supreme Court Chief Justiceship
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If the unique circumstances prevailing at the time of preparation for and 
transition to independence was seen as the reason for the US Speaker being as 
it is, a second factor is seen as accounting for the developments, shifts and 
trends in the Office up to and including the current incumbent Peters (1997) 
argues that the nature of the Speakership changes either because of what he 
terms environmental factors or alternatively as a result of a forceful 
personality taking office As he wntes (Peters 1997 195)
Speakership has undergone several distinct 
historical transformations These
transformations paralleled and caused by broad 
changes in the political system of which the 
house and the Speakership are a part 
Characteristic pattern of party politics, a
predominant policy agenda, particular
institutional arrangements, distinct Speakership
Peters goes on to identify four mam periods in the evolution of the 
Speakership However, he cautions that these periods are less revolutionary 
changes rather than subtle, if still important, changes He prefaces the
description of the four periods by noting that the office's fundamental
character has not mutated and over time has remained remarkable resilient to 
long-term change It soon becomes obvious that Peters' four phases, as
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outlined in Table 3 1, is closely related to the arrival in office of Speakers with 
a particular view of the office 23
Table 3 1
The evolution of the American Speakership
D escrip tion P erio d C h a ra c te r is tic s
Parliam entary
Speakership
Independence to Civil War W eak Congress, internally 
disorganised, weak Speaker
Partisan
Speakership
Civil W ar to departure o f  
Speaker Canon in 1910
Strong Speaker, individual strengths 
allied with highly partisan Congress
Feudal
Speakership
Post canon to departure o f 
Rayburn
W eaker Speaker, sharing pow er with 
new centre o f  power, nam ely 
com mittee Chairs
Democratic
Speakership
Post Rayburn to date Speaker has procedural authority but 
is agent o f party as m uch as leader
Source adapted from Peters (1997 6 Figure 1)
Mirroring classical role theory, it is claimed that the personal ideas, 
personality and characteristics of the individual impact on the nature of the 
office Change may therefore be gradual or, in the case of a strong-willed 
individual, the impact may be both far reaching and occur very quickly One 
Speaker in particular is held as an example of how an individual can change 
the office
The partisanship and power of the Speaker is considered to have reached its 
zenith during the term of Speaker Joseph Cannon (Jones 1987) With few
23 This is not to deny that certain conditions needed to prevail to facilitate the change in nature
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exceptions, Cannon's period was seen as a case of an individual wielding 
exceptional personal control, indeed others rather despairingly talk of 
excessive leadership and label Cannon to be somewhat of a tyrant24 Cannon 
was elected in 1903 at a time when partisanship was at a high in Congress 
This afforded him the opportunity for independence, safe m the knowledge 
that he would have the almost-guaranteed backing of his party if ever he need 
it in a floor of committee vote
What is most noteworthy about Cannon's period was the way he increased his 
procedural prerogatives to maximise loyalty from members Essentially, he 
rewarded allies and punished people who were less willing to give him right 
of way The procedural powers he enjoyed and used included his power to 
appoint members to committees, appoint the chairman of the committees, give 
party seniority on the committees, allow members time on the floor Cannon's 
view of his right to rule and act as a partisan leader is typified in this extract 
from a speech he gave to members m 1910
Gentlemen of the House of Representatives Actions, 
not words, determine the conduct and sincerity of men 
m the affairs of life This is a government by the people 
acting through the representatives of a majority of the 
people Results cannot be had except by a majority, and
o f the office
24 Bolles (1951) characterised Cannon as the 'tyrant from  Illinois' (Canon cam e from the state 
of Illinois)
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in the House of Representatives a majority, being 
responsible, should have full power and should exercise 
that power, otherwise the majority is inefficient and 
does not perform its function The office of the minority 
is to put the majority on its good behaviour, advocating, 
in good faith, the policies which it professes, ever ready 
to take advantage of the mistakes of the majority party, 
and appeal to the country for its vindication 25
Cannon, however, seemed to go too far in his quest for power In March 1910 
the House revolted against one of his procedural rulings, a symbol of their 
lack of confidence in his ability to act in a manner which is not of keeping 
with his attitude to the office as portrayed above On losing the vote Cannon 
accepted that in a situation where a procedural decision of the Speaker is not 
upheld by the floor the Speaker is left with little alternative but to go His 
excessive use of power caused a revolt which resulted not just in his departure 
but also in the curbing of powers that the Speaker yields (Jones 1968) Most 
notably the future Speaker lost right to determine the composition of 
committees The procedural and precedent-based powers of the Speaker 
having been undermined would never be the same again 26
The difficulty of moving beyond a person-centred account of the development 
of the office is obvious Cooper and Brady (1981), in setting out their own
25 Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2ned session, M arch 19, 1910 3436
26 The shift tow ards a party-m odel o f  Congress has resulted in a renew ed interest in Cannon 
Krehbiel & W isem an (2001) are am ong those reassessing the nature o f  his leadership o f  the
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research agenda on the Speaker, identifying the methodological problems 
which continue to burden any scholar wishing to theorise the evolution of the 
office
analysts are perplexed by the difficulties of 
conceptualising key variables, treating highly 
transient and idiosyncratic personal factors, and 
identifying relationships amidst a maze of 
interactive effects Moreover the task is 
rendered even more complex by the highly 
politicised character of the Congress as 
compared with most of the organisational 
contexts in which leadership has been studied27
Consequences
That the British and US offices are very different causes little controversy in 
the literature The source of that difference has also been documented and 
become accepted wisdom Little attention, however, has been given to the 
consequences of the US model for the American political system and in 
particular the House of Representatives The difference would seem to 
provide an obvious vehicle with which to test the consequences of cross­
country differences in the Speakership Yet this has not been the case One 
good reason perhaps is that there are too many other variables floating around 
to make any comparisons of the consequences of differing design meaningful
House They argue (p 2) that 'Cannon was less o f  a tyrant than a m ajontarian in term s o f  
broader patterns o f  the organization and operation o f  the House'
27 Cooper &  B rady (1981 411)
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One consequence is taken as obvious because the American Speaker is not 
expected to be neutral the House of Representatives affords him/her less 
discretion in a number of circumstances As Bach (1999 218) points out, the 
American Speaker is more constrained by rules, precedents, and practice that 
limit his opportunity to exercise discretion for political purposes Comparing 
the detail of the rules and procedures of the British House of Commons and 
rules of the US House of Representatives is taken as evidence of this 28 In 
general, the consequences for the working of the legislature of having very 
different Speakers, either cross-nationally, or temporally has yet to be 
explored in any satisfactory fashion
vn From Westminster to Dublin the historical evolution 
of the Irish Speaker
The meeting of the first Dail on 21 January 1919 marked both continuity and 
change m the Irish political landscape (Mitchell 1995) Certainly, the (illegal) 
assembly of Irish MPs was a very Irish affair (Farrell 1994) but it was also a
28 The m les and procedures o f  the US House o f  Representatives runs to  som e 30 volum es 
w hile the British House o f  Com mons relies on the smgle volume and relatively concise 
Erskine May's for its rules and directions The degree to which it can be claim ed that the US 
speaker is less capable o f  independent action than his counterparts elsew here can be 
som ew hat over exaggerated In term s o f  overall freedom o f  action it is surely easier to counter 
the claim  than substantiate it One has only, by way o f  example, to look at the enorm ous, and 
uncontrolled, pow er o f  the Speaker vis a vis agenda setting
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reflection of the historical parliamentary link between Dublin and London As 
Farrell (1994 3) notes the creation of the Dail marked 'both the continuance 
of the mainline Irish political tradition and the true beginning of 
independence ’ Many of the political leaders, as the modern Irish 
parliamentary institution was about to be forged, were socialised into the 
Westminster parliamentary model As a consequence the procedures and 
parliamentary methods adopted reflected the processes of the British House of 
Commons As Lee (1994 144) notes
The incongruity of the Dail adopting its 
procedures, and much of its tone, from 
Westminster precedent, even while it rejoiced in 
its abstention from Westminster, has often been 
noted There was probably no realistic 
alternative m the immediate circumstances The 
leaders had no time to mediate at leisure on the 
constitutional arrangements of other countries, 
or to think through the deeper implications of 
their own behaviour
This transfer of institutional practice from Westminster to Dublin impacted 
greatly on the initial design of the office of presiding officer The two 
documents governing the first Dail (The Constitution of Dail Eireann and 
Standing Orders of Dail Eireann) allowed for the creation of a Speakership
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very much along the lines of the British Speakership As Farrell (1994 69) 
has noted
Article 3 [of the Constitution] provides for an 
elected Ceann Comhairle to preside over the 
Dail The Standing Orders provided were 
entirely based on British practice and the rulings 
of the chair stayed as firmly committed to 
Erskine May as any Mr Speaker at Westminster
It would be wrong to suggest that the design of the institutions matched 
perfectly the Westminster tradition There was no ceremony, no gowns, no 
mace (Mitchell 1995) 29 More interestingly the Constitution stated that the 
Ceann Comhairle would be elected annually At that first meeting in January 
1919 Cathal Brugha was elected Ceann Comhairle However with the move to 
the free state parliament m 1921 the term of the Ceann Comhairle was defined 
as that in Bntain From 1922 the Ceann Comhairle would be elected with the 
assumption of continuity in office until a dissolution of the chamber (Smyth 
1979 54)
The process of codifying the role, powers and procedures of the Irish Speaker 
was a gradual one Figure 3 1 sets out the Standing Orders concerning the
29 See also, Report o f  the Committee on Procedures and Privileges re Wearing o f  Gown by 
Ceann Comhairle, 25 June 1946 Today the Ceann Comhairle wears a black gown while in 
the chair
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selection of the Ceann Comhairle which were passed in the first ten years of 
the free state parliament, as well as the dates in which they were passed
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Figure 3 1 The enactment of Standing Orders related to the appointment 
of Ceann Comhairle
5 For The purposes of these Standing Orders the expression ‘Ceann 
Comhairle’ shall mean the member elected by Dail Eireann to be Chairman of 
Dail Eireann and the expression ‘Leas-Ceann Comhairle5 shall mean the 
member elected by Dail Eireann to be the Deputy Chairman of Dail Eireann
Enacted 21 July 1926
6 ( 1 )  The Dail shall then proceed to the election of a Ceann Comhairle, and a 
motion may be made to that effect by any member who has taken his or her 
seat according to law Such motion or motions shall be received by the Clerk, 
who shall act as Chairman until the Ceann Comhairle is elected
(2) If only one member be proposed as Ceann Comhairle the Clerk shall put 
the question, “That (naming the member) be elected and do now take 
the chair of the Dail as Ceann Comhairle”, which shall be decided like other 
questions Provided that in the event of their being an equality of votes, the 
question shall be decided m the negative
(3) If more than one member be proposed as Ceann Comhairle, the Clerk 
shall, in the order in which the members shall have been proposed, put the 
question, “That (naming the member) be elected and do now take the 
Chair of the Dail as Ceann Comhairle”, which shall be decided like other 
questions Provided that in the event of their being an equality of votes, the 
question shall be decided in the negative
Enacted 24 July 1923 and 21 July 1926
7 The Ceann Comhairle shall immediately upon his or her election take the 
Chair, but m the case of absence of the Ceann Comhairle elect, the Dail may, 
on motion made without notice, appoint any member to act as Ceann 
Comhairle for the time being Until such member is appointed the Clerk shall 
continue to act as Chairman
Enacted 24 July 1923 and 21 July 1926
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The only significant development in Standing Orders relating to the coming 
into office of the Ceann Comhairle came in 1996 when a sub-committee 
recommended that an incoming Ceann Comhairle should make the following 
declaration
I do solemnly declare that I will duly and 
faithfully and to the best of my knowledge and 
ability, execute the office of Ceann Comhairle 
of Dail Eireann without fear or favour, apply the 
rules as laid down by this House in an impartial 
and fair manner, maintain order and uphold the 
rights and privileges of members in accordance 
with the Constitution and the Standing Orders of 
Dail Eireann
In presenting this recommendation to the chamber the sub-committee 
explained the preference to include such a declaration as follows
These draft Standing Orders aim to underpin the 
impartiality of the Offices of Ceann Comhairle 
and Leas-Cheann Comhairle, by requiring the 
office-holders to make a declaration/affirmation 
to that effect when taking their positions30
Hogan and White (1994, 137 nl) note that no provision is made for the 
inability of the Dail to elect a Chairman In 1992 The Clerk of the Dail was
30 DcliI Eireann, First Report o f  the Sub-Committee o f  the Committee on Procedures and  
Privileges on Reform o f  D ail Procedures -  Explanatory Memorandum , 1996
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reported in the media to have sought and received legal advice to the effect 
that the Dail could not conduct any business without a Ceann Comhairle first 
being elected To date it has proved possible to elect a Ceann Comhairle at the 
first meeting of a new Dail
The Function and Powers of the Irish Speaker
In this section we explore the development of the functions and powers of the 
Irish Speaker Again, as with the process of selecting the Ceann Comhairle, 
we will see that the powers and duties of the Irish Speaker are the mirror 
image of those described earlier m this Chapter when describing the 
development of the British Speakership
Casting a Vote Under normal circumstances the Ceann Comhairle or person 
in the Chair is not permitted to vote m divisions The only occasion upon 
which the Chair is allowed to cast a vote is to break a tie Indeed Article 
15 11 2 of the 1937 Constitution clearly stipulates that in such an eventuality 
the Ceann Comhairle must exercise a casting vote
Upholding Rules o f debate One of the main tasks of the Ceann Comhairle is 
to enforce the rules governing public meetings of the Dail By and large these
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rules of debate are laid down in the Standing Orders but the past rulings of the 
Chair also create precedents The practice however is to incorporate rulings 
into updated Standing Orders Standing Orders are by their nature very 
detailed and the latest edition runs to over 51 pages (excluding the index and 
table of contents)
When m the chair the Ceann Comhairle presides over all aspects of debate and 
is prescribed a range of powers and functions in a way similar to other 
Speakers No member may address the Dail without being called upon to do 
so and all speeches must be addressed to the Chair A member who wishes to 
speak rises from their seat and m so doing seeks the attention of the Chair It 
is up to the Ceann Comhairle whether or not to allow the member to speak or 
in the case of two or more nsmg simultaneously the Chair will decide which, 
if any, member will be allowed to address the Dail In order to maintain order 
in the House standing Orders provides the Chair with a number of 
mechanisms to enforce proper conduct in the chamber
As a first attempt to ensure order, Standing Order 46 states that if the Ceann 
Comhairle rises from his seat the member engaged in debate must resume his 
or her seat Where a members conduct is ‘grossly disorderly’ the Ceann 
Comhairle can order that member to withdraw from the chamber for the 
remaimng of the day's business
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Standing Orders also allows for more drastic action in the case of more 
serious breaches of debate by members This allows for the Ceann Comhairle 
to ask the chamber to suspend a member Under current rules a member in 
breach of the Chair's ruling is named by the Ceann Comhairle and a motion to 
suspend the member is put to the House Previously the practice was for 
someone other than the Ceann Comhairle (typically the most semor member 
of the government present in the chamber) to name a member Once 
suspended a deputy has two realistic options firstly, as provided for in 
standing Orders, he or she may send the Ceann Comhairle a written 
expression of regret in which case the Ceann Comhairle will remove the order 
of suspension An alternative is for the suspended member to challenge the 
decision of the Ceann Comhairle with the Committee on Procedures and 
Privileges (CPP)
Where more than one single member is causing the disturbance or the member 
refuses to depart from the chamber the Ceann Comhairle is granted the power 
under standing order 62 to adjourn or suspend the sitting for a time so 
decided
Another important aspect of the Ceann Comhairle's work is to ensure that the 
debate is not just orderly but also adheres to the practice of privileged debate
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(McCracken, 1958, 122-123) Privilege allows members to make statements 
or other utterances without the fear of being subject to any review by an 
outside body such as the civil courts However, to protect the rights of non­
members, Standing Orders places limitations on what members can say m the 
chamber Where a member makes a defamatory remark about an individual 
the Chair will demand that the member withdraw it without qualification 
Where the member refuses to withdraw the remark the Ceann Comhairle is 
empowered to take action against the member similar those used against 
disruptive members However if the member making the remark so requests 
the matter can be referred to the Committee on Procedures and Privileges 
(CPP) In this case the Ceann Comhairle refrains from any action against the 
member concerned until the CPP has reported
The other mechanism to deal with alleged breaches of privileges is provided 
to deal with cases where the alleged breach was not apparent to the Chair 
during the debate In this case any other member of the Dail can request that 
the Ceann Comhairle consider referring the matter to the CPP Standing 
Orders also allow for the aggrieved party (the person who has been defamed) 
to make a submission to the Ceann Comhairle The Ceann Comhairle has the 
sole authority to decide whether or not to proceed in such circumstances If he 
decided that a defamatory remark has been made he can require the person to
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withdraw the remark (again the member can seek to refer the matter to the 
CPP) or can without notice refer the matter to the CPP
If a member is referred to the CPP that committee will, under normal 
circumstances, invite the member before it to defend his or her actions and 
will in due course make a decision as to whether a pnma facie abuse of 
pnvi lege has occurred The committee has the power to suspend the member 
and order him or her to withdraw the remark It is worth noting that the CPP is 
chaired by the Ceann Comhairle
Conduct o f Business Even a casual observer of proceedings on any given day 
cannot fail to recognise that the Ceann Comhairle exercises certain other roles 
and powers while in the Chair The first influence of the Chair usually occur 
in the morning when the daily Order of Business is being discussed It is not 
the Ceann Comhairle but the Taoiseach who determines the order of 
Government Business, times and arrangement for sittings However Standing 
Order Three allows for the Ceann Comhairle to permit questions about 
business on the Order paper, about the taking of Business which has been 
promised, including legislation promised by the Government This is a key 
opportunity for the opposition parties to question the government (usually the 
Taoiseach attends for the debate on the order of Business) on current issues
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Therefore the ability of the Ceann Comhairle to permit or refuse such 
interpellations is crucial
The right to ask formal questions to members of the Government remain one 
of the few truly independent prerogatives of members Formal questions taken 
two forms written and oral, and the Ceann Comhairle plays an important role 
in each The Speaker may grant permission for certain questions that are 
deemed of urgent public importance Under standing orders the Ceann 
Comhairle is required to scrutinise each question lodged to ensure it complies 
with certain requirements - it is relevant to the ministers department, it is as 
brief as possible, it seeks to elicit information or elucidate upon matters of fact 
or of policy, not contain argument or personal imputation, not anticipate 
discussion and not involve reputation in view of previous questions asked
The Ceann Comhairle faces three options with every question accept, rule out 
of order or after consultation with the member responsible for the question, 
amend the question to bring it in line with Standing Orders The powers can 
be delegated to the Clerk of the Dail On one occasion a member unhappy 
with the decision of the Ceann Comhairle on a question sought a judicial 
review into the actions of the Ceann Comhairle in disallowing the form of a 
question In seeking to bring a case in the High Court, and later in his appeal 
to the Supreme Court, Mr Pat O'Malley, who was no longer a deputy when the
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case came up for hearing, claimed that the question had been changed without 
reference to him The case was unsuccessful as neither the High Court or 
Supreme Court felt they had authority to interfere with internal Dail affairs 31
Extra Chamber Parliamentary Duties Withm the parliamentary arena the 
Cearrn Comhairle is a member of the Electoral Appeals Board This Board is 
primarily concerned with the recognition for the purposes of funding of Dail 
parties More recently legislation has been enacted which created a Public 
Offices Commission and specified the Ceann Comhairle as chair of the body 
The Commission published guidelines, provides advice and generally assists 
with the implementation of the Ethics in Public Office Act (1995) It is also 
required to investigate and report on possible breaches and contravention of 
the Act In essence the act seeks to maintain standards in high offices such as 
ministers and special advisers The Commission also has the pnncipal 
supervisory role under the 1997 Electoral Act This provided for the public 
funding of political parties, assistance with costs incurred by candidates in 
elections, the thorny issue of disclosure of donations to parties and the 
capping of electoral expenses at elections Clearly then the office is similar to 
the office in the British House of Commons of the Parliamentary
31 In his judgement Mr Justice O'Flaherty agreed that the current matter was very much a 
matter concerning the mtemal workings of the Dai I and that 'it would seem inappropriate for 
the court to intervene except in some very extreme circumstance which it is impossible to 
envisage at the moment' O'Malley v An Ceann Comhairle
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Commissioner for Standards Most interestingly, when the British 
Government was drawing up the legislation, they decided that the position 
should be separate from the Speaker while the Irish legislation provides for 
the Ceann Comhairle to be at the heart of maintaining standards in public 
office and the financing of parties
Administrative Duties The Ceann Comhairle has executive responsibility for 
the running of the administration of the Dail By law he and his equivalent in 
the Seanad occupy a role and function equal to that of a mimster in their 
departments in terms of responsibility for the functioning of their statutory 
obligations
Representative Duties and Symbolic Roles The Ceann Comhairle is the public 
face of the Dail As such the Ceann Comhairle acts as Chairman of the Irish 
Parliamentary Association and represents the Dail at the Conference of 
Presidents of European Parliamentary Assemblies The latter organisation 
gave rise to greater co-operation among European legislative bodies although 
most co-operative work is undertaken by a correspondent to the European 
Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation Irish Speakers have 
however participated in meetings of the Speakers' Conference
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The Ceann Comhairle is also a chairperson of the two bodies charged with 
making appointments to central and local government administration The 
Civil Service Commission was established in 1923 and has as its mam 
function the appointment and selection of staff to various grades m the Civil 
Service The two other commissioners are drawn from senior civil servants 
Departments of the Taoiseach and Finance The Local Appointments 
Commission undertakes a similar role with regard to positions in local 
authorities and the Health Boards In reality the Ceann Comhairle operates as 
a executive chairman of a board in his capacity and the detailed running of the 
two organisations are left to Civil Servants Another duty bestowed upon the 
office holder is to act as chairman of the little known Comhairle na Mire 
Gaile - the Deeds of Bravery Council This operates as a small section within 
the department of Justice and meets once a year to decide on which civilians,
n o
if any, should be awarded recognition for deeds of bravery
Under the Constitution two committees outside the Dâil occasionally require 
the attention of the Ceann Comhairle - The Presidential Commission and the 
Council of State Of these the former is the most important given that its role 
is to act in place of the President when the President is unable to perform his 
or her duties This arises most usually when he or she is outside the state on 
private or public business The commission also takes the place of a President
32 Staff of the Houses of the Oireachtas Act 1959
331 thank the Office of Ceann Comhairle for this information
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prematurely leaving office (either because of resignation as happened on two 
occasions - President O’Dalaigh and President Robinson, death, as in the case 
of President Childers or removal/impeachment) The other two members of 
the commission are the Chief Justice and the Chairperson of the Seanad For 
example, the dissolution of the 26th Dail in 1992 on the request of the 
Taoiseach was made by the Commission owing to the absence of the 
President
In a similar fashion the Constitution provides for a Council of State to aid and 
advise the President on matters which the President may wish to or is required 
to consult them These are specified m the Constitution and essentially revolve 
around seeking advice before making any of her independent decisions - such 
as whether or not to refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its 
Constitutionality The Council is comprised of a body of people such as the 
Taoiseach and former Taoisigh, the Tanaiste, senior judges and the Ceann 
Comhairle and Cathaoirleach of the Seanad Up to seven members are also 
appointed by the President Thus while the advice of the members carries 
some weight owing to the experience of those who comprise it its advice can 
be ignored by the President or Presidential Commission
Overall then the picture is one of an office heavily based on its British 
counterpart, but also one whose roles and functions have expanded to a 
republican system of government
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vili Conclusion
We set out at the beginning of this chapter to survey the comparative literature 
dealing with the office of Speaker Having provided a brief sketch it is 
difficult not to have mixed feelings about the quantity of the existing stock 
body of knowledge in this area
On the one hand the literature is rich with historical facts and interesting, if 
highly anecdotal and potentially problematic, assertions A very simple 
picture of two very different types of Speakerships is drawn Occasionally, 
compelling evidence is provided to describe the nature of the office The 
difference between the British and American Speakers is explained by 
reference to history
Moreover, we cannot but be impressed at the homogeneity within and 
between the various works The picture of two Speakers is generally accepted, 
crossing not just individual authors from disparate backgrounds but also 
finding its way into the wider literature on legislatures We are certainly able 
to conclude that there is a conventional wisdom about the Speakership, 
agreement about its contemporary nature and its historical roots Many would 
take the existence of such a well-accepted set of ideas as being a strength of 
the research
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But one cannot but be struck at the number of problems in the literature - it is 
not just the absence of a model or competing perspectives that is problematic 
We have alluded to numerous problems, methodological and substantive, in 
the current literature
But one of the major problems must surely be the very existence of a 
homogeneous understanding of the Speaker, and a lack of any alternative 
perspectives If knowledge progresses by comparing various theories, then it 
is little wonder that our understanding of the Speaker outside America has not 
progressed much in over 40 years Allied to this, is the often atheoretical 
nature of much of the research While other areas of legislative scholarship 
have benefited from the use of theoretical foundations in such research 
programmes as coalition studies, roll-call behaviour and member role 
orientation, research on the Speaker has not has not progressed at the same
34pace
We think we have succeeded m our aim of showing that something of a 
conventional wisdom exists regarding the Speaker Armed with this, we 
continue out attempt to provide an alternative account of the office
34 Rather than give examples of progress in the three areas mentioned here I refer the reader to 
Gamm & Huber (forthcoming 2002)
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Chapter Four: Empirical Expectations
i Introduction
In Chapter One we set out on our journey to reassess the Office of Speaker 
That ’reassessment' involves taking fresh look at the nature of the office, its 
evolution and its distributional consequences, particularly in the Irish case 
Chapter Two saw us reviewing some potentially useful theoretical approaches 
to studying political institutions and opting for the rational choice 
institutionalist framework Drawing on the office-seeking and policy-seeking 
thesis of political motivation we set out a rational choice account of the 
Speaker In Chapter Three we presented a review of the current literature and 
conventional wisdom on the Speaker to show how novel our rational choice 
institutional account is From here on in we move back from a negative 
critique of the existing approach to the more positive process of validating our 
choice-based account
We begin this process m this Chapter by clearly setting out, and explaining 
our reasoning behind, a series of hypothesis that we have derived from our 
rational choice theory of the office In subsequent chapters we will empirically 
test these hypothesis to falsify or validate our theory of the Speaker Before
133
we define and explain the basis of each of these hypotheses it may be worth 
stepping back to explain why we are taking the trouble to form hypotheses 
rather than opt for a more grounded and inductive empirical account to 
support the propositions made in Chapter Two
11 Developing and verifying hypothesis
Theories are well and good but only really useful if they help us explain some 
real-world phenomenon, hopefully the real-world phenomenon that we are 
interested in learning The reader will remember a criticism of formal models 
made in Chapter Three on the basis that while mathematically quite 
sophisticated their role in helping us understand and predict is often dubious 
(Morton 1999) This doubt arises most frequently in instances where a theory 
has not been subjected to empirical validation Quite often, of course, the 
theory is formulated in such a way as to be incapable of being given empincal 
content For us, empincal validation is achieved by a successful coming 
together of theory and real-world observations In other words, for a theory to 
be validated it must stand the test of observed facts We must investigate to 
what degree the world around us conforms to the predictions made by the 
theory?
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Of course, the method or methods used to correspond real-world facts with the 
theory that is being tested is crucial The discipline has a long history of 
attempts at improving theory and empirical conformation (King et al 1994, 
Morton, 1999) At a very basic level, these problems include the use of only 
supporting data with the elimination or side-stepping of invalidating evidence 
or 'outliers’ This problem has been particularly associated with qualitative 
research, even if the ability to cheat with quantitative data is as great1 The 
data used m this study are, by necessity, sometimes but not exclusively 
qualitative To overcome the perceived weaknesses of the quantitative 
research methods we adapt the approach urged by King et al (1994) We 
briefly set out this approach here before proceeding to our main business of 
hypothesis-formation
Designing Scientific Inquiry, co-authored by three leading US-based scholars 
(King, Keohane and Verba), has as its aim a bridging of the divide between 
qualitative and quantitative research in political science and more generally 
within the social sciences Although the ideas presented in the book are not 
always very new, the message is clear done correctly, inquiry involving the 
use of qualitative research can be as every bit as scientific as research based 
on quantitative data So, what is the secret to good qualitative research? The
1 As I pointed out briefly in Chapter One qualitative nature of much quantitative data is a 
point lost in the general debate about the costs and benefits of large n studies over small n 
case studies We are beginning to realise that statistical techniques often leave as much room 
for data manipulation as do the use of case study data
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solution according to KKV revolves around two ways of doing scientific 
inquiry better The first is having a standard of replication (we will deal with 
this in the concluding chapter) The second way to improve scientific inquiry, 
having developed a theory, to set out as many observable implications of that 
theory as possible In other words, if our theory were correct what would one 
expect to see in the real world7 Put slightly differently, if our theory is correct 
what would we expect not to see? By clearly setting out observable empirical 
expectations we can then collect data which validates or invalidates the 
theory The more observable implications there are, the more trustworthy and 
scientific are the findings - with qualitative or quantitative data
In this chapter we set out such a series of hypothesis These can be grouped 
into two categories The first relates to the nature of the selection and 
appointment process for the office of Speaker Our argument about the nature 
of the selection process focuses on expectations about who we would expect 
to be selected as Speaker and the actual (formal and informal) process of 
selection The basic argument here is that the nature of the appointment will 
tell us much about the office and in doing help illuminate the accuracy of our 
theory
2 Hereafter referred to as 'KKV ’
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Our second category of investigation revolves around the actual and perceived 
behaviour of the Speaker This includes not just the time he or she spends in 
the office but on the political behaviour and career orientation once they have 
exited the post Our focus is on the behaviour of the Speaker in voting to 
break a tie, the respect among members for the chair and also how partisan his 
or her behaviour on leaving office
111 Our Fourteen Hypotheses
Our fourteen hypotheses can be divided into two groups the first relating to 
who is selected as Speaker The second group of hypotheses relates to our 
expectations as regard the behaviour of the Speaker once appointed In this
section we outline each of these in turn Chapter five will see us giving
)
empirical content to our first group of hypotheses In chapter six we will 
assess the accuracy of our second group of hypotheses
As we have noted above, the nature of the selecting and appointment process 
should tell us much about the nature of the office and the officeholder We 
begin by contemplating possible answers to the question of who selects the 
Ceann Comhairle? The simple answer is to suggest that the selection of the 
Speaker is a matter for the entire membership of the chamber The Dail does
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after all select its own Ceann Comhairle However, as is often the case with 
the actual workings of parliament, the story may be more complicated than it 
seems on the surface
Level of threshold
Our first hypothesis revolves around how much support is required to elect a 
Speaker Parliamentary rules usually set one of three possible procedures for a 
ballot or nomination to be approved (see further, Rasch 1995) Applied to the 
election of a Speaker, the weakest requirement could be a plurality vote, 
which simply requires one candidate to have more votes than any other single 
candidate A vote needing an absolute majority, which requires a candidate to 
have at least fifty per cent plus one vote of the total votes is another possible 
way of selecting a Speaker A more difficult hurdle is set by a qualified 
majority rule which sets some higher threshold for the minimum amount of 
support necessary Whether the latter two are counted on the basis of the total 
membership of the chamber as distinct from the number of members voting is 
another crucial point It is obviously easier to achieve, say, half the votes cast 
than half the votes of the total membership
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Jenny and Muller (1995 342) argue that the more difficult it is to become 
presiding officer the more neutral the person so selected will be The basis of 
this proposition is that the higher the threshold for election the more the 
individual selected will be a product of the whole house as distinct from being 
the product of a faction or coalition of factions within the chamber A simple 
example should illustrate the appeal of this argument
Consider a chamber, consisting of 100 deputies and in need of selecting a 
Speaker Consider also the possibility that ten members put their name 
forward for election as Speaker It is hypothetically possible that if the 
parliament operates under a plurality voting system a Speaker with just eleven 
votes out of 100 (11 per cent) could be elected This is almost as far removed 
from being 'selection by the whole house' as is possible Compare this 
scenario with a majority or qualified majority voting system within the 
parliament and we soon understand the impact that the voting can have on the 
outcome If a majority is required for election as Speaker the candidate 
selected will have to gamer much more support than if a simple majority was 
required
The higher the threshold, the more a Speaker will have to have the backing of 
a large proportion of the Chamber A qualified majority requirement becomes 
important when the house is split into two camps - one government and one
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opposition In such circumstances even the majority cannot usually elect 
whom it wants as Speaker There must be negotiations to find a Speaker who 
is acceptable to all sides in the chamber Such a Speaker is the product not of 
a content between factions or parties but of a by-partisan decision A neutral 
Speaker is more likely to be the product of a high threshold Alternatively, if 
the system by which the Speaker is selected stresses majontananism over 
consensus the Speaker will more likely be the product of a party-based content 
withm the chamber In such a circumstance the appointment is more likely to 
be seen as a partisan one This logic leads us to our first hypothesis
H I The lower the electoral threshold the less neutral the 
Speaker
Obviously, this logic is most appealing m a chamber with factions of equal or 
near equal strength Where one faction can on its own constitute a qualified 
majority, then it is more difficult to contend that a qualified majority rule will 
lead to a more neutral Speaker There are two good reasons for not becoming 
overly worried by this point The first is the empirical reality that it is rare for 
one faction to have a qualified majority In most legislatures, particularly in 
Western Europe, the majority, if any, enjoyed by any one party is usually
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relatively small. Even coalitions tend to be minimal winning, ensuring that the 
legislative coalition will be close to half of the membership (Lijphart 1999). 
Nevertheless, chambers elected by means of a plurality system may be more 
likely to contain super-majority factions. Recent examples include the British 
House of Commons where the Labour Party has held comfortable majorities.3
However, the second reason for not becoming overly worried by the limitation 
of the argument is that the presence of a special threshold for the election of 
Speaker is in and of itself illuminating. That a candidate requires a majority or 
qualified majority is a decision made at some stage by some individual or 
body charged with drawing up the rules of procedure. The electoral rule by 
which the Speaker it selected can be viewed as an institution in and of itself. 
Where no specific threshold rules apply for the selection of Speaker or where 
the rules do not require a relatively high threshold, we can conclude that the 
chamber does not see the selection of the Speaker as being particularly 
different from any other vote.
3 In the 2001 British General Election the Labour Party returned to parliament with 412 of the 
659 seats.
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Level of Partisanship
Moving beyond the threshold rule we look next at the levels of partisan voting 
involved in the selection of Speaker Parliaments in Western Europe have a 
reputation for being highly partisan forums, especially compared to 
legislatures such as the US House of Congress If the vote for Speaker follows 
a similar pattern and breaks down along partisan lines, we have evidence 
indicating the partisan nature of the appointment
Where the vote to select a Speaker is exercised m public, as distinct from a 
secret ballot, and where this is recorded in the minutes of the proceedings, it is 
possible to test for the level of partisan voting among members What we may 
term rpure partisanship' occurs when all the members of the same party vote 
for the same candidate Non-partisanship is evident when there is no strong 
relationship between the membership of a legislative party and voting 
behaviour of members m the vote to select the Speaker
When members of different parties vote differently, it is difficult not to 
conclude that the selection of a Speaker is a partisan affair The outcome of 
such an election is an obvious one We can use a measure of partisan cohesion 
(such as the Rice Index of Cohesion)4 to measure the level of party versus
4 We discuss this method in greater detail in Chapter Five
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non-party voting From this argument our second hypothesis emerges as 
follows
H2 The higher the level of partisan cohesion on the voting  
to elect a Speaker the lower the level of neutrality
While very helpful, these raw measures of voting partisanship may provide a 
misleading account of the entire selection process Consider, for example, a 
legislature composed of two parties with two candidates seeking election to 
the Speakership, candidate A from party A and candidate B from party B 
Imagine if every member of party A voted for candidate B and every member 
of party B voted for party A An analysis of the voting would indicate strong 
partisanship, but yet the vote would be the opposite of what we would 
normally consider partisanship
This concern is, however, rather trivial In looking at the levels of party 
cohesion on the selection of Speaker all we need to do is be careful to 
examine the voting intention of each faction It would be bizarre to find, for 
example, complete socialist party cohesion but that cohesion being based on
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the party members voting not for the party candidate but for a candidate from 
the conservatives or Christian democrats
Partisan Strength
Our third empirical expectation is concerned with predicting the party origin 
of the successful candidate for Speaker If the Speaker is elected by and from 
among the chamber, then it is possible that the Speaker could come from any 
of the parties or factions If the office were neutral we would expect this to be 
the case The party affiliation of each candidate should not play any role in his 
or her chances Anything else adds a partisan element to the whole exercise If 
we can predict the party of origin of the successful candidate for Speaker, this 
will greatly add to our argument that the selection of Speaker is far from being 
non-partisan
Moreover, if the Speaker is considered a party-asset, then we would expect 
that each party would want to have someone from their benches in the job If 
the Speaker is prized as an asset in itself, then the party will want to distribute 
that prize to one if its own If the Speaker is an asset in assisting the parties m 
the performance of their parliamentary roles, then a party will also want the 
position to go to someone from its own ranks
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In short, we expect that, because of the partisan nature of the selection 
process, the Speaker will come from the faction of the chamber which has the 
necessary majority to have him or her elected This outcome is to be expected 
with high levels of party cohesion, but it may also result when there is an 
equal lack of discipline in the various factions In other words, the balance of 
power is maintained, even in the absence of full party cohesion Of course, if 
there is little party cohesion on the vote to select a Speaker, then it becomes 
more difficult to predict the party background of the successful candidate 
However, we have already dealt with the issue of party discipline above
Put simply, our expectation is that the candidate for Speaker who originates 
from the largest party m the parliament is, ceteris paribus, most likely to be 
elected This would be a clear indication of the partisanship of the office, each 
party trying to take for itself the prize of speaker in the same way as it tried to 
take the prize of government This leads us to our third hypothesis
H3 if the Speaker originates from among the ranks o f the 
largest faction or coalition of factions, that Speakership is 
less neutral
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This majority faction can comprise a smgle political party (which by 
definition would be the largest political party) or a coalition of parties, either 
m a legislative coalition or a government coalition Because the largest party 
might not be a member of that coalition, it is not necessarily the case that the 
Speaker will always come from the largest party In the case of a coalition it 
will be interesting to see from which party the Speaker will come Will it, for 
example, be from among the ranks of the largest political party in the 
legislative coalition? It is this expectation that we will consider due course 
First, however, we should examine one special case m which the largest 
faction or coalition of factions may not want to take the Speakership for itself
The Balance of Power
Consider a hypothetical case where the chamber is equally split between two 
blocks One block consists of a political party which is just one seat short of 
the majority required to form and maintain a government The other side we 
could thmk of as being composed of the remaining political parties and 
perhaps some non-aligned members The largest party wants to form a 
government and requires a majority for the vote of investiture and in order to 
maintain itself m office and see its programme of policies safely pass the
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legislative process In this case, and assuming, as is typical, that the Speaker is 
elected at the start of business prior to any vote of investiture, it becomes clear 
that the rational action of the largest party is to give the Speakership to the 
other block Supporting a candidate from the other block will shift the balance 
of voting power In this scenario, the Chair will not go to the obvious party, it 
may go to any party or individual happy not to attempt to block the entry into 
government of the largest party
Not only does the party not forfeit a vote, but also the combined opposition is 
weakened Of course, it may not even take a hung parliament to tempt the 
prospective parliament into following such a strategy if its majority is slim 
enough, it may wish to use this option as insurance And the same option 
applies to cases of minority governments that want to reduce the relative 
minority they hold Of course, if the opposition block is interested in the 
potential of forming an alternative government, they may be unwilling to play 
along with the large party This game brings us to our fourth hypothesis
H4 Where a prospective incoming government is m a 
minority position or has a very slim majority they will, out 
of self-interest, offer the Speakership to another party
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In essence, we are predicting that the larger party is forfeiting the prize of the 
Speakership for the prize of Government It would seem quite obvious that, if 
offered the choice, a party would prefer to form a single-party majority 
government than supply a Speaker No matter how influential the Speaker is, 
how much an asset it is for the party, its benefits can hardly outweigh the 
attractions of Government for the party leadership 5
Coalition Bargaining
We have only gone so far as to predict that the Speaker will come from the 
controlling party or coalition of parties We briefly discussed the question of 
what would happen when the winning faction m the legislature is a coalition 
of parties It is to this issue that we now turn In one sense, given the great 
interest shown in the process of government formation it is perhaps surprising 
that the issue of selecting the Speaker and its impact on government formation 
has never been considered m the literature Before proceeding, it may be 
illuminating to briefly sidetrack a little and discuss the general government 
formation process
5 We must be conscious however that, as Strom (1990) has shown, not all parties are 
mterested in Government Some may prefer to use the influence of the legislature to 
participate in policy making Such parties are very likely to have their eye on the Speakership* 
particularly if the incoming minority governments are willing to agree to this
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When after a general election no single party is capable of forming a 
government, it is usual for the various parties making up the legislature to 
consider the viability of various coalitions of parties Central to these 
negotiations are agreements on policy as well as the division of spoils - in 
particular the allocation of seats around the cabinet table to the various 
political parties
Theories of coalition government, seeking to explain which governments 
form, are prolific6 One of the most popular theories argues that the 
government formation process is best understood as a game of allocating 
cabinet portfolios, with the various parties bargaining for government 
ministries important to them for policy reasons (Laver & Shepsle 1996)
Yet, as we have mentioned, little attention has been paid to the Speaker 
Whether this is because there is little evidence, or because the theorists do not 
see the Speakership as a valued bargaining chip, or because the theories are 
more policy-centred than office-centred we can only speculate
We do think, however, that a case can be made for examining the allocation of 
Speaker among various parties to a coalition We speculate that the 
Speakership may well be part of the prizes divided among the political parties
6 For an overview see Layer (1988)
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trying to form a coalition The Speaker is, as we have argued in previous 
chapters, an asset (again that asset may be of the pure variety or an asset 
which helps the government achieve its aims) Given that the success or 
failure of coalition bargaining often rests on each party getting an acceptable 
share of the offices available, it seems a little odd to think that the Speakership 
is not part of the bounty being negotiated around the table This brings us to 
our fifth hypothesis
H5 In a coalition the allocation of a partisan Speaker will be 
the subject of negotiations between the various parties to the 
coalition
In giving empirical content to this hypothesis, we will be looking in particular 
to see if any trends emerge as to which party 'wins' the Speakership Is it for 
example going to the largest party7 We will have to examine more qualitative 
evidence to see if the Speakership was actually part of the deal brokered 
between coalition partners We may of course find that because of the 
sequence of government formation the Speaker may have to be selected 
during or even before talks to form a coalition take place
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Previous Career
Laundy (1964) pays particular importance to the type of person selected as 
Speaker as an example of the need to maintain neutrality Key to the 
emergence of a non-partisan Speaker is the precedent that before being 
considered candidates for the post of Speaker members must have been 
removed from active national partisan politics for some years What 
constitutes active partisan politics is open to debate, but certainly includes 
being a government minister or a member of the party front bench Certainly, 
too, the Speakership should have not been embroiled in particular political 
controversy
In summary, the Speaker is expected to come from the rather more sleepy 
recesses of the backbenches It is difficult to imagine how an active partisan 
could, literally overnight, become a neutral non-partisan One of the key tests 
of our rational account is to see whether or not this norm actually exists in 
practice If recent government ministers or shadow ministers are appointed 
Speaker, it adds credibility to our argument that the Speakership is indeed a 
political office Our sixth prediction then is that
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H6 A neutral Speaker will be a long-serving backbencher, 
removed form active partisan politics 
Intra-party decision making
So far we have focused on the allocation of the office between parties, but 
what of the allocation process, if any, within parties? There are two inter­
related issues to be considered here The first concerns the degree to which a 
member of the party standing is a candidate of that party Secondly, if his or 
her party has selected the candidate for Speaker, what exactly is the process 
by which such a selection takes place In particular, we are interested in seeing 
whether the decision is an oligarchic or a democratic one
If the Speaker is to be neutral and non-partisan, then it is unlikely that each or 
any party could put forward candidates for the office Although candidates 
may receive the backing of their party colleagues, this does not imply that 
they are necessarily party candidates Evidence that parties do actually run 
candidates can be gleaned from whether or not there is more than one 
candidate from each political party If there is only one candidate, this may be 
on the face of it, evidence that the party (at some level) has a strategy to run a 
single candidate If the party did not involve themselves on this issue, it is
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more likely that several candidates could emerge from the same political 
party Hypothesis seven tests for the degree to which competitions are 
between candidates from both the same and opposite parties or situations 
where a party only runs one candidate each
H7 If the appointment of the Speaker is a partisan one, we 
will see no more than one candidate from each party
Of course, we may only see one candidate from each party anyway To further 
investigate the inter-party element we need to take the lid off the 
parliamentary party politics In particular, we are interested in establishing if 
there are any processes and rules (formal or informal) which guide the 
emergence of candidates for the office of Speaker
Recall from our review of the British Speaker that backbenchers jealously 
guard their right to select the person to hold the office Any interference from 
the party leadership, be it the party leader, front bench or whips, will not be 
tolerated However, we also saw that even at Westminster this is not always 
the case Comparatively the process of selecting a candidate may be very 
different
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At one extreme any member of a party might be able to put his or her name 
forward without reference to the party If the rules of the chamber permit any 
member to be nominated (and a nomination rarely requires more than the 
support of a handful of members), then we would expect this to be the case
At the other extreme, the decision of whom is to be the party candidate, or if 
the party is even going to have a candidate, may be a matter for the leader of 
the party Party leaders have a significant amount of influence in most 
European legislatures and their colleagues in the parliamentary party usually 
accept their decision
The most extreme case is where the party leader has the power to decide who 
in his or her party will run for the post On the other end of the scale, any 
member who so wishes may be able to seek the nomination Between these 
two extremes numerous other alternatives exists, such as giving the 
parliamentary party the last say
We suggest that the more democratic the mechanism for the selection of the 
party's candidate, the more generally accepted the candidate, and 
consequently, the less partisan his or her appointment will be A candidate 
selected by the party elite will in effect have been selected by one or a handful
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of parliamentarians This is a long cry from the expectation that a neutral 
speaker will be one who has the support of a large proportion of the whole 
house Any support gamed following their nomination must be considered in 
light of the usual requirements of parliamentary party discipline members of 
parliament delegate authority to the party elite, who in return, can rely on the 
support of the party members in the chamber If this were true, it would be in 
keeping with the prediction that the office is partisan how more partisan can 
one get than the party leader deciding who will be Speaker How a candidate 
for Speaker emerges from within his or her party will thus shed light on the 
partisanship of the appointment
H8 If the office is a partisan one, the party leadership, 
rather than a more democratic forum withm the political 
party, shall determine who will be nominated for the 
Speakership
Re-selection
One scenario that we have not discussed so far is what will happen if the 
Speaker of the outgoing parliament is available and willing to continue in
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office In the Irish case the Ceann Comhairle is elected at the first meeting of 
the Dail following a general election and normally holds office until that Dail 
is dissolved (which occurs when a general election is called) The non-partisan 
tradition associated with the office would imply that, assuming no 
inappropriate behaviour on his or her part during the previous sittings, an 
outgoing Speaker would be reappointed To effectively eject one Speaker in 
favour of a candidate would seem to be the height of partisanship
There are two scenarios in which our theory would predict that a Speaker 
would change The first is where the balance of power changes and the new 
power brokers prefer to select an alternative rather than reselecting their 
previous choice This could occur if, for example, a minority government 
initially selects from the opposition but following another general election 
wins a majority or is able to form a majority coalition Rationally it would 
seem that the same government would make a different selection, choosing 
this time a member from their own party
The second possibility is that the chances of the incumbent speaker will be 
affected by a change of government after an election - the new government 
wishing to select a replacement from its own side In such cases the outgoing 
Speaker, even if her or she is available and willing to serve another term, may 
lose the Speakership
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To remove effectively an incumbent Speaker who has made it known that he 
or she wishes to continue in office must be the height of partisanship It is 
hard to reconcile the non-partisan, neutral thesis of the Office if political 
parties are willing to uproot a Speaker so that one of their own can take the 
office Our ninth prediction seeks to capture this point
H9 If the Speakership is non-partisan, then the outgoing 
Speaker will, if he or she is willing to serve another term, 
even with a change of Government, be reselected
Removal from office
Our interpretation of the role played by incumbency in selecting a Speaker 
leads us to our next empirical expectation Tins expectation revolves around 
how difficult it is to remove the Speaker from that position Two things are 
likely to determine whether or not a Speaker is safe from challenge The first 
is a formal rule regarding whether or not a Speaker can be removed, the 
second is the norm of whether or not Speakers are easily removed, even if the 
rules permit such removal
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Formally the rules guiding the removal, impeachment or continuance in office 
of a Speaker are likely to be contained in the rules of the Chamber They 
could range from making it impossible to remove a Speaker once he or she 
has been appointed to allowing a Speaker to be removed by the same 
threshold by which they were selected A whole range of options can occur in- 
between - such as requiring a super-majonty to remove a Speaker or the role 
of a third agent such as the Head of State or superior Court justices
Jenny and Muller (1995 338) argue that the more difficult it is to remove a 
Speaker the less partisan that Speaker will be The justification for this 
argument being that no one faction can control the office if a super-majonty is 
needed to remove the speaker - if a simple majority was all that was needed 
then the Speaker would continually face the threat of removal from the 
majority and consequently might be less likely to act in a non-majoritarian 
way If the Speaker is accountable to a majority he or she may have to 
continuously be 'looking over their shoulder’ to ensure that they are not 
offending the party leadership If it is more difficult to remove a Speaker they 
can preside without any fear or pressure of having to 'accommodate' the 
majority This gives rise to hypothesis ten
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H10 A non-partisan Speaker will have the security of 
tenure above and beyond a simple vote of removal
The formal rule, however, may tell only half the picture Even if the rules 
allow for the removal of the Speaker, this may not still be possible for purely 
political reasons We must also examine how secure in practice is the term of 
office of the Speaker The formal rules may indicate one thing but the 
informal rules may tell a different story Likewise, even the most secure 
Speaker may be forced to resign if they come under unbearable pressure This 
pressure may of course need to come from all sides of the house to warrant a 
Speaker considering resignation On the other hand, a Speaker may feel it 
necessary to resign if he or she no longer has the confidence of a large 
proportion of the chamber over which he or she presides In summary, do 
Speakers resign or are they ever pushed7 Ultimately are they ever removed 
from office9
Of course, such moves may take place in the comdors of power without little 
supporting evidence that such attempts ever took place Nevertheless, we will 
need to look at how secure the Speaker is and how willing parties are 
pressurise a Speaker into resigning should the Speaker be out of favour with 
them If such events have occurred, they will strengthen our belief that the
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office is a highly partisan one - but only if the desire to get rid of a particular 
incumbent comes from only one faction or group of factions Our rational 
account of the Speaker then predicts that
H ll If a faction can remove a Speaker from office, that 
speaker is less likely to be non-partisan
Our first eleven predictions focus on the process of selecting, appointing and 
potentially removing a Speaker We now turn our attention to the second 
category of hypotheses where we make predictions about the behaviour of the 
person elected as Speaker Making claims about the Speaker in action results 
in the predictions being rather more qualitative than most of those used above 
and are by their nature more subjective While there are potentially numerous 
empirical expectations we could draw from our rational account of the office, 
we will limit ourselves to evidence that is least subjective and where we are 
likely to find hard evidence to support or undermine our theory
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Casting Vote
Our first prediction about the Speaker while in office relates to what is 
perhaps the one occasion when he or she can choose to express, or not 
express, a political preferences Normally the Speaker is not entitled to 
participate in debate or to vote on matters before the house However, one 
scenario allows him or her to retreat from this when the house has divided 
equally on a vote the Speaker may exercise a casting vote In some 
legislatures the rules go one step further requiring that the Speaker must break 
the tie in such an event In deciding how to vote we suggest the Speaker can 
be motivated by two very different factors The first is the Speaker's own 
political preferences Here the Speaker will look at the issue before the 
chamber and make his or her own decision based on his/her opinion of the 
issue before the chamber and then vote accordingly
Closely related to the above, and perhaps more realistic, is where the Speaker 
supports the faction or coalition of factions from which he or she came In 
other words, the Speaker will vote in a partisan manner The question of 
whether it is the personal political preferences or simply to abide by with the 
policy of the party from which they came is not overly important what is 
important is that the Speaker is, far from being neutral, actually voting in a 
partisan manner
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The alternative is for the Speaker to rely on some precedent to determine how 
he or she will cast their vote Here, personal or political preferences will play 
no role The vote of the Speaker will be a foregone conclusion Does 
precedent exist to cover such issues7
The answer as we will recall from our comparative analysis in Chapter Three 
is yes The British Speaker is guided by precedent in determining how to vote 
in the event of a tie taking place The norm is for the Speaker to vote in such a 
way as to maintain the status quo in other words he or she will usually vote in 
negative On occasions, such as a vote of confidence in the Government, the 
Speaker supporting the vote maintains the status quo Such behaviour ensures 
the impartiality of the Speaker by permitting the House to return to the subject 
at another date if it so wishes
Were the Speaker not to follow such a precedent, it may suggest that he or she 
is voting on the basis of his or her own opimons This would be clear evidence 
that the person was not acting m a neutral non-partisan way From this logic 
we derive hypothesis twelve based on a rational Speaker
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H12 If a Speaker is partisan they will not rely on 
precedent to break a tie
Of course, we must take account of cases where both precedent and partisan 
interest determine that the Speaker vote the same way If such circumstances 
were ever to occur we would certainly expect that the Speaker would not vote 
against precedent
Respect for the Speaker
Our next three hypotheses revolved around a variable that is at the heart of the 
neutrality thesis that our account seeks to replace That variable is the amount 
of respect that is shown the Speaker by various actors We will remember that 
Laundy (1964) stressed the high nature of the office and the unwillingness of 
parliamentarians to question the decisions of the chair Because the Speaker is 
above politics, parliamentarians are willing to be no more than deferential to 
the rulings and actions of the chair Laundy (1964 46) suggests that, even 
when an action of the Speaker is questioned by a parliamentarian, it is that 
specific decision, rather than the Speaker or his/her judgement, that will be
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called into question It would in other words be unthinkable or at the very 
least unlikely for a neutral Speaker to be the subject of criticism
If this claim that the speaker will be respected is correct, an assertion upon 
which much of the neutrality thesis is based then we would expect to find little 
evidence of open criticism being levelled at the Speaker from any side of the 
chamber Individual parliamentarians or their leaders will not usually call 
decisions of the Chair into question They will treat the Speaker with a high 
level of respect
H13 A neutral speaker will have high standing withm the 
chamber and enjoy the respect of the whole, or vast 
majority of, the house
Where criticism is made of the Speaker and the speaker is a non-partisan we 
would expect that the level of criticism should be equally distributed across 
the floor At the very least, we would not expect to see a pattern where it is 
one side of the house that is continually being critical of the Speaker If one 
side of the house continually questioned or criticised the actions of the 
Speaker this must surely call into question his neutrality More specifically it
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calls in to question the perception of one side of the house as to the Speaker's 
neutrality Likewise, why would the other side be quiet on such matters unless 
they were benefiting from the Speaker's interpretation of the rules or other 
behaviour7 If criticism is continually coming form one faction, however 
difficult this measure may be to operationalise, it provides further support for 
the above hypothesis
Career
As a final measure of the non-partisanship of the office we move from the 
behaviour of the Speaker as Speaker to his or her behaviour on vacating the 
Chair Again, we will recall the tradition established in the UK that not only 
does the Speaker renounce all political affiliations while in the position, but 
also on taking up office they totally and irrevocably cut themselves off from 
party politics (Laundy, 1964) The important point here is that the non- 
partisanship is expected to continue even after the Speaker has left office It 
is, as it were, a case of ’once a Speaker always a Speaker' for to be seen to be 
passing judgement on affairs which were under consideration while Speaker 
would be a gross violation of the idea of neutrality
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In our final hypothesis we explore the career paths of Speakers after they have 
left the chair What we will be looking for in particular is evidence of whether 
or not they have re-entered political life Signs of this could include 
continuing to sit in the parliament, and more particularly participating in 
debate and voting, or taking on other political roles outside the chamber Our 
final prediction then is that
H14 If partisan, retired Speakers will not necessarily
refrain from active partisan politics
While former Speakers may choose to retire fully, we are more interested to 
see if there are actual cases of Speakers leaving the Chair and pursuing an 
active political career If so, the level at which such partisanship is played out 
will be interesting Certainly returning to frontbench politics would seen to be 
in total conflict with the neutrality thesis
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iv Conclusion
In this chapter we have set out what we believe are fourteen clear hypotheses 
concerning the nature of the Office of Speaker m general and the Irish 
Speaker in particular We explained why each hypothesis serves as a check on 
the accuracy of our theory of the Speaker presented m the previous chapter 
Each hypothesis can serve to either validate or contradict the understanding of 
the office that we have presented
Each of the propositions is capable of empirical examination In some cases 
the data required to confirm the hypothesis is of a quantitative nature, for 
other hypothesis we are left to rely on more qualitative material Nevertheless, 
the number of hypothesis should give some comfort that it will be difficult to 
distort the evidence for our own particular benefit
It is to the evidence that we turn in the next three chapters In chapter five we 
examine m detail the nature of selection and appointment of the Irish Speaker 
and test each of the hypotheses one through eleven In chapter six we explore 
hypothesis concerning the security of the Speaker's tenure, the attitudinal 
hypothesis and the hypothesis relating to the post-office career paths of former 
Speakers
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Chapter Five: Selection and Appointment
i Introduction
Having set out our sixteen hypotheses, which we expect will validate our 
rational-choice theory of the Office of Speaker, we now turn to the process 
of giving empirical content to these assertions In this chapter we explore 
the selection and appointment of the Irish Speaker (as explored in 
hypothesis one through 11) In the subsequent chapter we will apply 
empirical data to the remaining hypothesis, which deal with the post- 
appointment behaviour of the Speaker
Our goal m this Chapter then is to investigate whether the hypotheses 
relating to the selection of the Speaker can survive the test of empirical 
analysis If they do, we have gone a long way in validating our claims 
about the Office of Speaker If our propositions do not stand up to 
empirical scrutiny, then the accuracy of our theory of the Speaker will be 
highly suspect and it is back to the drawing board
The empirical focus throughout this Chapter is on the 28 occasions on 
which the Dail has selected a Ceann Comhairle Rather than provide a 
chronological account of each case, we have opted to proceed in a more 
thematic approach, gathering and analysing evidence related to each of the
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hypotheses. This has the advantage of allowing us to test clearly each of 
our assertions. We begin with the first assertion made in Chapter Four, 
which related to the threshold level required for election to the 
Speakership.
ii. The Threshold for Election
Our first hypothesis relates to the level of support required in the chamber 
for a candidate to become Speaker. Two different documents dictate the 
rules for the selection of Ceann Comhairle. The Constitution of Ireland 
(Bunreacht na hÉireann) provides the framework within which the 
appointment is made, while the Standing Orders of the Dâil prescribe in 
greater detail the rules of appointment. The question of threshold is left to 
Standing Orders.1 The relevant Standing Orders governing the election of 
Ceann Comhairle are set out in figure 5.1 below.
1 The only constitutional provision regarding the selection of a Speaker is set out in 
Article 15.9. 1° which reads: Each House of the Oireachtas shall elect from its members 
its own Chairman and Deputy Chairman, and shall prescribe their powers and duties. The 
Constitution also states that 'Each House shall make its own rules and standing orders’ 
(Article 15.10). This latter provision permits the finer details of selection a Speaker to be 
determined by Standing Orders.
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Figure 5 1 Standing Orders relating to the election of Speaker
6 (1) The Dail shall then proceed to the election of a Ceann Comhairle, and a motion may 
be made to that effect by any member who has taken his or her seat according to law 
Such motion or motions shall be received by the Clerk, who shall act as Chairman until 
the Ceann Comhairle is elected
6 (2) If only one member be proposed as Ceann Comhairle the Clerk shall put the 
question "That (naming the member) be elected and do now take the Chair
of the Dail as Ceann Comhairle", which shall be decided like other questions Provided 
that in the event of there being an equality of votes, the question will be decided in the 
negative
6 (3) If more than one member be proposed as Ceann Comhairle, the Clerk shall, in the 
order in which the members shall have been proposed, put the question, "That 
(naming the member) be elected and do now take the Chair of the D&il as 
Ceann Comhairle", which shall be decided like other questions Provided that in the 
event of there being an equality of votes, the question shall be decided in the negative
(Emphasis added)
From Standing Order Six we can see that no specific threshold is set for 
the election of Speaker The key phrase is that the motion 'shall be decided 
like other questions' Under the Dail Standing Orders, questions put to a 
vote are decided by a simple majority - the threshold for success thus 
being a relative, as distinct from qualified, majority Applied to the 
election of Ceann Comhairle, this system leaves a nominee for the office 
requiring only more votes in support than votes in opposition the number 
of deputies voting in favour of the motion must only be greater than the 
number of Deputies voting against
As an example of how this plurality voting system operates let us briefly 
ponder the election of Tom Fitzpatrick as Ceann Comhairle in December 
1982 The appointment of a Ceann Comhairle was required following the
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re-assembly of the Dail after a general election the previous month As is
j
usual, the Clerk of the Dail invited nominations for the post of Ceann 
Comhairle The leader and deputy leader of Fine Gael nominated a 
member of their own party Two non-aligned members made a second 
nomination and the leader of Fianna Fail, which happened to be the largest 
party in the chamber, subsequently supported this nomination
Under the voting rule for Ceann Comhairle the name of the first person 
nominated is put to a vote Consequently, the motion to elect the Fine Gael 
member is voted upon The number of ’yes' votes amounted to 86, with 80 \ 
votes against Fitzpatnck was elected Ceann Comhairle with the motion to 
elect the second nominee never being put to a vote
What the above example illustrates very well is how the low threshold rule 
in Irish parliament reduces the need for some form of cross-party support 
in the election of Speaker If one or more of the parties can secure a 
plurality of votes, then the other parties are left helpless The relative 
closeness of the vote in 1982, with a margin of only six between those in 
favour and those opposed to the candidate, provides a good example of the 
majontanan, as distinct from consensual, nature of the appointment 
process
This process adds credibility to our argument that the Speakership is a 
partisan office Indeed, our first hypothesis is verified The Irish
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parliament has the lowest possible threshold for the selection of a Speaker, 
with a nominee only requiring more votes in favour of his or her 
nomination than there are against This is only further confirmed when we 
consider that there only needs to be a quorum of members present to elect 
a Ceann Comhairle With the normal quorum being set at twenty members 
it is, at least theoretically, possible for eleven of a total membership of 166 
to decide who will be Ceann Comhairle The absence of any special 
quorum for electing the Ceann Comhairle is yet another example of how 
'ordinary' the election of Speaker is considered to be Such 'ordinary' votes 
are the stuff of partisanship, or at the very least allow for the possibility of 
greater partisanship Only a higher threshold, requiring cross-party support 
or agreement, would render such competitions from being so obviously 
partisan
in Level of Partisanship
In Chapter Five we argued that the partisanship of the Speakership can be 
inferred from the level of partisan voting which occurs in the election of 
Speaker As the voting behaviour of each deputy is recorded in the Irish 
parliament, we can easily test the levels of partisanship usmg a simple roll- 
call analysis 2 Roll-call analysis tests the unity or cohesion of the party 
vote Put simply, it measures what proportion of the legislative party votes
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the same way A high level of cohesion occurs where a large proportion of 
the legislative party vote the same way Low cohesion occurs when there 
is no relationship between members voting behaviour and his or her party 
membership
There have been four occasions (1932, 1977, 1982 and most recently in 
1989) on which a vote has been required to appoint the Ceann Comhairle 
So how partisan was the voting on each of these occasions The result of 
our roll-call analysis is presented in Table 5 1 and certainly makes for 
interested reading
2 It is not unusual, especially in the European context, for votes in parliamentary 
chambers to be held m secret or if by a show of hands not recorded (see further, Saalfeld 
(1995)
3 A formal vote is required when there is more than one candidate, or where a division 
(vote) is otherwise called Otherwise where there is a sole nominee he has deemed 
elected We will return to this point in Chapter Seven Here we are only concerned with 
situations where a vote takes place
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Table 5 1 Levels of PartisanVoting in the election 
of Ceann Comhairle
Year FF FG LAB WP PD Others Total
1932 In favour 71 53 7 18 78
Against 0 0 0 0 71
Unity (%) 100 100 100 100
1977 In favour 84 0 0 0 84
Against 0 43 16 1 60
Unity (%) 100 100 100 100
1982 In favour 0 70 16 0 0 86
Against 75 0 0 2 3 80
Unity (%) 100 100 100 100 100
1989 In favour 78 0 0 1 0 2 87
Against 0 55 15 0 6 2 78
Unity (%) 100 100 100 100 100 50
The evidence could not be stronger If we look at the level of partisan 
cohesion for each of the political parties, we see it has always equalled one 
hundred per cent In each of the years in which a vote has taken place, 
party members have always voted along party lines Only in the case of the 
non-aligned block has any cross-voting taken place This however is not 
particular surprising, nor does it take away from our argument given that 
non-aligned members are just that They do not necessarily form or enter 
into a voting agreement with each other
In three of the four cases the party which secured the majority was voting 
in favour of one of their own members becoming Ceann Comhairle In 
1932 Fianna Fail supported Frank Fahy, himself a member of Fianna Fail 
In 1977 another Fianna Fail deputy, Joseph Brennan, is elected with the 
support of his parliamentary party colleagues In December 1982 the
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incoming Fine Gael / Labour Party coalition government voted to secure 
the appointment of Tom Fitzpatrick, a member of the Fine Gael party
The only occasion in which members of a party voted to support a 
candidate from outside the party was in 1989 On that occasion Fianna Fail 
deputies voted in support of Sean Treacy Treacy was a non-aligned 
member On that occasion no member of Fianna Fail was nominated4
An obvious question arises as to why such high levels of partisanship 
voting exist Is it the case that members of the same party simply are 
inclined to back the same person? While it is difficult to disprove 
completely this point, it seems unlikely 5 On the contrary the total absence 
of any cross-party voting suggests that party discipline must be responsible 
for the voting behaviour of members It is normal for each party to issue 
’whips' to their deputies instructing them when and how to vote on 
particular motions 6 The vote on the motion to select a Ceann Comhairle 
appears to be no different Members, it would seem, are not removed from 
the shackles of the party whip, even when it comes to the selection of 
Ceann Comhairle
4 As we will see below this is because the Fianna Fail leadership needed a deputy from 
the other side of the house to assist in the government formation process
5 Where such unity or cohesion occurs because of shared preferences can be referred to 
natural cohesion - to differentiate it from cohesion which occurs because of an agreement, 
requirement or expectation to vote m unity
6 Rather amusingly the term 'whip' originated in the British House of Commons and is 
said to be derived from the English tradition of fox-hunting where whips are used by a 
hunt to prevent hounds from straying too far1
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It would be very difficult to reconcile the issuing of party whips, and the 
consequential partisan nature of the voting as detailed above, with the 
claim that the selection of a Ceann Comhairle lies above party politics. If it 
did, then we would expect to see no strong relationship (instead of an 
absolute correlation) between the voting behaviour of members and their 
party origin.
Our second hypothesis would seem to be validated. Every time a vote has 
been required to select a Ceann Comhairle we, have observed as high a 
level of partisanship as is possible.
The reader may well question the low occurrence of voting, and perhaps 
relate this to a high level of non-partisanship. We will need to discuss the 
infrequency of actual voting as this may slightly diminish the validity of 
our argument here. As already mentioned we take up this point in Chapter 
Seven along with other apparent anomalies which may emerge from our 
empirical investigation. Suffice to say at this stage that we do not believe 
the infrequency of voting is related to non-partisan motives, but rather to 
an acceptance that any vote would be a fait accompli.
iv. Partisan Origin
Recall our argument that if the selection of a Speaker is above partisan 
politics, then the party affiliation of each candidate should have no role to
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play in his or her chances of being elected Speaker. If the Speakership is 
the subject of partisan politics then a clear pattern should emerge. Our first 
prediction with regard to the party affiliation of the winning candidate 
(Hypothesis 3) was to suggest that the Speaker will originate from the 
benches of the largest faction or coalition of factions.
Table 5.3 provides data based on an analysis of the party origin of each 
Ceann Comhairle, both on his initial appointment and in addition on each 
of the occasions he was re-appointed. Specifically, the table relates the 
distribution of partisan power each time a Ceann Comhairle was elected to 
the party background of the successful candidate. The picture which 
emerges is mixed: in just over half (15 of 28) of the cases the Ceann 
Comhairle came from the largest party. Interestingly the Ceann Comhairle 
is more likely to be from the third largest party than from the second 
largest. Moreover on five occasions the Ceann Comhairle has came not 
from the ranks of a political party but from the non-aligned members.
Table 5.2: Partisanship as Determinant of Selection (by Party size)
TOTAL
Ceann Comhairle from largest party 15
Ceann Comhairle from second largest party 1
Ceann Comhairle from third largest party 7
Ceann Comhairle from smaller party 0
Non-party (independent) Ceann Comhairle 5
What Table 5.2 does not take account of is the question of coalition 
factions. This information is presented in Table 5.3 which takes the unit of
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analysis to be the faction about to enter government, rather than a political 
party The results are more in line with our expectations In 18 of the 28 
cases the Speakership has come from the ranks of the largest faction
Table 5 3 Partisanship as Determinant of Selection (by winning faction)
TOTAL
Ceann Comhairle from largest faction 18
Ceann Comhairle from outside largest faction 10
While this provides qualified evidence of our third hypothesis, we must 
examine why on ten occasions the Speakership has been 'given' to a person 
from outside the ranks of the winning faction Our fourth hypothesis, 
which relates to the balance of power, may go some way to explaining 
these nine cases
It may be worth pausing here to consider just how accepted it has become 
that the appointment is a partisan one with no tradition of cross-party 
consensus This is perhaps best summed up in the words of the then leader 
of Fine Gael, commenting in the Dail on the way m which a party will 
nominate a candidate without hearing the views of other parties
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I think that it could be desirable in general 
principle were it the practice of this House 
that the appointment of Ceann Comhairle 
had been the subject of prior consultation, 
but this has not been. There is not a 
precedent for this and therefore I make no 
criticism of the Taoiseach for not having 
such. I make that remark merely at the outset 
and I think that for the future such a 
precedent might be useful (Dail Debates, 
Vol. 323, Col. 121, 16 October 1980).
v. Balance of Power
We claimed that there would be one situation in which it would clearly be 
irrational for a political party to select a Ceann Comhairle from among its 
own ranks. This exceptional circumstance occurs where the largest party 
or coalition of parties is not completely capable of forming a government. 
To assist in the process of forming and maintaining a government they 
would 'offer* the Speakership to the other side, thus enhancing and perhaps 
even fundamentally altering their ability to enter government.
In recent years no single party has been able to secure the necessary 
number of seats in the Irish parliament to gain an overall majority which 
would entitle them to enter government as a single-party majority 
administration. Not since 1977 has one political party political commanded 
an overall majority. Consequently either coalition government or minority 
government and, more recently again, minority coalition government have 
become the rule rather than the exception. Table 5.4 sets out to capture the
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relationship between minority/majority status of the incoming government 
and whether or not the Ceann Comhairle comes from the government side
Table 5.4 Incoming Government strength and party affiliation of
Ceann Comhairle
YEAR Gov Seats Total Seats %support % support if CC 
came from 
opposition
Did CC come from 
non-government 
party7
1922 58 128 45 3 45 7
1923 63 153 412 41 4
1927 (a) 47 153 30 7 30 9
1927 (b) 62 153 40 5 40 8
1932 72 153 47 1 47 4
1933 77 153 50 3 50 7
1937 69 138 50 50 4
1938 77 138 55 8 56 2
1943 67 138 48 5 48 9
1944 76 138 55 1 55 5
1948 67 147 45 6 45 9 Yes
1951 69 147 46 9 47 3 Yes (reappointed)
1954 74 147 50 3 50 7
1957 78 147 53 53 4 Yes (reappointed)
1961 70 144 48 6 48 9 Yes (reappointed)
1965 72 144 50 50 4
1969 75 144 52 1 52 4
1973 73 144 50 7 51
1977 84 148 56 8 57 1
1981 80 166 48 2 48 5 Yes
1982 (a) 8] 166 48 8 49 1 Yes
(reappointment)
1982 (b) 86 166 51 8 52 1
1987 81 166 48 8 49 1 Yes
1989 83 166 50 50 3 Yes
(reappointment)
1992 83 166 50 50 3 Yes (reappointed)
1997 81 166 48 8 49 1 Yes
NB % are rounded
There have been nine occasions in which the government have had over 50 
per cent of parliamentary seats, four occasions in which they have exactly
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50 per cent and 14 occasions in which they have had under 50 per cent of 
seats When we look at cases where the Ceann Comhairle was not from 
parties forming the incoming Government we see that when the 
Government enjoys a majority they generally do not appoint someone 
from the opposition benches7 When party support hovers around the 50 
per cent mark the Ceann Comhairle is more likely not to be a member of 
the Government party
However, the data fails to support the generalisation that minority 
governments will always opt for a Ceann Comhairle from outside their 
own ranks In 1932, for example, the incoming Fianna Fail minority 
government opted to appoint a Fianna Fail member Was this irrational7
In the 1932 case, it would seem that other factors may have been at play 
In that year Fianna Fail was supported on votes within the chamber by the 
Labour Party and, while technically a minority government, they had the
Q
comfort of majority support To some degree, this discrepancy can be 
explained by the fact that minority governments can rely on the support of 
smaller parties or independents In other circumstances it seems that the 
trend is to offer the Speakership to someone from the opposition benches
7 The outlier is 1957 where the appointment was a re-appointment and can perhaps be 
explained by the later criteria (namely the reappointment criteria)
8 The Labour Party support for the Fianna Fail government was given in return for the 
implementation of policies common to both parties (Dunphy, 1995, p 197) Until 1989 
Fianna Fail refused to countenance the possibility of ever participating in a coalition 
government They did however frequently do ‘deals’ with other individuals 
parliamentarians or parties to gain their support
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By way of example, the most recent appointment to the Speakership 
illustrates how an incoming Government will offer the post of Ceann 
Comhairle to someone from the opposition benches for its own partisan 
benefits In 1997 the Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat electoral alliance 
found itself three seats short of an overall majority (it had 81 of the 
required 84 seats needed for a clear majority) Following negotiations it 
won the support of a number of independents but could not afford to lose 
one of its members to the office of Ceann Comhairle Giving the post to an 
independent would have the same result - one vote less for the government 
side To overcome this, the incoming Taoiseach suggested to the 
leadership of the Labour Party that one of its members become Ceann 
Comhairle With the agreement of the Labour leadership, a Labour deputy 
was subsequently nominated and supported by the incoming government
The selection of a Speaker following the 1987 general election illustrates 
further the dilemma faced not just by the willing faction, but also by the 
losing faction whose acquiescence to having one of its members become 
Ceann Comhairle is to strengthen the government The 1987 general 
election returned a hung Dail with Fianna Fail attempting to gain enough 
support to form a minority government dependent on the opposition not to 
bring them down Part of their strategy was to ensure the Ceann Comhairle 
came from the opposition benches The leader of the Fianna Fail Party 
offered the position to the outgoing Ceann Comhairle (Tom Fitzpatrick a
182
member of Fine Gael) Fitzpatrick was faced with a dilemma assist Fianna 
Fail by allowing himself to be re-nominated and consequently reduce the 
chance of his own party returning to office within as short a period as 
possible or decline the offer, thus increasing the difficulties for Fianna Fail 
and increasing the probability of another general election
The 'advice' of the Fine Gael Parliamentary Party was that Fitzpatrick 
should decline any offer from Fianna Fail The Fine Gael leadership of the 
party made it clear that they considered the filling of the post to be a party 
political matter and they would be vigorous m their opposition to 
Fitzpatrick taking the office because they considered that he would be 
propping up an opposition party m Government Cornered by his party 
leadership, he was forced to reject the offer to be re-nominated
The evidence suggests that an incoming minority government is mindful of 
the need to ensure that the appointment of Ceann Comhairle will not 
jeopardise their chances of winning and retaining office Where the 
appointment can change the balance of power, parties will be only too 
happy to offer the chair to the other side Where opposition parties are 
unwilling to accept such an arrangement, the offer may be made to an 
independent member This was the eventual outcome in 1987 with a non- 
aligned member being nominated by Fianna Fail as the Ceann Comhairle
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vi Coalition Bargaining
We already have a taste for the impact of the needs arising from the 
government formation process from our above discussion What is certain 
is that the selection of Speaker is on occasions crucial to the chances of a 
party or coalition of parties forming a government What happens when 
this is not the case? For example, where the incoming coalition has a 
majority? In such cases we would expect the allocation of the Speakership 
to be the subject of negotiations between the various political parties 
making up that coalition
Yet this scenario, despite the recent dominance of coalition government, 
seems to been played out very infrequently This is because, as we have 
seen above, the Speakership is offered to the opposition benches, more 
often than not, in an attempt to secure the entry into and workability of a 
government Most recently, in 1997 for example, there was no question of 
the Speaker coming from within the Fianna Fail/Progressive Democrat 
coalition What happens on those occasions where it is possible? We 
consider here those occasions where a coalition is formed and where the 
Speakership is to be given to one of the parties m that coalition The inter- 
coalition selection of Speaker has happened only on two occasions, each of 
which is summarised in Table 5 5
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Table 5 5 The inter-coalition allocation of the Speaker
Year Coalition Parties Outcome
1982 (November) Fine Gael / Labour Fine Gael
1973 Fine Gael / Labour Labour
Table 5 5 presents a mixed result with no clear picture as to whether the 
largest or smaller party takes the Speakership On one occasion the mam 
government party took control of the Speakership, while on another the 
second party in Government received the Speakership
There is also little evidence to evaluate the degree to which the selection of 
Speaker is a matter for negotiations between the political parties If we 
consider a typical case of government formation, we may well begin to see 
why the selection of Speakership may not always form part of the 
allocation of portfolios, even when the incoming government has the 
freedom to allocate at will (as rare as this is)
In the immediate aftermath of the 1992 general election the focus fell on 
the emergence of a rainbow coalition between The Labour Party, the 
Progressive Democrats, and headed by Fine Gael However, the 
emergence of such a coalition was to prove impossible and it became 
increasingly obvious, if only in the run up to the Dail convening, that such 
a coalition was becoming difficult to form Fianna Fail, under the 
leadership of Albert Reynolds, appeared initially ambivalent towards the 
idea of coalition
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Indeed, by the time the Dail convened on Monday, 14 December 1992, 
there was as yet no agreement between any of the political parties as to 
who would be elected Taoiseach The period between the general election 
and the first meting of the Dail proved just too short to elicit an agreement 
On that day, no nominee for Taoiseach was successful Indeed, it took 
until January 10 1993, almost one month after the Dail first convened, for 
a coalition agreement to emerge and be accepted by both parties
Now, consider the rules governing the election of Ceann Comhairle As we 
saw earlier in this Chapter, the first business of the chamber is the election 
of a chair This must occur before any other business, including the 
business of electing a Taoiseach, can take place While it is not absolutely 
necessary to select a Ceann Comhairle on the first meeting of the Dail, this 
has always been the case Much speculation surrounds what would happen 
if the Dail was unable to select a Ceann Comhairle, but what appears clear 
is that all parties prefer to see this happen
Consequently, in 1997 the decision of who was to be Ceann Comhairle 
had to be made before it became clear to anyone as to who would actually 
form the government As a result, it is not possible in this case to talk of 
the Fianna Fail / Labour Coalition negotiating over the allocation of the 
Speakership They were not yet in serious talks on coalition, never mind in 
a position to decide on the allocation of the Speakership
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Clearly then, the sequence of decision making, with agreement on 
government formation coming after the point at which a Ceann Comhairle 
is elected, ensures that the Speakership may not be part of the allocation of 
prizes between parties
vn Previous Career
Our sixth hypothesis predicts that because the Speaker may be a partisan, 
he or she will not necessarily be a long-standmg backbencher, having been 
removed for some time from active partisan politics To test the accuracy 
of this prediction, we introduce three pieces of information for each of the 
individuals who served as Ceann Comhairle This information relates to 
the point at which they first became Ceann Comhairle (for obvious reasons 
we ignore their subsequent, if any, re-selection) The information we 
explore relates to their years as a member of the Dail, previous experience 
in the role of chairing Dail sessions and finally the rank of partisan office 
previously held For the latter information, we will also examine the time 
frame between partisan office and being elected Speaker
Figures for each of these variables are presented in Table 5 6 Before 
drawing conclusions from this information, we must be conscious of the
9 In one sense of course this is a very inefficient outcome If political parties could agree 
before the date at which the Speaker is due to be selected, then they could take the 
Speakership
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unique circumstances surrounding our first case Michael Hayes, as the 
first Ceann Comhairle of the Irish Free State could not have met any 
expectation as to parliamentary experience, ministerial office or length of 
tenure as the selection of Ceann Comhairle came at the very beginning of a 
new phase in Irish parliamentary democracy Other than this though, the 
information should prove very interesting
Table 5 6 Prior Experience of Ceann Comhairle on Appointment
Years 
as TD
Dail Experience Highest political office
Hayes 1 Cabmet Minister
Fahy 14 Opposition Spokesman
Hogan 28 Leas-Ceann Comhairle Cabmet Minister
Breslm 30 Leas-Ceann Comhairle Chair, Donegal County Council
Treacy 12 Opposition Spokesman
Brennan 26 FF Deputy Leader 
Parliamentary Secretary 
(Finance)
Faulkner 26 Cabmet Minister
O’Connell 16 Temporary Chairman Opposition Spokesman
Fitzpatrick 17 Cabinet Minister
Chau- of National Executive
Pattison 36 Temporary Chairman Junior Government Minister
Excluding the case of Hayes, the average number of years served by an 
incoming Ceann Comhairle is just under 27 Yet, there is some 
discrepancy Cormac Breslm had 30 years in the Dail when he was 
appointed whereas Sean Treacy became Ceann Comhairle with a 
somewhat shorter parliamentary career spanning 12 years 10
10 As with Hayes it would be wrong to count Fahy's 14 years as being a short term given 
that he had served as long as was possible given the youth of the institution at that stage
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While no data on the average tenure of a parliamentarian are easily 
available, it seems that experience is a requirement for becoming Ceann 
Comhairle 11 Yet tins is not crucial to our investigation of the partisanship, 
other than to suggest that gaining the Speakership may be akm to a 
'retirement' post for long-serving members 12
Data on the chairing experience of the Ceann Comhairle is interesting also, 
if not inconclusive Only two of the ten people to have held post of Ceann 
Comhairle were promoted from the position of Deputy Speaker, while two 
more had previously served on the panel of temporary chairmen In most 
cases, then, it would seem that the Leas-Ceann Comhairle was overlooked 
for appointment as Ceann Comhairle If the decision was a non-partisan 
one, we would surely have been entitled to expect that the Deputy Speaker 
would be the obvious career for any Speaker Yet this is not the trend in 
the Irish Parliament with the vast majority of new Ceann Comhairle not 
ever having acted as temporary Chairman of the Dail
Looking at the highest political office, we see that all except one had held 
posts m government or on the frontbenches of their respective political 
parties Four had served as cabinet ministers, three as opposition
11 It would be useful to compare this date with the average years of tenure for specific 
years However the collection of the latter is beyond the scope of this work
12 This is only a perception and it would be wrong to attach too much significance to it 
However comparisons with the traditional election of Irish Presidents are difficult to 
avoid For many years the relative maturity of Irish presidential candidates led some to 
speculate that the Presidency was a retirement home for ageing politicians Could it be 
that the Speakership is a retirement home for at least some ageing politicians7
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spokespersons and one as a junior government minister (Minister for 
State) Joseph Brennan, elected Ceann Comhairle in 1977, had held the 
post of Parliamentary Secretary (since abolished, but at the time the lowest 
rudder on the ladder of government posts) Brennan is interesting because 
on his appointment he was the deputy leader of the Fianna Fail 
Parliamentary Party The only Ceann Comhairle without front-line 
national political experience was Cormac Breshn He was, nevertheless, 
Chairman of Donegal County Council The fact that holding high political 
office is no bar to becoming Ceann Comhairle is thus exemplified in all of 
the appointments since the foundation of the state, when the first Ceann 
Comhairle had previously served as a Cabinet Minister
Perhaps the best example of how indifferent the Dail is to appointing a 
senior partisan figure occurred in 1980 when the Fianna Fail leadership 
nominated a serving Cabinet Minister to be Ceann Comhairle Padraig 
Faulkner was the Minister for Defence only hours before he became Ceann 
Comhairle Indeed, he only resigned when approached by the Taoiseach 
and asked to become Ceann Comhairle and had agreed (The Irish Times, 
16 October 1980)
The data on experience in chairing sessions of the Chamber and the prior 
political office provide us with ample evidence to support our expectation 
that there is no divide between serving in partisan office and serving as 
Ceann Comhairle This is only confirmed by the case of a Ceann
190
Comhairle being able to take up office only hours after having being at the 
very front line of partisan politics as a Cabinet Minister
v i i i  Intra-party decision making (no of candidates)
We now move to an empirical analysis of the role played by parties in the 
selection of Ceann Comhairle We have two major questions to explore In 
this section, we examine the number of candidates emerging from each of 
the political parties In the next section, we look at the role of the party 
hierarchy versus the parliamentary party in the selection of party 
candidate(s) Both of these issues are seen as providing further evidence of 
the partisanship of the office
Recall from Chapter Four that if the selection of the Speaker is a non­
partisan matter, then there is no reason to suspect that the number of 
candidates emerging from each party will be limited to one If we see a 
clear pattern of single candidates, this points to a role for the party in 
selecting a single candidate - further evidence that the selection of Speaker 
is a partisan affair
The data from Ireland supports the proposition that parties limit the 
number of candidates which emerge from their own benches It has always 
been the case that not more than one nominee for the office of Ceann
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Comhairle has came form each political party Never have two candidates 
faced each other from the ranks of the same party
To account for why this is the case, we must refer to some of the form of 
control which the parties maintain over the nomination process However, 
it would be wrong to suggest that these control mechanisms are derived 
from any formal parliamentary procedure On the contrary, it only requires 
the support of two members for a candidate to be nominated Evidently 
then, the decision of who will be a candidate is made not on the floor of 
the chamber but in the party rooms around Lemster House The formal 
rules of the House certainly permit it, but the rules, or at least practice, of 
the parties means that the candidature of members who aspire to the 
Speakership is organised and controlled by the Party 13
The absence of intra-party competition on the floor of the House provides 
clear and unmistakable evidence, then, to suggest political parties exercise 
some control mechanism over their members vis-a-vis being nominated for 
the post of Ceann Comhairle This is clear evidence for our seventh 
hypothesis, further validating our partisan account of the Speakership
13 Of course this point may be less relevant to the process of nominating an independent 
(non-party) member Leinster House is the building which comprises the D&il chamber, 
member's offices and party rooms
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ix. Intra-party decision making (role of leadership)
Safe in the knowledge that political parties play some form of co­
ordinating or veto role in the selection of candidates for the Speakership, 
we must now explore the degree to which such power is centralised or 
decentralised within the parliamentary party. The greater the level of 
centralisation, the fewer members involved and, consequently, as we have 
already argued, the more partisan the Speaker. Our task, then, is to uncover 
exactly who within the Irish political parties has control over the selection 
of candidates for the Speakership?
This is made all the more difficult by the fact that Irish legislative parties 
have never been subjected to much in-depth research, in large part because 
they operate in a very secretive manner - unwilling to have their business 
scrutinised by the media or academics. Much of their operating principles 
are unfamiliar to even the most experienced political journalist not to 
mention legislative or party scholar. The two largest parties operate under 
the most secretive conditions leaving outside observers searching for clues 
rather than hard evidence.14
14 One example of this is that a member of the Fianna F£il parliamentary party must 
promise not to make available to non-members of the Parliamentary party such things as a 
copy of the Rules of the Parliamentary Party. A recent departure, however, is the 
assistance given by Fine Gael Head Office to an academic survey of party members and 
published as Gallagher & Marsh (2002).
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Nevertheless, it is possible to build a picture of how the political parties 
operate m relation to the selection of Speaker For this, we rely on various 
first and second-hand accounts of key actors, in addition to what we know 
more generally about mter-party decision making While it is important to 
take into account differences between the vanous parties, it does seem that 
the three larger parties do deal with such matters in very similar ways
Consider, for example, the account by Dr John O’Connell (O'Connell 
1989, p 160-161) in his autobiography of him being asked to become 
Ceann Comhairle
I had a telephone call from Jimmy Tully, 
asking me to consider becoming Ceann 
Comhairle Michael O’Leary had taken over 
from Frank Cluskey as Leader, because 
Frank had lost his seat in that election, and 
Tully was O’Leary’s emissary “Give me a 
few minutes to think about it,” I said, and 
put down the telephone The room was filled 
with supporters, the people who had worked 
with me for years 
I told them what Tully had said
“What do I do7” I asked them
Go for it, they said Take it Without proper 
deliberation I went over to Leinster House at 
about five minutes to two to accept, knowing 
that the new Dail was meeting at 2 30
A second way to confirm the key role played by the party leaders is seen in 
the most recent appointment to the office, which, as the reader will recall,
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saw a Labour member becoming Ceann Comhairle at the invitation of the 
Fianna Fail leader What is generally considered Ireland’s newspaper of 
record was able to confirm how the Fianna Fail leader had offered the job 
through the leader of the Labour Party (The Irish Times 23 June 1997) 
When the actual candidate was asked all he would say was
“I haven’t been approached or asked”, “so 
it’s difficult to give an answer to a question 
you haven’t been asked” “There have been 
vague comments made to me regarding the 
post, but I couldn’t interpret them as being 
asked if I would take the job”
The events surrounding the search for a Ceann Comhairle following the 
1987 general election are also testament to the fact that the decision as to 
who will hold the post is decided m or at least around the offices of the 
various party leaders As outgoing Ceann Comhairle, Fitzpatrick was not a 
member of the Fine Gael Parliamentary Party or the wider party However, 
and despite the fact that it was a personal decision for him, he was 
requested not to reply to the Fianna Fail request before the Fine Gael 
Parliamentary Party had met and offered its advice to him (The Irish Times 
6 March 1987) The decision had been made by his party leader and 
supported by the Parliamentary Party
Given this evidence, it is hard to conclude that the parliamentary party, let 
alone the wider party membership, have little more than a ‘rubber-
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stamping’ one when it comes to appointing the Ceann Comhairle The 
desire of the party elite to control the filling of the post allied to the 
unwillingness of members to question their party leaders means that the 
filling of the office is firmly in the control of the party leader This can 
only come at the expense not just of the chamber but of the party and 
ensures ultimately that the person nominated as Ceann Comhairle must 
enjoy the confidence of one person the leader of the winning faction 
within the chamber This is a far cry from the understanding of the Speaker 
as being a product of a collective decision of the chamber as a whole
x Re-Selection
Our ninth hypothesis predicts that if the Speaker is non-partisan, then she 
or he will, if available and willing to serve another term, be reselected A 
non-partisan account would expect this to be the case even when the 
voting balance has changed, say, for example, when a new government is 
to be appointed What we expect to find is a change in the Speakership 
with a shift in the partisan balance of power within the chamber This 
would indicate further the partisan nature of the selection and appointment 
process
In looking at the data on reselection we must be conscious of the role 
played by other factors, especially the desire by governments to reappoint
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an outgoing Speaker if this will aid their chances of remaining in office 
What is clear, as we will highlight below, is that there have been occasions 
in which the outgoing Ceann Comhairle has been available and indeed 
happy to be re-appomted but nevertheless was not re-selected
With regard to re-appointing the outgoing Ceann Comhairle, one of the 
earliest arguments was made in 1932 by the leader of the incoming 
opposition, W T Cosgrave When citing the provision that the Ceann 
Comhairle be automatically returned at a General Election, he claimed 
that
Its objective, as most Deputies are aware, 
was to provide for continuity in the office of 
Ceann Comhairle, and, for that purpose, to 
have available to the incoming Dail the 
Services of the Presiding Officer of the 
previous House We believe that is a sound 
plan, making for uniformity in practice and 
procedure, and conducting to efficiency in 
the conduct and despatch of the business 
submitted to this house (Dail Debates, 9 
March 1922, Vol 41, Col 19)
This is undoubtedly a key argument for offering the Chair to the outgoing 
Ceann Comhairle Although the motivation put forward above for 
automatically returning the Ceann Comhairle may not be accurate, it is 
difficult to argue that that individual is the most capable individual to 
again perform the task Indeed, in the case of the outgoing Chair not being 
invited to retake the chair, it is hard to see it as anything other than a vote
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of no confidence and further evidence of the partisan nature of the 
selection On the other hand change can always be helpful in any senior 
leadership position, allowing as it may for renewed dynamism in any 
organisation
As we can see from Table 5 7, almost all Ceann Comhairle have been re­
selected at least once The exceptions are Brennan who died during his 
first term of office, Fitzpatrick who declined to accept the offer of a 
nomination, and Pattison who is currently in his first term of office In the 
earlier years, the Ceann Comhairle was likely to be re-selected more often
Table 5 7 Number of times Ceann Comhairle was re-selected/rejected
Re-selected Rejected
Hayes 3 1
Fahy 6
Hogan 4
Breslin 1
Treacy 3 1
Brennan n/a
Faulkner 1
Fitzpatrick 0
O’Connell 1 1
Pattison n/a
However, we can also see that on three occasions the outgoing Ceann 
Comhairle was not re-selected despite putting their name forward The 
first occurred in 1932 when Fianna Fail rejected the argument of W T 
Cosgrave and appointed Frank Fahy over Michael Hayes Exactly fifty 
years later Fine Gael were the party to break with tradition by nominating
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Tom Fitzpatrick and declining to support John O’Connell who was the 
outgoing Ceann Comhairle On that occasion an independent colleague of 
Deputy O’Connell criticised the actions of the incoming government, 
noting how the leader of Fine Gael, despite now refusing to re-nominate 
O’Connell had previously warmly supported his nomination earlier m the 
year (Dail Debates, Vol 339, Col 16-17)
More surprisingly, the leader of Fine Gael was going against his earlier 
stance on the right of outgoing Ceann Comhairle to be re-appointed In 
1977 Dr FitzGerald cited the precedent of maintaining in the Chair an 
outgoing Ceann Comhairle and voted unsuccessfully on that basis to retain 
Treacy over Deputy Joseph Brennan who was the Fianna Fail candidate
The evidence suggests that where the outgoing Ceann Comhairle is from 
the party of the incoming Government he will be re-appointed However, 
where the government and outgoing Ceann Comhairle are not from the 
same side, then much will depend on other circumstances such as the 
balance of power requirement In certain circumstances parties have 
agreed to keep a Ceann Comhairle from the opposition even when making 
a change would not aversely affect their balance of power For example, in 
1957 Patrick Hogan (Labour Party) was re-nominated by a majority Fianna 
Fail government He had, of course, previously been re-nommated and 
supported but this principle did not stop Fine Gael declining to support 
O’Connell in November 1982
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It is, therefore, not unknown for an incoming majority administration to 
block the re-appointment of the outgoing Ceann Comhairle in favour of 
one of their own backbenchers While such behaviour causes consternation 
for the opposition parties, it rarely affects the standing of the government 
parties This provides farther evidence of how party-political the process 
of selecting a Ceann Comhairle is
xi Tenure
Out tenth hypothesis concerned the ease by which a Speaker could be 
removed by the Dail We argued that there exists a relationship between 
guarantee of tenure and political neutrality - the more difficult it is for a 
faction to remove the Speaker, the more neutral he or she will be
In the Irish case there exists a formal provision for the removal of Speaker 
Standing Order 14 (see Figure 5 2 below) makes two explicit points of 
interest to us The first is that the normal term of office is the term of the 
Dail In other words, the Ceann Comhairle will normally be expected to 
remain in office until the next General Election However, crucial is the 
last sentence which gives the Dail the power to remove the Ceann 
Comhairle
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Figure 5 2 Rules relating to the removal of Speaker
The term of office of the Ceann Comhairle and of the Leas-Cheann 
Comhairle shall be the term of the Dail existing at the time of their 
appointment, but the Ceann Comhairle shall continue in office until his or 
her successor has been appointed for the purpose of these Standing Orders 
Providing that the D&il may, at any time, by special resolution, remove from 
office either the Ceann Comhairle or Leas-Cheann Comhairle
The actual wording of the provisions is even more interesting for us Note 
the absence of any reference to reasons why the Ceann Comhairle may be 
removed In provisions for the impeachment of officers it is normal to 
explicitly state the boundaries which are likely to constitute a removable 
offence In the Irish constitution such reasons include stated misbehaviour 
or incapacity What is interesting for us is that no such requirement needs 
to be met for the Ceann Comhairle to be removed
Moreover, the inclusion in the text of the standing order of the words 'at 
any time' gives a real sense that such a special resolution can be made for 
whatever reason the proponents of the resolution make
We have established that it is very easy to propose that the Ceann 
Comhairle be removed, but what kind of threshold is required for him or 
her to be actually removed? The short answer is that no special threshold is 
required The vote on such a special resolution takes place like all other 
votes - in open, and more importantly for us, falls or is passed on the basis 
of a relative majority If more members present and voting vote for the
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Ceann Comhairle to be removed than vote for him to remain in office, then 
he is removed
In short, there exists no provision to protect the Ceann Comhairle from a 
majority faction determined to remove him There is no need for cross­
party support, no need for a majority of all members to vote for his or her 
removal, let alone a requirement for some form of qualified majonty This 
leads us back to our argument concerning the level of neutrality In the 
Irish case it may be politically impossible for a Ceann Comhairle to remain 
neutral in the face of a majority government - to do so would be to put his 
or her position on the line 15
xu Removal from office
Even if the formal rule makes it easy to remove the Ceann Comhairle, 
informal norms may still prevent this from happening No Ceann 
Comhairle has ever been removed from office, although as we will see 
there was an initial attempt to remove one There are two possible 
explanations as to why the majority may be unwilling to replace a Ceann 
Comhairle during the life time of the Dail
15 The weakness in security of tenure of the Irish Speaker becomes even more apparent 
when we consider rules in other legislatures In the Aljnngi Islendinga (Islandic 
parliament), for example, the Speaker can only be removed by a two-thirds majority (I am 
grateful to Wolfgang Muller for this information)
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The first explanation is that the majority are quite happy with how the 
Ceann Comhairle is behaving This is certainly in keeping with our 
partisan theory and with the fact that it is relatively easy for a majority to 
remove the Ceann Comhairle The Speaker knows that he or she is 
dependent on the support of the majority and consequently will not behave 
in such a way as would warrant the majority acting to replace him or her
The second explanation is that the government is willing to live with its 
initial choice, even where it has proved less satisfactory Removing a 
Ceann Comhairle may be more trouble than it is of benefit Consider, for 
example, the reaction of the opposition, of the Ceann Comhairle, and of 
the wider media and public opinion, which are unlikely to be favourable 
In fairness, then, it is more difficult in practice to remove the Speaker than 
we would have gleaned from the provision in Standing Orders relating to 
the removal
There is one scenario when the change of Ceann Comhairle would seem 
desirable to a government That is when a new government is formed 
during the lifetime of the Dail The only example of a change of the party 
composition of Government occurred m 1994 when, a month after the 
demise of the Fianna Fail-Labour Party coalition, a new three-party 
coalition was formed between Fine Gael, The Labour Party and the 
Democratic Left The incumbent Ceann Comhairle was Sean Treacy, an
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independent member, who as we will recall from above, had been 
appointed by the Dail before the emergence of the Fianna Fail - Labour 
party Coalition The attitude of the new three-party coalition to the Ceann 
Comhairle and the Leas Ceann Comhairle is certainly interesting Let us 
consider the fate of the Leas Ceann Comhairle first
In 1994 Deputy Joe Jacob held the post of Leas Ceann Comhairle (Deputy 
Speaker) Nominated following the 1992 General Election, he also held the 
position of chairman of the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party By agreement 
of the leaders of the three political parties forming the 1994 coalition it 
was decided that the government would table a resolution to remove Jacob 
as Leas Ceann Comhairle and replace him with a member of Fine Gael 
(The Irish Times 14 May 1997) Not alone was this decision made, but 
within days of taking office the government publicly indicated that it 
would be pursuing this option
It was also the case that the Government considered removing the Ceann 
Comhairle and indeed had agreed on a replacement (The Irish Times 14 
May 1997) However, unlike m the case of the Leas Ceann Comhairle, the 
Government had a re-think on the fate of Sean Treacy Treacy, according 
to one source, was deeply disliked by John Bruton, the new Taoiseach 
They two had clashed over Dail procedures on several occasions during 
question time and the morning Order of Business It is believed, but not 
widely known, that Sean Treacy requested a meeting with Bruton at which
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he indicated what he considered the inappropnateness of the Government's 
move to remove a Ceann Comhairle 16 It is also believed that he made 
clear his view that he would have to resist publicly any such move, 
considering it not just a personal attack but an attack on the dignity of the 
chairmanship of the D ail17 Treacy called the new administration's bluff 
and all plans to have the Ceann Comhairle replaced were dropped The 
Government made clear their opinion that the Ceann Comhairle would 
(whatever about should) remain in office
Although the Government did go further m their desire to replace the Leas 
Ceann Comhairle, making their decision to do so public, they never carried 
out their threat and both Ceann Comhairle and Leas Cheann Comhairle 
survived the mid-term change of administration The Leas Cheann 
Comhairle was apparently saved by the desire of the Government not to be 
seen to be openly playing politics with the office Fianna Fail, and in 
particular its leader Bertie Ahem, was irate at the intentions of the new 
government and publicly denounced the removal of someone who was 
appointed for the duration of the 27th Dail under the Standing Orders of 
Dail Eireann (The Irish Times 20 December 1994)
What this episode shows us is that parties may wish to remove and appoint 
the Speaker as they so wish, but shy away from doing so because of any 
political embarrassment which such a heave would cause Looking at it
16 Anon Interview No 2
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from a cost-benefit perspective, the costs may very well outweigh the 
benefits
xm Conclusion
As we have been at pains to stress throughout, there is no point in having a 
theoretical understanding of a political phenomenon if that understanding 
is not subjected to a comparison with the reality of the object being 
scrutinised This chapter has begun that process of providing empirical 
validation of our account of the Irish Speakership Our focus thus far has 
been on the process and practice of selecting and appointing the Ceann 
Comhairle
As one reads through the proceeding pages, it becomes increasingly clear 
how complex and detailed many of the cases are We have avoided trying 
to reach unrealistic conclusions from the factual information available to 
us Rather than provide a summary of the evidence thus far (which we 
believe we have shown to be generally very supportive of our claims), we 
will leave this to the concluding chapter There, we will attempt to 
summarise the evidence using a four point strong to weak scale Before we 
do this, we think it appropriate to examine the remaining hypotheses
17 Anon Interview No 2
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Chapter Six: The Speaker in Office
i Introduction
The evidence presented in the last chapter is encouraging in that it goes 
some way to supporting our reassessment of the office of Speaker The 
data presented thus far focuses on the process and nature of selecting the 
Irish Speaker In this chapter we move to an examination of the post- 
appointment behaviour of the Speaker We follow closely the three 
hypotheses relating to the behaviour and career of the Speaker, which we 
developed in Chapter Four
Our goal then in this chapter is to investigate empirically the degree to 
which the office of Speaker is partisan, once the Speaker has been 
selected Before presenting our findings it is necessary to considering two 
issues The first relates to any potential differences between our findings at 
the pre and post-appointment stages The second highlights some of the 
particular methodological issues that the data-type presented in this 
chapter give rise to
We make the distinction between pre-appointment and post-appointment 
because it is, at least hypothetically, possible to think of a Speaker 
behaving in a neutral and non-partisan manner despite the fact that the
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p ro c e s s  b y  w h ic h  h e  o r  sh e  w a s  se le c te d  is  h ig h ly  p a r t is a n  I f  o u r  
h y p o th e s e s  re la t in g  to  th e  p o s t- s e le c t io n  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  a re  
p ro v e d  in a c c u ra te  (th a t  is  to  s a y  th e  S p e a k e r , o n c e  e le c te d , is  a  n e u tra l 
o f f ic e r  o f  th e  le g is la tu re ) , th e n  o u r  th e o ry  h a s  h a d  m ix e d  e m p ir ic a l  
s u c c e s s  W e  a re  le f t  w it h  a  h ig h ly  p a r t is a n  b a tt le  to  s e c u re  th e  O f f ic e  (a s  
w e  h a v e  se e n  m  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r )  b u t a  S p e a k e r  w h o  o n  a p p o in tm e n t 
n e v e rth e le s s  re n o u n c e s  p a r ty  fa c t io n a l is m  an d  b e g in s  to  b e h a v e  in  a  n o n ­
p a r t is a n  m a n n e r
O f  c o u rs e  w e  m a y  n o t h a v e  to  d e a l w it h  s u c h  a  s c e n a r io  T h e  in fo rm a t io n  
to  be p re se n te d  in  th is  C h a p te r  m a y  a l lo w  u s  to  c o n c lu d e  th a t the  
S p e a k e rs h ip  is  a  p a r t is a n  o f f ic e  In d e e d  it  s h o u ld , n o t b e c a u se  w e  w a n t  it  
to , b u t b e c a u se  th a t is  w h a t  w e  e x p e c t  to  f in d  f ro m  o u r  th e o ry  o f  the  o f f ic e  
A n y  s u c h  d is c u s s io n  a s  to  m id - w a y  th e o ry  b re a k d o w n , h o w e v e r  
e n te r ta in in g  an d  p h ilo s o p h ic a l ly  in te re s t in g , i s  p re m a tu re  b e fo re  w e  
e x a m in e  th e  e v id e n c e  re la t in g  to  th e  ro le  o f  a  S p e a k e r
T h e  se co n d  is s u e  w o r th  c o n s id e r in g  is  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  d a ta  a v a i la b le  fo r  
te s t in g  so m e  o f  th e  h y p o th e s is  w h ic h  w e  e x p lo re  in  th is  c h a p te r  A s  w e  
h a v e  a lre a d y  n o te d , th e  e m p ir ic a l  fo c u s  th ro u g h o u t th is  c h a p te r  i s  o n  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  in  o f f ic e  an d  th e  p o s t - o f f ic e  b e h a v io u r  
(th e  la t te r  d e a lin g  w it h  w h e th e r  o r  n o t a  r e t ir in g  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  're tu rn s ' 
to  a c t iv e  p a r t is a n  p o l it ic s )
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O n ly  te n  p e o p le  h a v e  s e rv e d  a s  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  s in c e  th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  
th e  sta te  F o r  ease  o f  re fe re n c e  th e  n a m e s  an d  p e r io d  o f  s e r v ic e  fo r  e a c h  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  a re  se t o u t in  F ig u re  6  1 A lth o u g h  it  n ee d  n o t c o n c e rn  u s  
h e re , i t  is  in te re s t in g  to  n o te  th a t S e a n  T r e a c y  is  th e  o n ly  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
to  h a v e  b e e n 'm  an d  out' o f  o f f ic e  an d  e q u a l ly  in te re s t in g  is  th e  c h a n g e  in  
h is  p a r ty  a f f i l ia t io n  ( f r o m  b e in g  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  L a b o u r  P a r t y  in  1 9 7 3  o n  
h is  f i r s t  e le c t io n  to  th e  o f f ic e ,  to  b e in g  a  n o n - a f f i l ia te d  m e m b e r  w h e n  h e  
w a s  re s e le c te d  to  th e  p o s t in  th e  1 9 8 0 s ) A l l  o th e r  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a v e  
se rv e d  c o n t in u o u s  te rm s
Figure 6 1 Ceann Comhairle, 1922-2001
Name & Party Affiliation Period Served
Michael Hayes (Cumann na Ngaedheal) [1] 1922-1932
Frank Fahy (Fianna Fail) 1932-1951
Patrick Hogan (Labour) 1951-1967
Cormac Breslrn (Fianna Fail) 1967-1973
Sean Treacy (Labour) 1973-1977
Joseph Brennan (Fianna Fail) 1977-1980
Padraig Faulkner (Fianna Fail) 1980-1981
John O’Connell (non-Party) 1981-1982
Tom Fitzpatrick (Fine Gael) 1982-1987
Sean Treacy (Non-Party) 1987-1997
Seamus Pattison 1997-
M u c h , b u t c e r ta in ly  n o t a l l ,  o f  th e  in fo rm a t io n  p re se n te d  is  b y  it s  n a tu re  
v e r y  q u a l ita t iv e  I n  g e n e ra l w e  w i l l  a tte m p t to  p ro v id e  a s  m u c h  
q u a n t if ia b le  e v id e n c e  a s  p o s s ib le  F o r  e x a m p le , in  lo o k in g  a t th e  a tt itu d e s  
o f  m e m b e rs  to  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w e  w i l l  lo o k  a t th e  n u m b e r  o f  
s u s p e n s io n s  f ro m  th e  c h a m b e r , a s  an  in d ic a to r  o f  re s p e c t  o r  d is re s p e c t  fo r
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th e  C h a i r  O f  c o u rs e , in  a d d it io n  to  th e  n u m b e r  o f  s u s p e n s io n s  w e  w i l l  lo o k  
a t m o re  q u a l it a t iv e  e v id e n c e  s u c h  a s  th e  c o m m e n ts  o f  m e m b e rs  a n d  
e x a m p le s  o f  m e d ia  c o v e ra g e  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  I t  s h o u ld  b e  s tre sse d  at 
th e  o u tse t th a t w e  do  n o t se e k  to  b u ild  w h a t  o ne  m ig h t  th in k  o f  a s  a  
d a ta b a se  o f  b e h a v io u r  o n  e v e ry  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  In s te a d , w e  h o p e  to 
p re se n t s t ro n g , c le a r ,  u n a m b ig u o u s  e v id e n c e  o f  w h e re  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
h a s  b e e n  o b v io u s ly  p a r t is a n  I f  th e re  is  l i t t le  o r  n o  e v id e n c e  th a t  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  h a v e  b e e n  p a r t is a n , th e n  th is  a p p ro a c h  w i l l  h a v e  fa i le d ,  a n d  
w it h  it  o u r  th e o ry  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  w i l l  h a v e  s u f fe re d  W e  n o w  tu rn  f i r s t  to  
h y p o th e s is  1 2 , w h ic h  re la te s  to  h o w  th e  S p e a k e r  h a s  e x e rc is e d  th e  c a s t in g  
v o te  w h e n  re q u ire d  to  do  so
11 The Casting Vote
H a v m g  th e  r ig h t  to  b re a k  a  t ie  p la c e s  th e  S p e a k e r  in  a  u n iq u e  p o s it io n  o f  
p o w e r  W e  c a n  t h in k  o f  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  a s  b e in g  p iv o ta l  m  
s u c h  a  s c e n a r io  I n  s h o rt , th e  o u tc o m e s  o f  th e  v o te  re s ts  w it h  th e  S p e a k e r  
T h i s  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  in  th e  I r i s h  c a se  w h e re  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  is  
re q u ire d  to  b re a k  a  t ie  A r t ic le  15 11 2  o f  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  c le a r ly  s t ip u la te s  
th a t  m  th e  e v e n t  o f  a n  e q u a lit y  o f  v o te s  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  must e x e rc is e  
a  c a s t in g  v o te  T h i s  i s  th e  o n ly  t im e  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  i s  a l lo w e d  to  
e x e r c is e  h is  o p in io n  v is - a - v is  a  d iv is io n  in  th e  C h a m b e r  O r d in a r i ly ,  th e  
S p e a k e r  w i l l  n o t b e  c a l le d  u p o n  to  ta k e  s id e s  in  s u c h  a  m a n n e r  a n d  s h o w  so
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c le a r ly  h is  o r  h e r  p re fe re n c e s  M o re o v e r , an d  b y  d e f in it io n  o f  w h a t  c a u s e s  
th e  u se  o f  a  c a s t in g  v o te , th e  h o u se  is  a b s o lu te ly  s p l it  o n  th e  is s u e
T h e  c a s t in g  v o te  p ro v id e s  an  o p p o rtu n ity  to  te s t c le a r ly  th e  le v e l  o f  
p a r t is a n s h ip  o f  a  S p e a k e r  A s s u m in g  a  c le a r  d iv is io n  in  v o t in g  b e h a v io u r  
b e tw e e n  p a r t ie s  (th e  a c c e p ta b il it y  o f  th is  a s s u m p t io n  re s ts  o n  th e  h ig h  
le v e ls  o f  p a r t is a n  c o h e s io n /d is c ip lin e  w h ic h  ca n  b e  o b s e rv e d  in  m o s t  
E u ro p e a n  le g is la t u r e s ) ,  w h ic h  p a r ty  w i l l  th e  S p e a k e r  v o te  w it h ? 1 W i l l  h o w  
h e  o r  sh e  c h o o s e s  to  v o te  be  re la te d  to  th e ir  p a r ty  o f  o r ig in ?  O r  p e rh a p s  th e  
S p e a k e r  w i l l  u se  h is  o r  h e r  o w n  p o l ic y  p re fe re n c e s  in  d e c id in g  h o w  to  
v o te ?
T h e  p ic tu re  m a y  n o t b e  so  s im p le  D u e  to  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  ’p re c e d e n t ’, it  
m a y  b e  th e  c a s e  th a t th e  S p e a k e r  w i l l  n o t s h o w  h is  o r  h e r  o w n  p re fe re n c e s  
o r  p o l it ic a l  ju d g e m e n t  A s  w e  p o in te d  o u t in  C h a p te r  T h r e e ,  so m e  s c h o la r s  
h a v e  p o in te d  to  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  p re c e d e n t in  th e  b re a k in g  o f  a  t ie  O u r  
a s s e r t io n  is  th a t  th e  c a s t in g  v o te  m a y  p ro v id e  e v id e n c e  th a t  th e  S p e a k e r  
d o e s  in  fa c t  a c t  o n  h is  o r  h e r  o w n  p a r t is a n  ju d g e m e n t  T h i s  i s  th e  c r u x  o f  
w h a t  w e  a re  in v e s t ig a t in g  h e re  H o w  d o e s  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  v o te  w h e n  
re q u ire d  to  do  s o ?  M o re  im p o r ta n t ly , w h a t  e x p la in s  th e  w a y  th e y  v o te ?  Is  it  
p a r t is a n , o r  i s  i t  b a se d  o n  p re c e d e n t T h e  p re c e d e n t , a s  w e  o u t lin e d  i t  in  
C h a p te r  T h r e e ,  c la im s  th a t a  S p e a k e r  w i l l  v o te  in  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  to  
m a in ta in  th e  s ta tu s  q u o  R e c a l l  th a t th is  s h o u ld  see  th e  S p e a k e r  v o t in g  in
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th e  n e g a t iv e , e x c e p t  o n  s u c h  m a tte rs  a s  a  v o te  o f  c o n f id e n c e  in  a  
g o v e rn m e n t  In  th is  in s ta n c e , a  v o te  in  th e  n e g a t iv e  w o u ld  n o r m a l ly  b re a k  
th e  g o v e rn m e n t  an d  re s u lt  in  th e  d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  le g is la tu re  W h a te v e r  
ab o u t a n y  o th e r  m o t iv a t io n , v o t in g  in  s u c h  a  w a y  w o u ld  c le a r ly  be  a g a in s t  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f  a l lo w in g  th e  h o u se  to  re tu rn  to  th e  m a tte r  - g iv e n  th a t it  
w o u ld  b e  d is s o lv e d 1
W h e n  w e  lo o k  a t th e  o c c a s io n s  w h e re  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a s  b e en  
re q u ire d  to  v o te , w e  w i l l  a tte m p t to  la b e l e a c h  o f  th e se  a s  b e in g  in  th e  
'k e e p in g  w it h  p re c e d e n t ’ o r  a l t e r n a t iv e ly  as b e in g  'p re c e d e n t b r e a k in g ' T h e  
t ra d it io n a l v ie w  o f  th e  o f f ic e  e x p e c ts  th a t th e  fo rm e r  w i l l  a lw a y s  b e  th e  
c a s e , o u r  th e o ry  p re d ic ts  th a t th is  w i l l  n o t be  th e  c a s e  an d  w e  s h o u ld  see  
e x a m p le s  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  ig n o r in g  p re c e d e n t , in  fa v o u r  o f  
p e rs o n a l o r  p a r t is a n -b a s e d  ju d g e m e n ts  2
B a s e d  o n  a  s e a rc h  o f  th e  o f f i c ia l  p ro c e e d in g s  o f  th e  I r i s h  le g is la tu re  (Dad 
Debates) ,  w e  h a v e  id e n t if ie d  a  to ta l o f  se v e n te e n  o c c a s io n s  o n  w h ic h  th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a s  b e e n  re q u ire d  to  e x e rc is e  h is  c a s t in g  v o te  T h i s  
a v e ra g e s  ju s t  o v e r  o n e  e v e r y  fo u r  y e a rs  s in c e  th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  th e  sta te  I t  
i s  w o r th  n o t in g  h o w e v e r  th a t th e  o c c a s io n s  o n  w h ic h  th e  u se  o f  a  c a s t in g  
v o te  h a v e  a r is e n  a re  n o t e v e n ly  d is t r ib u te d  o v e r  t im e  T h e r e  w e re  tw o
1 On the topic of unity in legislative parties see Bowler et al (1999) In the case of Ireland 
voting cohesion within legislative parties in extremely high (see further, Martin & 
O’Halpm, 2000)
2 We do not differentiate here between personal and partisan-based judgments in so much 
as we take a personal judgment to be little more than a signal or proxy of partisan 
preference
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c a s e s  o n  th e  1 9 2 0 s  an d  th e n  n o n e  u n t i l  th e  1 9 8 0 s , w it h  z e ro  c a s e s  a g a in  
d u r in g  th e  1 9 9 0 s  W e  n eed  n o t b e  o v e r ly  c o n c e rn e d  h e re  w it h  th e  re a s o n s  
w h y  a  v o te  is  t ie d , b u t it  is  p ro b a b ly  w o r th  s p e c u la t in g  th a t i t  is  c lo s e ly  
re la te d  to  tw o  th in g s
T h e  f i r s t  re la te s  to  h o w  c lo s e  th e  o p p o s in g  s id e s  a re  m a tc h e d  in  th e  
c h a m b e r  T h a t  is  to  s a y  h o w  m u c h  o f  an  e f fe c t iv e  m a jo r i t y  (p o s it iv e  o r  
n e g a t iv e )  i s  e n jo y e d  b y  th e  g o v e rn in g  p a r ty  o r  c o a l it io n  o f  p a r t ie s  T h e  
se co n d  re la te s  to  the  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  G o v e rn m e n t  to  m a n a g e  its  o w n  b e n c h e s  
an d  it s  le g is la t iv e  a g e n d a  in  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  to  e n su re  s u c c e s s  in  
p a r l ia m e n ta ry  v o t in g  A n y  s u c h  d is c u s s io n  a s  to  th e  c a u s e s  o f  a  t ie d  v o te  
a re  s e c o n d a ry  fo r  u s  - o u r  d e s ire  to  o b s e rv e  h o w  th e  S p e a k e r  re a c ts  w h e n  
fa c e d  w it h  h a v in g  to  e x p re s s  a  p re fe re n c e
T a b le  6  1 p ro v id e s  th e  d e ta ils  o f  e a c h  o f  th e  s e v e n te e n  t ie - b re a k in g  c a s e s  
an d  fo r  e a c h  d e ta ils  w h e n  i t  o c c u r re d , th e  s u b je c t  o f  th e  v o te  a n d  w h e th e r  
o r  n o t th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  v o te d  in  th e  n e g a t iv e  o r  th e  p o s it iv e  T h e  ta b le  
a ls o  s h o w s  o u r  c a lc u la t io n s  a s  to  w h e th e r  o r  n o t th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
v o te d  w it h  o r  a g a in s t  th e  G o v e rn m e n t  P e rh a p s  m o s t  im p o r ta n t ly  w e  a ls o  
c a lc u la te  w h e th e r  o r  n o t h o w  th e  S p e a k e r  v o te d  w a s  in  k e e p in g  w it h  o r  a t 
o d d s  w it h  p re c e d e n t
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Table 6 1 How the Ceann Comhairle has Exercised their Casting
Vote
Date Occasion Yes / 
No
Support or
oppose
Government9
In keeping 
with
precedent9
30/5/23 Motion on expenditure for land owners No With No
16/8/27 No confidence motion m government No With Yes
7/7/81 Election of Leas Ceann Comhairle - 
Government candidate
No Against Yes
23/3/82 Election of Leas Ceann Comhairle Yes With No
24/6/82 Committee stage of Finance Bill Yes With No
24/6/82 Finance Bill Yes With No
24/6/82 Finance Bill Yes With No
26/11/86 Motion on social welfare Christmas 
bonus
Yes With No
26/11/86 Government motion Yes With No
17/12/86 Extradition Bill (Committee Stage) No With No
17/12/86 Extradition Bill (Committee Stage) No With No
17/12/86 Extradition Bill (Committee Stage) Yes With No
17/12/86 Extradition Bill (Report/Final Stage) No With No
17/12/86 Extradition Bill (Report/Final Stage) Yes With No
10/3/87 Appointment of Taoiseach Yes With No
13/5/87 Private members bill - Adoption Bill 
1987
No With No
29/11/89 Criminal Justice Bill No With No
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W h a t  ca n  w e  s a y  b a se d  o n  o u r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  s e v e n te e n  t im e s  th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  h a s  e x e rc is e d  a  c a s t in g  v o te ?  T h e  e v id e n c e  p o in ts  to  an  
o v e r w h e lm in g  n o rm  in  th e  I r i s h  s itu a t io n  w h e re  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a r le  w i l l  
su p p o rt th e  g o v e rn m e n t . O n  o n ly  o n e  o c c a s io n  h a s  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
e v e r  c a s t  h is  v o te  a g a in s t  th e  G o v e rn m e n t . A s  e a r ly  a s  th e  1 9 2 0 s  the  
S p e a k e r  w a s  p ro p p in g  u p  w e a k  g o v e rn m e n t m a jo r it ie s . I s  th is  p ro o f , o r  c a n  
th e  S p e a k e r  r e ly  o n  p re c e d e n t to  e x p la in  th e ir  v o t in g  b e h a v io u r ?  I t  is  
c e r t a in ly  tru e  th a t C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a v e  a tte m p ted  to  e x p la in  th e ir  v o t in g  
b e h a v io u r . O n e  o f  th e  e a r lie s t , an d  p e rh a p s  m o st c r u c ia l ,  g iv e n  th a t i t  w a s  
o n  a  v o te  to  re m o v e  th e  g o v e rn m e n t f ro m  o f f ic e ,  c a m e  in  1 9 2 7  w h e n  
S p e a k e r  M ic h a e l  H a y e s  v o te d  w ith  th e  g o v e rn m e n t . 3
T h a t  c a s e , in fa m o u s  in  I r i s h  p o l it ic a l  h is to ry  a s  th e  c a u s e  o f  th e  t ie  w a s  the  
u n e x p la in e d  a b se n ce  o f  a  g o v e rn m e n t D e p u ty , a l le g e d ly  in to x ic a te d  an d  
l i t e r a l ly  se n t o n  a  lo n g  t r a in  t id e  b y  th e  o p p o s it io n  d e p u t ie s , s e rv e s  a s  a  
r e m in d e r  o f  h o w  im p o rta n t  th e  c a s t in g  v o te  c a n  b e , an d  o f  h o w  o p e n  to  
c r i t ic is m  a  S p e a k e r  is  fo r  th e  w a y  th e y  v o te d . 4
H a y e s  re c o g n is e d  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t he  w o u ld  fa c e  c r i t ic is m  an d  g a v e  a  
r e la t iv e ly  d e ta ile d  e x p la n a t io n  o f  w h y  h e  v o te d  a s  h e  d id :
3 Article 22 of the Free State Constitution states that the Ceann Comhairle only votes in 
the event of tie.
4 On the events surrounding this confidence motion see McCrackin (1958).
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I  p ro p o se  to  s ta te  to  th e  D a i l ,  an d  h a v e  
re c o rd e d  o n  th e  Jo u rn a l o f  th e  p ro c e e d in g s  
o f  the  D a i l ,  the  re a so n s  an d  th e  
c o n s id e ra t io n s  w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  th e  C h a i r  in  
g iv in g  a  v o te  u p o n  th is  o c c a s io n  In  th e  f i r s t  
p la c e , th e  v o te  o f  the C h a i r  s h o u ld , I  t h in k , 
a lw a y s  be g iv e n  in  su c h  a  w a y  a s  to  p ro v id e , 
i f  p o s s ib le , th a t th e  H o u s e  w o u ld  h a v e  a n  
o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  r e v ie w in g  th e  d e c is io n  
a r r iv e d  at S e c o n d ly , th e  s ta tu s  q u o  s h o u ld , i f  
p o s s ib le , be  p re s e rv e d  W h e n  it  i s  n o t 
p o s s ib le  to  v o te  o n  e ith e r  o f  th e se  p r in c ip le s , 
it  w o u ld , o f  c o u rs e , be  n e c e s s a ry  fo r  th e  
C h a irm a n  to  v o te  o n  th e  m e r it s  o f  th e  
p ro p o s a l b e fo re  th e  H o u s e , w it h  o r  w ith o u t  
a n y  s ta te m e n t , a s  h e  m ig h t  th in k  f i t  I n  th is  
p a r t ic u la r  c a se  a  v o te  a g a in s t  th e  m o t io n  
e n a b le s  th e  D a i l  to  r e v ie w  it s  d e c is io n  o n  a  
fu r th e r  o c c a s io n  o n  a  v o te  o f  n o  c o n f id e n c e , 
n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  id e n t ic a l in  te rm s  w it h  the  
m o t io n  b e fo re  th e  H o u s e  th is  e v e n in g , b u t 
a im in g  at th e  sa m e  re s u lt , an d  o f  s im i la r  
e f fe c t  i f  e a rn e d  F u r t h e r , in  m y  ju d g e m e n t , a  
m o t io n  o f  no  c o n f id e n c e  in  a n y  E x e c u t iv e  
C o u n c i l  s h o u ld  be a f f irm e d  b y  a  m a jo r i t y  o f  
D e p u t ie s  an d  n o t m e re ly  b y  th e  c a s t in g  v o te  
o f  th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  o f  th e  H o u s e  I  
th e re fo re  v o te  a g a in s t  th e  m o tio n
T h e  f ig u re s , c o n s e q u e n t ly , a r e — F o r  th e  
M o t io n , 7 1 , A g a in s t  th e  M o t io n , 7 2  I  
a c c o rd in g ly  d e c la re  th e  m o t io n  lo s t
I f  H a y e s ’ s  e x p la n a t io n  w a s  a p p ro p n a te  to  h o w  w e  w o u ld  e x p e c t  th e  
S p e a k e r  to  b e h a v e  in  n o n -p a rt is a n  m a n n e r , th e  a c t io n s  o f  h is  s u c c e s s o rs  
w e re  n o t A s  c a n  b e  se e n  f ro m  T a b le  6  1 , n e a r ly  a l l  o c c a s io n s  s in c e  th e n  
h a v e  se e n  th e  S p e a k e r  f o l lo w  g o v e rn m e n t  p re fe re n c e s  a n d  n e a r ly  a l l  c a s e s  
c o u ld  b e  e x p la in e d  b y  p re c e d e n t
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I t  i s  p e rh a p s  i r o n ic ,  b u t th e  o n ly  o c c a s io n  w h e n  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a s  
v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  is  i l lu s t r a t iv e  o f  a  S p e a k e r  e x e r c is in g  h is  
o w n  p o l it ic a l  ju d g m e n t  H a v in g  b e en  ju s t  e le c te d  w it h  th e  h e lp  o f  th e  
in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t , th e  n o n -p a rty  Jo h n  O ’ C o n n e ll  p ro c e e d e d  to  v o te  in  
a  m o st p a r t is a n  fa s h io n  o n  th e  e le c t io n  o f  L e a s  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  F ia n n a  
F a i l  n o m in a te d  a  c a n d id a te  f ro m  it s  o w n  b e n c h e s , b u t w h e n  th e  h o u se  
d iv id e d  e v e n ly  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  n o m in e e  o n  th e  
b a s is  th a t he  w a n te d  to  se e  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  o p p o s it io n  ta k e  th e  p o st
T h e  e v id e n c e  p o in ts  c le a r ly  to  the  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  a s  an  ag en t p ro p p in g  
u p  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  o r , a s  o n  o n e  o c c a s io n , o p e n ly  r e b e l l in g  a g a in s t  th e m  
O n  th e  o n e  o c c a s io n  w h e n  p a r t is a n  b e h a v io u r  is  p e rh a p s  m o st v is ib le ,  th e  
I r i s h  S p e a k e r  c le a r ly  e m e rg e s  as a  p a r t is a n  a n im a l I t  w o u ld  se e m  th a t th e  
p a r t is a n s h ip  e v id e n t  in  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  a  S p e a k e r  c o n t in u e s  in  th e  ro le  th e y  
p la y  in  th e  c h a m b e r
in Respect and confidence among members
T h e  id e a  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  b e in g  im p a r t ia l an d  n o n -p a r t is a n  is  to  e n s u re  th a t 
h e  o r  sh e  w i l l  e n jo y  th e  re s p e c t  o f  th e  m e m b e rs h ip  o f  th e  c h a m b e r  A  
p a r t is a n  s p e a k e r , i t  i s  a rg u e d , c o m p ro m is e s  th e  c o n f id e n c e  th a t  a n y  
m e m b e r  h a s  in  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  p ro c e e d in g s  H o w e v e r ,  do  
m e m b e rs  h a v e  re sp e c t  fo r  th e  c h a ir 9  G iv e n  th e  p ro b le m  o f  m e a s u re m e n t , i t  
i s  p e rh a p s  m o re  e f f ic ie n t  to  a s k  w h e th e r  o r  n o t m e m b e rs  e x p re s s  a  la c k  o f
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c o n f id e n c e  in  th e  C h a i r  A  la c k  o f  c o n f id e n c e  is  a n  o b v io u s  r e s u lt  o f  a  
p a r t is a n  S p e a k e r s h ip  S o  h o w  h a s  the  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  fa re d ?
W e  lo o k  a t th re e  d if fe re n t  s o u rc e s  to  d e te rm in e  th e  d e g re e  to  w h ic h  th e  
c h a ir  i s  re sp e c te d  b y  m e m b e rs  F i r s t l y ,  w e  lo o k  a t th e  le v e l  o f  s u s p e n s io n  
S e c o n d ly , w e  d r a w  m o re  q u a l ita t iv e  e v id e n c e  o f  m e m b e rs  a tt itu d e s  a s  
e x p re s s e d  in  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  d e b ates  an d  on  o ne  n o ta b le  o c c a s io n  b y  a  
m e m b e r  in  a  m e d ia  in t e r v ie w  F in a l l y ,  w e  lo o k  a t h o w  th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  is  p e rc e iv e d  m o re  g e n e ra lly  in  I r i s h  p o l it ic s  b y  e x a m in in g  
p a r t ic u la r  c a s e s  w h e re  th e y  w e re  n o t h e ld  in  p a r t ic u la r ly  h ig h  e s te e m  in  th e  
p r in t  m e d ia
L e t  u s  p re fa c e  o u r  f i r s t  se t o f  e v id e n c e  b y  an  e x p la n a t io n  o f  w h y  w e  lo o k  
at th e  n u m b e r  o f  s u s p e n s io n s  to  p ro v id e  e v id e n c e  th a t th e  S p e a k e r  is  n o t 
re sp e c te d  a s  a  n o n -p a r t is a n , n e u tra l a rb ite r
I f  th e  S p e a k e r  is  re s p e c te d , w e  w o u ld  o n ly  v e r y  r a r e ly ,  i f  a t a l l ,  e x p e c t  to  
se e  a  m e m b e r  b e in g  s u sp e n d e d  M e m b e rs  a re  su sp e n d e d  b y  th e  S p e a k e r  
fo r  d is o rd e r ly  b e h a v io u r , in a p p ro p r ia te  c o m m e n ts  w h ic h  th e y  re fu s e  to  
w it h d r a w  o n  b e in g  c a l le d  to  do  so  b y  th e  c h a ir ,  o r  fo r  r e fu s in g  to  f o l lo w  
so m e  o th e r  r u l in g  o f  th e  c h a ir  (s u c h  a s  's it  d o w n 1’)  I f  th e  s p e a k e r  w a s  
re s p e c te d , th e n  i t  c o u ld  b e  a rg u e d  th a t a  m e m b e r  w o u ld  a lw a y s  re s p e c t  th e  
w is h e s  o f  th e  C h a ir
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I n  T a b le  6  2  w e  p re se n t in fo rm a t io n  o n  th e  n u m b e r  o f  s u s p e n s io n s  f ro m  
D a i l  E i r e a n n  fo r  e a c h  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  u p  to  b u t e x c lu d in g  the  
c u r re n t  o f f ic e h o ld e r  5
Table 6 2 Suspensions for disorderly behaviour, by Ceann Comhairle
1922-1997
Name ( Party Affiliation) Period Served No o f Suspensions Average per year
Michael Hayes CnG [Note 1] 1922-1932 6 06
Frank Fahy (Fianna Fail) 1932-1951 14 07
Patrick Hogan (Labour) 1951-1967 27 1 6
Cormac Breslm (Fianna Fail) 1967-1973 13 22
Sean Treacy (Labour) 1973-1977 3 07
Joseph Brennan (Fianna Fail) 1977-1980 7 23
Padraig Faulkner (Fianna Fail) 1980-1981 1 1
John O'Connell (non-Party) 1981-1982 2 2
Tom Fitzpatrick (Fine Gael) 1982-1987 11 22
Sean Treacy (Non-Party) 1987-1997 48 48
T h e  f i r s t  D e p u ty  to  b e  su sp e n d e d  fro m  th e  p o s t- in d e p e n d e n c e  D a i l  w a s  
D e p u ty  F r a n k  A ik e n  o n  5 D e c e m b e r  1 9 2 9  (h e  w o u ld  la te r  b e c o m e  a  
C a b in e t  M in is t e r  in  a  F ia n n a  F a i l  g o v e rn m e n t ) 6 A ik e n  w a s  su sp e n d e d  
a f te r  h e  s a id  to  th e  C h a i r  ' I  th in k  y o u  a re  a  d a m n  h y p o c r ite  an d  n o th in g  b u t 
a  p a r t y  m a c h in e  ' C a l le d  to  w it h d r a w  th e  r e m a rk , A ik e n  re p e a te d  h is  c la im
5 No record of suspensions are maintained by the Oireachtas so this data was obtained 
from an analysis of Dail Debates during the period covered We relied on the index to 
each volume to calculate the information It is worth noting that the classification of 
suspensions in the index has changed on several occasions (for example, at various dates 
a suspension would be indexed as one or more of the following 'Suspension of Member’, 
'Members, Suspension of, 'Members, Naming of, ’Ceann Comhairle Suspension of 
Deputy' and 'Ceann Comhairle Nammg of Deputy’) In cross-verifying the index against 
the actual debates we found that the indexes in the late 1980s and early 1990s contained 
several omissions (which we corrected for) otherwise we consider the data relatively 
sound On one other methodological point we include only suspensions for mappropriate 
behaviour in the Dail, we do not include cases where a member is suspended for other 
reasons, such as breaching rules outside the chamber)
6 No member was suspended between 1922 and 1928 This may not be surprising given 
the fact that the mam opposition did not enter the Dail until 1927
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' I  a m  s a t is f ie d  th a t th e  p re se n t o c c u p ie r  o f  th e  c h a ir  i s  s im p ly  a  h a c k ' ( D a i l  
D e b a te s  V o l  2 4 , C o l  1 7 4 1 ) F o r  th is  in te rv e n t io n  h e  w a s  su sp e n d e d  A n d  
as  w e  c a n  se e  f ro m  T a b le  6  2  m a n y  m o re  h a v e  fo l lo w e d  in  h is  s te p s  a n d  
b e in g  fo rc e d  to  w it h d r a w  f ro m  th e  s e rv ic e  o f  th e  h o u se  fo r  a  p e r io d  o f  o n e  
to  th re e  d a y s  O n  a v e ra g e  ju s t  o v e r  1 75  D e p u t ie s  h a v e  b e e n  su sp e n d e d  fo r  
e a c h  y e a r  s in c e  1 9 2 2  W h i le  th is  m a y  se e m  v e r y  f e w , i t  d o e s  re p re s e n t 13 2  
d e p u t ie s , a lth o u g h  so m e  d e p u tie s  h a v e  b e e n  su sp e n d e d  o n  m o re  th a n  o n e  
o c c a s io n , an d  th e  s e r io u s n e s s  o f  b e in g  su sp e n d e d  d o e s  p ro v id e  so m e  
e v id e n c e  o f  d is re s p e c t  fo r  th e  C h a ir
W e  w e re  a ls o  in te re s te d  to  e x p lo re  f ro m  w h ic h  s id e  o f  th e  c h a m b e r  a  
su sp e n d e d  d e p u ty  w a s  m o st l i k e ly  to  c o m e  f ro m  I f  a  la rg e  p ro p o r t io n  
c a m e  fro m  th e  O p p o s it io n  s id e , i t  w o u ld  ad d  c r e d ib i l i t y  to  o u r  th e s is  th a t 
th e  S p e a k e r  i s  p a r t is a n  I t  is  o p p o s it io n  m e m b e rs  ra th e r  th a n  m e m b e rs  o f  
th e  g o v e rn in g  p a r ty  w h o  w o u ld  b e  m o st l i k e ly  to  d is t re s s  an d  b e  d is t re s s e d  
b y  th e  S p e a k e r  W h y ,  fo r  e x a m p le , w o u ld  a  g o v e rn m e n t  d e p u ty  be  a n g e re d  
a n d  d is re s p e c t fu l to w a rd s  a  p a r t is a n  s p e a k e r?  I f ,  o n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e re  
w a s  n o  c le a r  m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  a  g o v e m m e n t-o p p o s it io n  d iv id e , th e n  w e  
m ig h t  b e g in  to  s u sp e c t  th a t th e  s p e a k e r  w a s  b e in g  d is re s p e c te d  fo r  re a s o n s  
o th e r  th a n  th e  fa c t  th a t h e  w a s  p a r t is a n
I t  w a s  th e  d is t in g u is h e d  B r i t i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  s c h o la r , S a m u e l H  B e e r ,  
w h o  o n c e  w ro te  th a t th e re  w a s  l i t t le  p o in t  c o u n t in g  th e  le v e l  o f  p a r ty  
v o t in g  c o h e s io n  in  th e  B n t i s h  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s  - i t  w a s  a lw a y s  too  h ig h
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to  p ro d u c e  in te re s t in g  re s u lt s  ( B e e r ,  1 9 6 9 ) B e e r  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  a b le  to  
m a k e  th e  sa m e  p o in t  ab o u t the  fa c t io n a l (g o v e rn m e n t  o r  o p p o s it io n )  o r ig in  
o f  su sp e n d e d  m e m b e rs  A s  fa r  as w e  c a n  t e l l ,  f ro m  o u r  c ro s s - in d e x in g  th e  
m e m b e r  o f  p a r l ia m e n t  w it h  th e ir  s ta tu s  a s  a  g o v e rn m e n t  o r  o p p o s it io n  
d e p u ty , n o  m e m b e r  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t h a s  e v e r  b e e n  s u sp e n d e d  fo r  
d is o rd e r ly  b e h a v io u r 7 T h e  su sp e n d e d  m e m b e r  h a s  a lw a y s  c o m e  f ro m  th e  
o p p o s it io n  b e n c h e s  T h i s ,  fo r  u s , is  s tro n g  e v id e n c e  th a t th e  S p e a k e r  is  
p a r t is a n  an d  w o u ld  a s  w e  e x p e c te d  re c e iv e  th e  b ru n t  o f  c r i t ic is m  fo rm  
o p p o s it io n  m e m b e rs
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  le v e l  o f  an d  p a r t is a n - b ia s  in  s u s p e n s io n s , th e  o f f i c ia l  
p ro c e e d in g s  o f  th e  D a i l  a re  re p le te  w it h  a rg u m e n ts  b e tw e e n  th e  c h a ir  an d  
m e m b e rs  - a rg u m e n ts  th a t a lm o s t  a lw a y s  re s t  o n  th e  u n w il l in g n e s s  o f  a  
m e m b e r  to  a c c e p t th e  a u th o r ity  o f  th e  c h a ir  In  re c e n t  t im e s , i t  is  ra re  fo r  a  
d a y  to  p a s s  w ith o u t  th e  c h a ir 's  ro le  a n d  a c t io n s  b e in g  q u e s t io n e d  b y  a  
m e m b e r  o r  m o re  c o m m o n ly  a  g ro u p  o f  m e m b e rs  In d e e d , th e  p ra c t ic e  o f  
th e  O p p o s it io n  d is o b e y in g  th e  d ir e c t io n s  o f  th e  C h a i r  c o u ld  be  c o n s id e re d  
a  p lo y  to  g a m  v a lu a b le  a ir  t im e  o n  th e  n a t io n a l n e w s , a s  w e l l  a s  in  th e  
p a r l ia m e n ta ry  re p o rts  A n  e x a m p le  o f  a  t y p ic a l  in te ra c t io n  i s  g iv e n  in  
F ig u re  6  2  T h i s  is  b y  n o  m e a n s  th e  m o s t  e x t re m e  in te ra c t io n  b e tw e e n  a  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  an d  a  m e m b e r  t r y in g  to  in te q e c t  o r  p a r t ic ip a te  in  d e b ate
7 For each of the deputies we identified as having being suspended (see footnote 1) we 
cross referenced their partisan affiliation against the previous and next election (to ensure 
accuracy in terms of any member having crossed to the other side following an elections) 
with Parliamentary Election results in Ireland 1918-92
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o r  q u e s t io n s , b u t it  d o e s  i l lu s t r a te  th e  g e n e ra l la c k  o f  re s p e c t  m e m b e rs  h a v e  
fo r  th e  C h a ir
Figure 6 2 Example of Deputy-Chair Interaction
Mrs Owen A Cheann Comhairle, on a point of order, I participated in this debate on 
what the Minister had to say about this legislation
An Ceann Comhairle That is not a point of order The Deputy will resume her seat 
Mrs Owen The Minister should take seriously what any Member of this House says 
about a constitutional Bill----
An Ceann Comhairle It is not a point of order The Deputy is being disorderly 
Mrs Owen  and not try to settle old scores
An Ceann Comhairle When the Chair is on its feet, the Deputy should resume her seat 
It is not a point of order
Mrs Owen I look to you, a Cheann Comhairle, for protection 
An Ceann Comhairle The Deputy is well able to protect herself 
Mrs Owen I do not know whether I will get it but I look to you for it
An Ceann Comhairle The Deputy is well capable of protecting herself____________
Source Dai 1 Debates, 1 May 2001
A n o th e r  e x a m p le  o f  c r it ic is m  b y  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  g a ve  
r is e  to  a  s p e c ia l m e e t in g  o f  th e  D a i l  C o m m it te e  o n  P ro c e d u re  an d  
P r iv i le g e s  in  e a r ly  1 9 7 0  O n  th is  o c c a s io n , a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  c h a m b e r  h ad  
m a d e  a lle g a t io n s  a g a in s t  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  to  th e  e f fe c t  th a t th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  w a s  p o l i t ic a l ly  b ia s e d  T h e  c o m m itte e  w a s  a s k e d  to  e x a m in e  
th e  c o m m e n ts  o f  D e p u ty  C r u is e  O 'B r ie n  w h ic h  th e  re p o rt  e a rn e d  O n  th e  
o c c a s io n  o f  th e  in t e r v ie w , D e p u ty  O 'B r ie n  w a s  a s k e d  i f  h e  th o u g h t th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w a s  u n fa ir  to  th e  o p p o s it io n  T h e  D e p u ty  re p l ie d  'I fe e l
A
th a t h e  is  s u b -c o n s c io u s ly  b ia s e d  to w a rd s  h is  o w n  p a r ty ’
8 Report o f  the Committee on Procedure and Privileges on a Magazine Item containing 
Criticism o f the Ceann Comhairle, 12 March 1970
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T h e  C o m m it te e , w h ic h  p e rh a p s  in te re s t in g ly  is  c h a ire d  b y  th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le ,  re a c h e d  tw o  c o n c lu s io n s  F i r s t l y ,  it  d e e m e d  th a t ’h e n c e fo r th , 
a d v e rs e  c r i t ic is m  o f  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  th e  C h a ir ,  m ad e  o u ts id e  th e  H o u s e , 
s h a l l  be  a  b re a c h  o f  p r i v i l e g e ' T h e  C o m m it te e  fu r th e r  fo u n d  th a t th e  
D e p u ty  h a d  b e e n  in  b re a c h  o f  p r iv i le g e  an d  e v e n  e x te n d e d  th is  b re a c h  o f  
p r iv i le g e  to  c o v e r  th e  m a g a z in e  p u b lis h e r s  In  b o th  c a s e s  n o  a c t io n  w a s  
ta k e n  T h e  re b u k e , h o w e v e r , se n t a  c le a r  s ig n a l to  th e  m e d ia  it  i s  n o t 
a p p ro p r ia te  to  a c c u s e  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  o f  b e in g  p a r t is a n  P e rh a p s  th is  
e x p la in s  w h y  so  l i t t le  is  w r it te n  ab o u t th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  in  I r i s h  
n e w s p a p e rs
I t  is  c le a r ,  f ro m  th e  a b o v e , th a t  d e p u tie s  h a v e  b e en  c r i t ic a l ,  e v e n  to a  le v e l  
w h ic h  c o u ld  b e  d e s c r ib e d  a s  b e in g  v e r y  c r i t ic a l ,  o f  th e  C h a i r  H o w e v e r ,  i t  
i s  n o t a lw a y s  p o s s ib le  fo r  m e m b e rs  to  o p e n ly  c r i t ic is e  th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  fo r  b e in g  p a r t is a n , p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  s p e a k in g  f ro m  o u ts id e  th e  
c h a m b e r
I t  is  w o r th  c o n s id e r in g  w h e th e r  th e  c r i t ic is m  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
w it h in  th e  c h a m b e r  m a n ife s t s  i t s e l f  o u ts id e  T h e re  h a v e  b e e n  o c c a s io n s  
w h e re  th e  m e d ia  h a v e  h it  o u t a t a  p a r t ic u la r  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  T w o  a re  
w o r th  re c o rd in g  h e re , m e r e ly  b y  w a y  o f  e x a m p le
O n e  o f  th e  f i r s t  a t ta c k s  f ro m  th e  m e d ia  c a m e  a s  e a r ly  a s  1 9 3 0  w it h  The 
Nation la u n c h in g  a  b l i t z  o n  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  H a y e s  in  i t s  e d it io n  o f  J u l y
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2 6 .9 T h e  c e n t ra l a c c u s a t io n  is  v e r y  c le a r  f ro m  th e  s e le c te d  e x c e rp ts  
p re se n te d  b e lo w : T h e  S p e a k e r , a lth o u g h  c la im in g  n o t to  b e , i s  in  fa c t  
b e h a v in g  in  a  h ig h ly  p a r t is a n  m a n n e r . H e re  a re  s o m e , a t t im e s  e n te r ta in in g , 
e x c e rp ts  f ro m  the  a r t ic le :
M r  H a y e s  s a y s  to o  m u c h . . .m o r e  th a n  o n c e  
The Nation h a s  ch a rg e d  M r  M ic h a e l  H a y e s , 
S p e a k e r  o f  th e  F re e  S ta te  P a r l ia m e n t , w it h  
r a n k  p a r t is a n s h ip  w h i le  p re s id in g  o v e r  th e  
D a i l  D e b a te s  w h i le  s u b m itt in g  to  M r  
C o s g ra v e 's  d i r e c t io n . . . .  b u t M r  H a y e s  h a s  
a lw a y s ,  i f  w it h  so m e th in g  o f  a  s m ir k ,  
p ro c la im e d  h is  o w n  im p a r t ia l i t y .
T h e  sa m e  a r t ic le  go es o n  to  c r it ic is e  an  in t e r v ie w  w h ic h  M r .  H a y e s  g a v e  to  
a  F r e n c h  m a g a z in e  o n  th e  h is to ry  o f  I r i s h  re p u b lic a n  p o l it ic a l  h is to r y :
M r  H a y e s  h a s  n o t y e t  le a rn e d  th e  v ir tu e  o f  
k e e p in g  h is  m o u th  sh u t . [b ]u t  w h a t  a  
sp e c ta c le : th is  in t e r v ie w  fro m  an  in d iv id u a l  
w h o m  th e  c o u n try  is  m a d e  to  p a y  £ 1 7 0 0  fo r  
im p a r t ia l i t y .
I n  fa irn e s s  to  th e  o f f ic e  o f  S p e a k e r , i t  i s  w o r th  n o t in g  h e re  th e  d e g re e  to  
w h ic h  th e  S p e a k e r  is  h e lp le s s  in  c o m m u n ic a t in g  h is  p a r t ic u la r  v ie w p o in t  
e ith e r  to  o r  b y  u s in g  th e  m e d ia . B y  t ra d it io n  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  d o e s  n o t 
g iv e  in t e r v ie w s  to , c o rre sp o n d  w it h  o r  in d e e d  in te ra c t  w it h  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  
c o rre sp o n d e n ts . R e s p o n d in g  to c r i t ic is m  is  e f f e c t iv e ly  u n h e a rd  o f .  A
9 The Nation, July 26 1930 pp.53-57.
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m a jo r  c h a n g e  c a m e  in  2 0 0 1  w h e n  th e  H e a d  o f  P u b l ic  R e la t io n s  fo r  th e  
O ire a c h ta s  u se d  th e  L e t te r s  to  th e  E d it o r  s e c t io n  o f  The Irish Times to  
a tte m p t to  c o rre c t  a lle g e d  m is in fo rm a t io n  ab o u t the  ro le  an d  p o w e rs  o f  th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  T h e  le t te r  is  re p ro d u ce d  b e lo w  in  F ig u re  6  3
F ig u re  6  3 L e t t e r  to  The Irish Times, R e  C r i t ic i s m  o f  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le
A Chara, -Your article "Ceann Comhairle suspends Broughan in row over Harney’s 
response to unemployment in Dublin" (October 26th), refers The purpose of the Order of 
Business is for the Taoiseach to inform the House of the business of the day and to seek 
agreement to the proposed arrangements for its disposal In addition to questions arising 
directly from these proposals, Standing Orders allow members to raise matters of business 
on the Order Paper, promised business, promised legislation, arrangements for sittings 
and circulation of House documents
The Chair ensures that matters raised comply with these provisions and it is no reflection 
by the Chair on the genuine merit of any other matter if it is raised by a member at a time 
when it does not appropriately arise for consideration
These are necessary provisions for the orderly conduct of business in the House The 
Chair acts on behalf of all members in the mterests of ensuring that proper order is 
maintained and, as such, neither acts alone (in so far as a decision of the House is required 
for the suspension of a member) nor in an arbitrary fashion
Furthermore, the Chair applies uniform standards in dealing with all instances of 
disorderly conduct and will frequently urge a member to resume their seat and desist from 
interrupting before ordering him or her to leave the House
Moreover, it should be noted that a member is never requested to leave or be suspended in 
respect of the issue he is seekmg to raise but rather because he refuses to comply with the 
Ceann Comhairle’s ruling (as set out m the Standing Orders) to resume his seat
Indeed it is the members of D£il Eireann who have put this procedure in place to ensure 
the orderly conduct of debate and the smooth and uninterrupted transaction of business in 
the chamber
- Is mise le meas, VERONA Ni BHROINN
I t  i s  e v id e n t  th a t n o t o n ly  h a s  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  b e e n  th e  s u b je c t  o f  
c r i t ic is m  in  th e  c h a m b e r  an d  th e  m e d ia  b u t h e  an d  h is  o f f ic e  h a s  b e e n
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a w a re  o f  th e  c r it ic is m  an d  a tte m p t in g  in  a t le a s t  a  v e r y  m in im a l w a y  to  p u t 
th e ir  s id e  o f  th e  s to ry  a c ro s s
iv  Post-office behaviour
O u t  f in a l  p re d ic t io n  (H y p o th e s is  1 4 ) re la te s  to  th e  c a re e r  p a th s  o f  fo rm e r  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  R e c a l l  th e  c la im s  in  th e  lite ra tu re  th a t ‘ o n c e  a  S p e a k e r  
a lw a y s  a  s p e a k e r ’ F r o m  th is  e x p e c ta t io n  a s  to  p o s t- o f f ic e  b e h a v io u r  a  
w h o le  ra n g e  o f  a s s u m p t io n s  a re  m a d e  ab o u t w h a t  a  re t ire d  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  w i l l  n o t do  W e  p re d ic te d  th a t th e  c la im s  o f  n o n -p a r t is a n s h ip  
p o s t- o f f ic e  w o u ld  b e  a s  w e a k  a s  th e  c la im s  o f  n e u t ra l it y  in  o f f ic e
T a b le  6  3 se ts  o u t th e  m a in  c a re e r  m o v e s  o f  th e  n in e  fo rm e r  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  G iv e n  th a t o n e  d ie d  in  o f f ic e  an d  o n e  re t ire d  d u e  to  i l l  h e a lth , 
w e  a re  e f f e c t iv e ly  le f t  w it h  s e v e n  c a s e s  W e  a n a ly s e  m o re  c lo s e ly  th e  
e v id e n c e  s u m m a r is e d  in  th e  ta b le  in  a  m o m e n t I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  lo o k  
b e h in d  th e  s u m m a ry  an d  i t  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  u s e fu l to  lo o k  a t th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  
e a r ly  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  o n  re t ire m e n t , a s  th is  m a y  s ig n a l a  n o rm  o f  
b e h a v io u r
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7Table 6 3 Career Moves of the Ceann Comhairle
N am e L eft Office Post Retirement Activities
Michael Hayes 1932 Subsequently Elected to the Senate Served periods as both 
Leader o f the Opposition and Leader o f the Government 
Active within Fine Gael Head Office
Frank Fahy 1951 Died in 1953
Patrick Hogan 1967 Resigned due to bad health Died soon after
Cormac Breslin 1973 Remained until the next general election (1977) but did not 
stand for re-election
Sean Treacy 1977/
1997
Remained in Dail/Sought Re-election Retired Second time
Joseph Brennan 1980 Died in Office
Padraig Y aulkner 1981 Re-elected in the February 1982 and November 1982 general 
elections - topping the poll each time Did not seek re- 
election in the 1987 general election
John O ’Connell 1982 Subsequently joined Fianna F ill, defeated as FF TD in 1987, 
regained his seat in 1989, Re elected in 1992 general 
election, appointed m 1922 as Minister for Health, resigned 
from mid-term on health grounds
Tom Fitzpatrick 1987 Retired at the 1989 general election
A s  y o u  w i l l  r e c a l l ,  M ic h a e l  H a y e s , th e  f i r s t  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  o f  th e  F re e  
S ta te  P a r l ia m e n t , fa i le d  in  h is  a tte m p ts  to  be re -e le c te d  in  1 9 3 2  a s  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  H e  h a d  n o t c h o s e n  to  re t ire  an d  h a d  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  c o n t in u e  
to  s e rv e  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  s e v e n th  D a i l  D id  H a y e s  e f f e c t iv e ly  re t ire  
g r a c e fu l ly  to  th e  b a c k b e n c h e s , r e f r a in in g  f ro m  p a r t is a n  b e h a v io u r , r e t ir in g  
a t th e  n e x t  g e n e ra l e le c t io n  to  a  n o n -p a rt is a n  l i f e 9
F o r  H a y e s ,  h is  c a re e r  o n c e  o u t o f  th e  C h a i r  o f  D a i l  E i r e a n n  w a s  a n y th in g  
b u t n o n -p a r t is a n  T h is  i s  e v id e n t  f r o m  h is  a c t io n s  d u r in g  th e  re m a in d e r  o f  
th e  s e v e n th  D a i l ,  h is  a tte m p ts  to  re m a in  in  p o l it ic s ,  h is  y e a rs  a s  a  S e n a to r  
an d  h is  a c t iv i t ie s  in  C u m a n n  n a  n G a e d h a e l/ F in e  G a e l I t  i s  w o r th  ta k in g  a  
c lo s e r  lo o k  a t h is  b e h a v io u r  a s  h is  a c t io n s  p ro v id e  a  c o m p e ll in g  im a g e  o f  a  
p a r t is a n  a n im a l - a lm o s t  f ro m  th e  h o u r  h e  w a s  n o  lo n g e r  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le
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W e  f i r s t  in v e s t ig a te  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  fo rm e r  S p e a k e rs  in  th e  c h a m b e r  
i t s e l f  T h i s  ca n  b e  te ste d  a t th re e  d if fe re n t  le v e ls  w h e th e r  th e y  c o n t in u e  a s  
m e m b e rs  o f  th e  h o u s e , i f  so , w h e th e r  th e y  p a r t ic ip a te  in  d e b a te  a n d , i f  so , 
h o w  p a r t is a n  is  th e ir  p a r t ic ip a t io n  a n d , t h i r d ly ,  i f  th e y  s h o w  p o l it ic a l  
c o lo u rs  m  v o t in g  a n d  b y  th e ir  v o t in g  p a tte rn
O n  th e  f i r s t  te s t  H a y e s  c o m e s  o u t a s  b e in g  a  p a r t is a n  in  th a t h e  c o n t in u e d  
to  h o ld  h is  se a t In  m a n y  re s p e c ts  su c h  an  o c c u r re n c e  se e m s  q u ie t  n o rm a l 
g iv e n  th a t an  o u tg o in g  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  i s  a u to m a t ic a l ly  re -e le c te d  a s  a 
m e m b e r  an d  th a t p ro c e s s  o f  b e in g  a u to m a t ic a l ly  re tu rn e d  is  n o t m e a n t to  
im p a c t  o n  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  a  n e w  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le ,  i t  w o u ld  se e m s  s tra n g e  
i f  a  re tu rn e d  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w h o  w a s  n o t re -e le c te d  to  th e  C h a i r  w o u ld  
re s ig n  A  s tro n g e r  te s t p e rh a p s  is  to  see  w h e th e r  o r  n o t a  fo rm e r  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  w i l l  s ta n d  a t th e  n e x t  g e n e ra l e le c t io n  T o  d o  so  re q u ire s  
s h o w in g  o n e 's  p o l it ic a l  a f f i l ia t io n  an d  th e  n a tu re  o f  e le c t io n e e r in g  an d  
p o l it ic a l  m a rk e t in g  m a y  d e m a n d  so m e  n e g a t iv e  p o l it ic s  -  a g a in s t  th o se  a n d  
p ro b a b ly  re la t in g  to  a  t im e  p e r io d  w h e n  th e  in d iv id u a l  c la im e d  to  b e  n o n ­
p a r t is a n  A g a in ,  o n  th is  c o u n t th e  f i r s t  p o s t- in d e p e n d e n c e  S p e a k e r  w a s  n o t 
o f  th e  n o n -p a rt is a n  c a m p  H a y e s  so u g h t re - e le c t io n  in  th e  1 9 3 3  g e n e ra l 
e le c t io n  -  a s  it  h a p p e n e d  w it h in  o n e  y e a r  o f  h im  b e in g  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
U n fo r tu n a te ly  fo r  h im  H a y e s  lo s t  h is  s e a t 10
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T h e  re c o rd  o f  D a i l  p ro c e e d in g s  fo r  th e  s e v e n th  D a i l  (b e g in n in g  in  1 9 3 2 )  
p ro v id e s  c le a r  e v id e n c e  th a t , a lth o u g h  H a y e s  m a y  n o t h a v e  b e e n  th e  m o s t  
a c t iv e  b a c k b e n c h e r  d u r in g  th a t y e a r  h e  c e r t a in ly  c o n tr ib u te d  to  d e b a te s  an d  
a s k e d  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  q u e s t io n s  S u c h  in te rv e n t io n s  w e re  v e r y  o fte n  p ro -  
o p p o s it io n  a n d  a n t i-g o v e rn m e n t H e  se e m e d  p a r t ic u la r ly  fo n d  o f  
e m b a rra s s in g  g o v e rn m e n t m in is te r s  b y  p o in t in g  o u t e r ro rs  in  th e ir  
r e c o l le c t io n  o f  e a r l ie r  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  b u s in e s s  11
A n d  w h e n  it  c a m e  to  s h o w in g  h is  p o l it ic a l  a l le g ia n c e s  m o s t  c le a r ly  -  in  th e
m a n n e r  in  w h ic h  h e  c h o se  to  e x e rc is e  h is  v o te  in  a  c h a m b e r  d iv is io n  -
H a y e s  m ad e  n o  a tte m p t to  a c t  im p a r t ia l ly  In d e e d , o n  th e  sa m e  a fte rn o o n
h e  h ad  fa i le d  to  be  re -e le c te d  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le ,  H a y e s  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e
in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t an d  w it h  th e  C u m a n n  n a  n G a e d h e a l/ L a b o u r
o p p o s it io n  I r o n ic a l ly ,  h is  f i r s t  v o te  o f  m a n y  a g a in s t  F ia n n a  F a i l  w a s  o n  a
d iv is io n  to  e le c t  th e  L e a s - C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  T h a t  a fte rn o o n , th e  p a tte rn
b e g an  to e m e rg e  w h e n  h e  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  n o m in a t io n  o f  D e p u ty  de
1
V a le r a  to  th e  p o s t o f  P re s id e n t  o f  th e  E x e c u t iv e  C o u n c i l  I f  a n y o n e  h a d  
b e e n  in  a n y  d o u b t a s  to  h is  p o l it ic s  in  k e e p in g  th e  C u m a n n  n a  n G a e d h e a l 
p a r ty  in  g o v e rn m e n t  so m e  y e a rs  e a r l ie r  b y  th e  w a y  h e  e x e r c is e d  h is  c a s t in g
10 Hayes was a candidate for the Cumann na nGaedheal party m the National University 
of Ireland constituency In a four-way contest he failed to obtain either of the two seats 
available (Gallagher, 1993)
11 See, for example, his participation in the Adjournment Debate—Oireachtas Reporting 
Staff Vacancies (Dail Debates, Volume 41, 09 March, 1932) and his speech on the 
Governments taxation policy (Dad Debates, Volume 42, 01 June 1932)
12 Hayes voted against the nomination of Sean T O'Kelly (Fianna Fail) as Leas-Cheann 
Comhairle Dail Debates, Volume 41,15 March, 1932
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v o te  (se e  a b o v e ) , f e w , in c lu d in g  h im s e lf ,  c o u ld  b e  u n d e r  a n y  i l lu s io n  th a t 
th e  p re te n c e  o f  n o n -p a r t is a n s h ip  h ad  b e e n  d ro p p e d  o v e rn ig h t
I f  H a y e s ’ s sh o rt  te rm  as  a  b a c k b e n c h e r  in  1 9 3 2  p ro v id e s  e v id e n c e  o f  h is  
n e w ly - fo u n d  p a r t is a n s h ip , th e n  h is  c a re e r  p a th  a fte r  th a t is  e v e n  m o re  
i l lu m in a t in g  H a v in g  fa i le d  to  be re -e le c te d  in  1 9 3 3 , h e  se tt le d  f in a l ly  fo r  
m e m b e rs h ip  o f  th e  I r i s h  u p p e r  H o u s e  -  S e a n a d  E ir e a n n  A  m e m b e r  o f  th e  
S e a n a d  fro m  1 9 3 8  u n t i l  1 9 6 5 , h e  n o t o n ly  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  d e b a te , b u t w a s  
a p p o in te d  le a d e r  o f  th e  o p p o s it io n  in  th a t c h a m b e r  A m o n g  h is  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  w a s  k e e p in g  p re s s u re  o n  th e  G o v e rn m e n t  an d  a t te m p tin g  to  
u n d e rm in e  th e  le g is la t iv e  a g e n d a  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t W h e n  F in e  G a e l  le d  
th e  in te r- p a r ty  g o v e rn m e n t , H a y e s  b e c a m e  th e  L e a d e r  o f  th e  G o v e rn m e n t  
in  th e  h o u se  A l l  in  a l l ,  th is  i s  a  f a r  c r y  f ro m  re t ir in g  g r a c e fu l ly  to  th e  
b a c k b e n c h e s
O u ts id e  p a r l ia m e n t  to o , H a y e s  c o n t in u e d  a s  a  p o l it ic a l  a n im a l H is  
p e rs o n a l p a p e rs  c o n ta in  c o p ie s  o f  le t te rs  to  th e  e d ito rs  o f  n a t io n a l 
n e w s p a p e rs  o n  p o l it ic a l  an d  o c c a s io n a l ly  o th e r m a tte rs  W r it in g  o n e 's  
p o l it ic a l  o p im o n s  fo r  p u b lic a t io n  in  th e  le t te r  s e c t io n  o f  a  n e w s p a p e r  is
1 ‘i
h a rd ly  th e  w a y  to  s ig n i f y  c o n t in u e d  im p a r t ia l i t y
I t  s h o u ld  b e  n o te d  th a t H a y e s  w a s  n o t o n ly  an  a c t iv e  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n  in  th e  
d e ca d e s  fo l lo w in g  h is  te rm  as  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le ,  b u t h e  w a s  a ls o  a  s e n io r
13 UCD Archives Department, P53, Hayes Papers
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a c t iv is t  w it h in  th e  C u m a n n  n a  n G a e d h e a l an d  la te r  F in e  G a e l  P a r t y  The 
Irish Times re c o rd s  h im  a s  h a v in g  se rv e d  in  a  n u m b e r  o f  p a r ty  p o s it io n s  
s u c h  a s  C h a ir  o f  th e  F G  S ta n d in g  C o m m it te e  an d  th e  F G  O rg a n is a t io n s  
C o m m it te e  an d  c h a irm a n  o f  v a r io u s  p a r ty  A r d  F h e is  H e  w a s  a ls o  
a p p a re n t ly  a c t iv e  in  p a r ty  e le c t io n e e r in g , b e in g  d e s c r ib e d  b y  o n e  jo u r n a l is t  
a s  th e  'V i r t u a l  D ir e c to r  o f  E le c t io n s 1 fo r  a  n u m b e r  o f  y e a rs  14
A s  w e  c a n  se e  f ro m  T a b le  6  3 , a  n u m b e r  o f  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a v e  n o t 
fo l lo w e d  th e  p a r t is a n  ro u te  in  so  m u c h  a s  th e y  h a v e  re t ire d  at th e  
su b se q u e n t g e n e ra l e le c t io n  o r  th e y  h a v e  b e e n  to o  i l l  to  c o n t in u e  m  
p o l it ic s  I t  d o e s  se e m  to  be  th e  c a se  th a t w h e re  an  o u tg o in g  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  is  r e la t iv e ly  y o u n g  th e y  w i l l  re -e n g a g e  w it h  th e ir  p o l it ic a l  p a r ty  
an d  c o n t in u e  to  be  a c t iv e  in  p o l it ic s
O n e  re c e n t  c a s e  i l lu s t r a te s  th e  d e g ree  to  w h ic h  a  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  c a n  
q u ic k ly  re -e n g a g e  D e p u ty  Jo h n  O 'C o n n e l l  c a m e  to  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  a s  a n  
in d e p e n d e n t n o n - a f f i l ia te d  d e p u ty  H o w e v e r , w it h in  a  y e a r  o f  r e l in q u is h in g  
th e  C h a i r  h e  b e c a m e  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  p o l it ic a l  p a r ty  th a t e f f e c t iv e ly  
s e c u re d  h is  p la c e  a s  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  T h e  p a r ty  w a s  F ia n n a  F a i l  
O 'C o n n e ll  p ro v id e s  fu r th e r  e v id e n c e  o f  th e  p a r t is a n s h ip  o f  fo rm e r  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  m  th a t h e  w a s  a p p o in te d  a  c a b in e t  m in is te r  in  1 9 9 2  In  h is  h e a th  
p o r t fo l io  O 'C o n n e l l  w a s  a t th e  v e r y  f ro n t  o f  p a r t is a n  p o l it ic s
14 Biographical details are taken from various sources including The Irish Times and, to a 
lesser degree, A Dictionary o f Irish Biography (Boylan 1988)
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T h e  im a g e  o f  a  S p e a k e r  w h o  q u ie t ly  an d  g r a c e fu l ly  re t ire s  to  th e  s i le n c e  o f  
th e  u p p e r  c h a m b e r  is  c e r t a in ly  a  m y th  in  th e  I r i s h  c a s e  A l l  th e  e v id e n c e  
p o in ts  to  th e  a b se n ce  o f  a n y  s u c h  n o rm  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a v e  in  th e  p a s t  
re tu rn e d  to  a c t iv e  p a r t is a n  p o l it ic s  a lm o s t im m e d ia te ly  fo l lo w in g  th e ir  te rm  
in  th e  C h a i r  O n  so m e  o c c a s io n s  th e ir  re - a c t iv a te d  p a r t is a n  c a re e r  h a s  le d  
to  s e n io r  p o s it io n s  in c lu d in g  th e  ro le  th e  p a r ty  le a d e r  in  th e  u p p e r  H o u s e  o r  
t a k in g  a  se a t at c a b in e t
v  C o n c lu s io n
W e  h a v e  p re se n te d , a t t im e s  d e ta ile d , in fo rm a t io n  in  th is  c h a p te r  o n  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  in  an  a tte m p t to  i l lu m in a te  th e  e m p in c a l  
v a l id i t y  o f  o u r  th e o ry  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  F o c u s in g  o n  th e  o b s e rv e d  
b e h a v io u r  an d  a c t io n s  o f  th e  S p e a k e r , an d  o n  th e  b e h a v io u r  an d  a c t io n s  o f  
o th e r  k e y  p la y e r s , th e  in fo rm a t io n  p re se n te d  p a in ts  a  p ic tu re  o f  a  ty p e  o f  
S p e a k e r s h ip  v e r y  d if fe re n t  f ro m  th e  n o n -p a rt is a n , n e u tra l B r i t i s h  m o d e l In  
te rm s  o f  h o w  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a v e  u se d  th e ir  c a s t in g  v o te , h o w  th e  
o f f ic e  an d  o f f ic e h o ld e r  a re  p e rc e iv e d  b y  m e m b e rs  an d  m  h o w  fo rm e r  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  c o n d u c t  th e m s e lv e s  o n  le a v in g  o f f ic e ,  th e  e v id e n c e  o f  
p a r t is a n s h ip  se e m s  r e la t iv e ly  s tro n g
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H o w e v e r ,  a s  w it h  th e  p re v io u s  c h a p te r , w e  w i l l  le a v e  a n  o v e r a l l  a n a ly s is  o f  
th e  e v id e n c e  p re se n te d  h e re  to  th e  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p te r  T h e r e ,  w e  w i l l  
b r in g  to g e th e r  th e  e v id e n c e  f ro m  th is  an d  th e  p re c e d in g  c h a p te r  an d  
a tte m p t to  d ra w  c o n c lu s io n s  f ro m  th e  f i t  o f  o u r  th e o ry  an d  e m p ir ic a l  
e v id e n c e  In  so  m u c h  a s  th e  c o rre la t io n  b e tw e e n  e x p e c ta t io n s  an d  e v id e n c e  
i s  a  fu n d a m e n ta l re q u ire m e n t  o f  th e  s c ie n t i f ic  m e th o d , w e  a re  a p p ro a c h in g  
th e  f in a l  s tag e  o f  o u r  s tu d y
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion
i Introduction
W e  b e g a n  th is  w o r k  b y  a rg u in g  th a t i t  w a s  n e c e s s a ry  to  ta k e  a  f r e s h  lo o k  a t 
th e  o f f ic e  o f  S p e a k e r  in  th e  le g is la tu re  T h u s  f a r ,  w e  h a v e  c r it iq u e d  th e  
p re v io u s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  o f f ic e ,  a rg u e d  th e  m e r it s  o f  ta k in g  a  ra t io n a l-  
in s t itu t io n a lis t  p e rs p e c t iv e , u se d  th a t f r a m e w o r k  to  d e v e lo p e d  a  th e o ry  o f  
th e  ra t io n a l S p e a k e r s h ip , se t o u t a  n u m b e r  o f  e m p ir ic a l ly  te s ta b le  
e x p e c ta t io n s  th a t f o l lo w  f ro m  th e  th e o ry , a n d , in  th e  la s t  tw o  c h a p te rs , 
g a v e  e m p ir ic a l  c o n te n t to  th o se  h y p o th e s is
In  th is ,  o u r  c o n c lu d in g  c h a p te r , w e  se t o u rs e lv e s  th re e  m a in  c h a lle n g e s  
T h e  f i r s t  i s  to  s u m m a r is e  an d  a n a ly s e  w h a t  w e  c o n s id e r  to  b e  th e  
th e o re t ic a l- e m p ir ic a l  f i t  W h i le  th e  re a d e r  w i l l ,  a t th is  s ta g e , b e  a w a re  
g e n e ra l ly  o f  th e  e v id e n c e  to  su p p o rt o u r  h y p o th e s e s , i t  is  u s e fu l  
n e v e r th e le s s  to  b r in g  s u c h  e m p ir ic a l  in fo rm a t io n  to g e th e r T h e  a im  h e re  is  
to  se e  i f  th e  d a ta  s u p p o rts  th e  o v e r a l l  e x p e c ta t io n s  a s  w e  o u t lin e d  in  o u r  
th e o ry  o f  th e  o f f ic e  R e c a l l  th a t in  th e  d e s ig n  o f  th is  re s e a rc h  w e  d e f in e d  it  
to  b e  a b s o lu te ly  n e c e s s a ry  th a t  th e  th e o ry  b e  c a p a b le  o f  b e in g  f a ls i f ie d  
T h e  e m p ir ic a l- th e o re t ic a l f i t  w i l l  s e rv e  to  v e r i f y  o r  f a l s i f y  th e  th e o ry , a n d  
a s  s u c h  is  a  c r u c ia l  p a r t  o f  the  c h a lle n g e  to  a s s e s s  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  
S p e a k e r s h ip
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A s s u m in g , a s  w e  b e lie v e  it  w i l l ,  th a t o u r  th e o ry  is  v a l id a te d , w e  th e n  
p ro c e e d  to  th e  se co n d  m a jo r  ta s k  o f  th is  C h a p te r  - to  d e ta il  w h a t  w e  
c o n s id e r  to  be  th e  m a m  im p lic a t io n s  o f  o u r  re s e a rc h  f in d in g s  O b v io u s ly ,  
w e  w i l l  a rg u e  th a t th e  f r a m e w o r k  an d  e v id e n c e  p re se n te d  h e re  le a d s  to  
v e r y  d if fe re n t  c o n c lu s io n s  ab o u t th e  n a tu re  an d  ro le  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  w it h in  
a n d , in d e e d , o u ts id e  th e  le g is la t iv e  a re n a  H o w e v e r , w e  a ls o  s h o w  h o w  th e  
re s e a rc h  i l lu m in a t e s  c r it ic a l  is s u e s  fo r  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  w o r k in g  o f  
le g is la tu re s  an d  p o lit ic a l  in s t itu t io n s  m o re  g e n e ra lly  In  th e  th ird  s e c t io n  
w e  e x p lo re  b r ie f ly  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  e x te n d in g  th e  re s e a rc h , at b o th  a  
th e o re t ic a l an d  e m p ir ic a l  le v e l  F in a l l y ,  w e  re c a p itu la te  o u r  th e o ry  an d  
f in d in g s
11 Summary and analysis of empirical findings
A s  c a n  b e  se e n  f ro m  th e  e m p ir ic a l  in fo rm a t io n  p re se n te d  m  th e  p re c e d in g  
tw o  c h a p te rs , th e  s to ry  o f  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  a  fa s c in a t in g  o n e  W e  
h a v e  a tte m p te d , in  a s  n e u tra l a  m a n n e r  a s  p o s s ib le , to  la y  b e fo re  th e  re a d e r  
e m p ir ic a l  in fo rm a t io n  u n d e r  e a c h  o f  th e  fo u rte e n  h y p o th e s e s  w h ic h  w e  
d e v e lo p e d  e a r l ie r  F o r  e a c h  o f  th e  h y p o th e s e s  w e  a tte m p te d  to  d r a w  so m e  
c o n c lu s io n s  a s  to  th e ir  a c c u ra c y  b a se d  o n  th e  a v a i la b le  e v id e n c e  In  th is  
s e c t io n  w e  s u m m a r is e  an d  a s s e s s  th e  e v id e n c e
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I t  i s  n o t u n u s u a l fo r  re s e a rc h e rs  to a tte m p t to  s u m m a r is e  th e ir  e m p ir ic a l  
f in d in g s  T h i s  i s  th e  s t u f f  o f  s o c ia l  s c ie n c e  a fte r  a l l  P ic tu r e s  th a t a re  
d e ta ile d , c o m p lic a te d  an d  c o m p le x  m u s t  be re d u c e d  i f  w e  a re  e v e r  to  d ra w  
c o n c lu s io n s , n o t o n ly  in  te rm s  o f  th e o ry  b u ild in g , b u t a ls o  w h e n  i t  c o m e s  
to  h a n d lin g  w h a t  m a y  be  la rg e  a m o u n ts  o f  e m p ir ic a l  in fo rm a t io n  D if f e r e n t  
w a y s  to  do  th is  h a v e  c e r ta in ly  b e e n  u se d  m  th e  p a s t A  m a jo r  o b je c t iv e  is  
to  p re s e n t th e  s u m m a ry  m  as  c le a r  an d  tra n s p a re n t a  m a n n e r  a s  p o s s ib le  
F o r  th is  re a s o n , w e  h a v e  o p ted  to  o u t lin e  o u r  e m p ir ic a l  f in d in g s  w it h  th e  
u se  o f  a  fo u r- p o in t  s c a le  ra n g in g  fro m  s tro n g  to  p o o r  in  te rm s  o f  
c o n f irm a to ry  e v id e n c e
G iv e n  th e  r e la t iv e  n o v e lt y  o f  th is  a p p ro a c h , an d  in  k e e p in g  w it h  th e  
g e n e ra l p h ilo s o p h y  o f  K in g  e t a l (1 9 9 4 ) ,  w e  f i r s t  p ro v id e  c le a r  
e x p la n a t io n s  o f  th e  e x a c t  c r it e r ia  u se d  in  d e te rm in in g  h o w  s tro n g  th e  le v e l 
o f  e v id e n c e  to  v a lid a te  a n y  o r  a l l  o f  o u r  h y p o th e s e s  E a c h  o f  th e  fo u rte e n  
h y p o th e s e s  c a n  b e  s c o re d  in  o n e  o f  fo u r  c a te g o r ie s  E a c h  c a te g o ry  r e f le c t s  
a  p r e c is e ly  p re -d e f in e d  le v e l  o f  p r o o f  re g a rd in g  w h e th e r  th e  e m p ir ic a l  
e v id e n c e  c o n f ir m s  o r  re je c ts  th e  h y p o th e s is  T h e  fo u r  s ta n d a rd s  o f  p r o o f  
c a n  b e  d e s c n b e d  a s  fo l lo w s
•  H ig h  T h e  v a s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  e v id e n c e  su p p o rts  th e  h y p o th e s is  O n ly  
e x p la in a b le  o u t lie rs  ( i f  a n y )  a re  p re se n t
236
•  M e d iu m  T h e  e m p ir ic a l  e v id e n c e  is  s tro n g  e n o u g h  to  c o n c lu d e  th a t  th e  
h y p o th e t ic a l s ta te m e n t is  an  a c c u ra te  re f le c t io n  a lth o u g h  th e re  is  so m e  
e v id e n c e  th a t is  c o n t ra ry  to  th e  h y p o th e s is
•  In c o n c lu s iv e  T h e  h y p o th e s is  re c e iv e d  m ix e d  r e s u lt s , i t  n o t b e in g  
p o s s ib le  to  c o n c lu d e  th a t th e  h y p o th e s is  a c c u ra te ly  r e f le c t s  th e  r e a l i t y
•  L o w  L i t t le  o r  n o  e v id e n c e  is  a v a i la b le  to  su p p o rt th e  h y p o th e s is
In  o rd e r  to  be a s  o b je c t iv e  a s  p o s s ib le , w e  h a v e  a tte m p te d  to be  as  
c o n s e rv a t iv e  a s  p o s s ib le  in  h o w  w e  ra te  th e  e v id e n c e  In  o th e r  w o rd s , i f  
th e re  is  o n ly  v e r y  l i t t le  d o u b t th a t th e  h y p o th e s is  is  a c c u ra te , w e  w i l l  s c o re  
th is  a s  p ro v id in g  a m e d iu m  a m o u n t o f  e v id e n c e  o n ly  In  e s s e n c e , w e  w i l l  
b e  s lo w  to  c o n c lu d e  th e  e v id e n c e  i s  h ig h  an d  m u c h  q u ic k e r  to  c o n c lu d e  
th a t  th e  e v id e n c e  is  w e a k  A s  n o v e l a s  th is  i s ,  w e  do  so  in  th e  e x p e c ta t io n  
th a t  th is  a p p ro a c h  w i l l  a l lo w  th e  re a d e r  to  h a v e  a  g re a te r  d e g re e  o f  
c o n f id e n c e  in  o u r  s u m m a ry  an d  o v e r a l l  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l  
p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  o u r  th e o ry
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Figure 7 1 The Empirical-Theoretical Fit
Hypothesis High Medium In­
conclusive
Low
HI The level of threshold set for election to 
Speakership
♦
H2 Level of partisan voting cohesion m election ♦
H3 Factional origin of Speaker ♦
H4 Government use of Speakership to enhance 
weak voting position
♦
H5 Speakership as subject of inter-party coalition 
negotiations
♦
H6 Speaker comes from role with low 
partisanship
♦
H7 Role of party in determining the number of 
candidates
♦
H8 Role of party leadership in nominating 
candidates for Speaker
♦
H9 Outgoing Speaker will be re-selection ♦
H10 Security of tenure ♦
H11 Attempts to remove Speaker ♦
H12 Use of casting vote ♦
H13 Respect for authority of Speaker ♦
H14 Level of partisanship after leaving the 
Speakership
♦
L o o k in g  a t F ig u re  7  1 , w e  c a n  be re a s o n a b ly  h a p p y  w it h  th e  e m p ir ic a l-  
th e o re t ic a l f i t  - w h i le  i t  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  v e r y  n ic e  fo r  a l l  h y p o th e s e s  to  
h a v e  a c h ie v e d  a  h ig h  s c o re , s e v e n  o f  th e  fo u rte e n  d id  M o r e o v e r , th e  le f t  
s id e  o f  th e  ta b le  is  r e la t iv e ly  b la n k  w it h  th e  e m p in c a l a n a ly s is  re tu rn in g  no  
d is c o n f irm a t io n  (a s  m e a s u re  b y  a  lo w  th e o ry - e m p ir ic a l f i t )  I n  s e v e n  o f  th e  
fo u rte e n  h y p o th e s e s , th e  f i t  i s  s tro n g  e n o u g h  to  su g g e st th a t  o u r  
e x p e c ta t io n s  h a v e  b e e n  v e r i f ie d ,  fo u r  m o re  re tu rn e d  a  m e d iu m  le v e l  o f  
e v id e n c e , w h i le  in  tw o  c a s e s  w e  fe lt  a b le  to  c h a ra c te r is e  th e  e v id e n c e  a s  
b e in g  in c o n c lu s iv e
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W e  th in k  it  w o r th w h i le  at th is  s tag e  to  ta k e  a  c lo s e r  lo o k  a t  e a c h  o f  th e  
h y p o th e s e s  to  e x p la in  h o w  w e  a w a rd e d  th e  s c o re s  a s  p re se n te d  in  F ig u re  
7 1 W e  a ls o  w a n t  to  e x p lo re  c lo s e ly  a n y  e v id e n c e  w h ic h  h a s  e m e rg e d  to  
q u e s t io n  o u r  c o n c e p t io n  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  a s  a  ra t io n a l p a r t is a n  o f f ic e ,  as  
w e l l  a s  o u t lin e r s  in  th o se  h y p o th e s e s  w h ic h  w e  w e re  n e v e r th e le s s  h a p p y  to 
c o n c lu d e  a s  h a v in g  e n o u g h  e v id e n c e  to  v e r i f y
H I  T o  be  e le c te d  I r i s h  S p e a k e r  i t  is  n o t n e c e s s a ry  to  o b ta in  e v e n  a  
m a jo r i t y ,  n e v e r  m in d  so m e  fo rm  o f  s u p e r - m a jo r ity  to  e n su re  b y -  
p a r t is a n s h ip  in  th e  s e le c t io n  a n d  a p p o in tm e n t p ro c e s s  T h e  S p e a k e r  c a n  
th e n  b e  a p p o in te d  b y  th e  la rg e s t  fa c t io n  in  the  le g is la tu re  T h e  c o n se q u e n c e  
o f  th is  e le c to ra l p ro c e s s  fo r  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
S p e a k e r s h ip , i s  th a t th e  o f f ic e  h o ld e r  re q u ire s  o n ly  th e  m in im u m  o f  su p p o rt 
an d  g o o d w il l  o n  a p p o in tm e n t
M o r e o v e r  i f ,  in  k e e p in g  w it h  th e  ra t io n a l- in s t itu t io n a h s t  p e r s p e c t iv e , w e  
th in k  o f  th is  in s t itu t io n a l r u le  a s  b e in g  a  d e lib e ra te  d e s ig n , th e n  it  b e c o m e s  
c le a r  th a t  th is  m ic ro - in s t itu t io n  (th e  ru le s  b y  w h ic h  a  S p e a k e r  is  s e le c te d ) 
r e f le c t s  a  m o re  g e n e ra l v ie w  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  a s  a  p o l it ic a l  p n z e  I f  th o se  
w h o  d e s ig n e d  th e  s e le c t io n  m e c h a n is m  lo o k e d  u p o n  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  a s  a  
h ig h  o f f ic e ,  th e n  w e  w o u ld  e x p e c t  th e m  to  h a v e  p u t m  p la c e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  
fo r  s e le c t io n  to  e n s u re  th a t th e  S p e a k e r  w o u ld  be  a p p o in te d  w it h  th e  w i l l  
a n d  s u p p o rt  o f  th e  b o d y  o f  th e  h o u se
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I n  H 2  w e  h y p o th e s is e d  th a t a  h ig h  le v e l  o f  le g is la t iv e  p a r t y  c o h e s io n  w a s  
l i k e ly  to  be o b s e rv e d  w h e re  a  v o te  w a s  re q u ire d  to  e le c t  th e  S p e a k e r  
M o r e o v e r ,  o u r  r o l l  c a l l  a n a ly s is  sh o w e d  e x c e p t io n a l ly  h ig h , in d e e d  
a b s o lu te , le v e ls  o f  c o h e s io n  T h e  o b s e rv e d  c o h e s io n  is  o f  c o u rs e  o n ly  
e x t r a o rd in a ry  w h e n  se t a g a in s t  th e  e x p e c ta t io n  th a t th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  is  n o n -  
p a r t is a n  O u r  a n a ly s is  o f  v o t in g  b e h a v io u r  d e m o n s tra te d  c le a r ly  th a t th e  
e le c t io n  o f  S p e a k e r  is  a  c le a r ly  p a r t is a n  m a tte r
T h e  o n e  s u rp r is e  h e re  w a s  th a t th e re  w e re  so  f e w  o c c a s io n s  o n  w h ic h  a  
v o te  w a s  c a l le d  R e c a l l  th a t o n  m o st o c c a s io n s  o n ly  o n e  c a n d id a te  
p re se n te d  th e m s e lv e s  C r i t ic s  o f  o u r  th e o ry  m a y  a tte m p t to  c la im  th a t th e re  
e x is t s  a  n o rm  th a t se es  a  c ro s s -p a r ty  c a n d id a te  e m e rg e , r e s u lt in g  in  o n ly  
o n e  c a n d id a te  fo r  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  W e re  th is  th e  c a s e , i t  w o u ld  c e r t a in ly  be 
m o re  in  k e e p in g  w ith  th e  n o n - ra t io n a l p e rs p e c t iv e  o n  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  
W h i le  th is  i s  o n e  w a y  to  v ie w  th e  la c k  o f  c o n te s t , a  se c o n d  i s  to  su g g e st 
th a t  b e c a u se  o f  th e  g e n e ra l le v e l  o f  le g is la t iv e  p a r ty  c o h e s io n  th e  re s u lt s  o f  
th e  c o n te s t to  b e c o m e  S p e a k e r  is  a  fait accompli A s s u m in g  a n y o n e  
in te re s te d  in  b e in g  n o m in a te d  fo r  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  w i l l  o n ly  do  so  i f  th e  
fe e l th e y  a re  l i k e ly  to  be s u c c e s s fu l  (a f te r  a l l  w h ic h  p o l it ic ia n  w o u ld  h a v e  a  
p re fe re n c e  fo r  lo s in g  an  e le c t io n ) , th e n  th e  a b se n c e  o f  m o re  th a n  o n e  
c a n d id a te  c a n  b e  se e n  a s  th e  re s u lt  o f  a lte rn a t iv e  c a n d id a te s  re a s o n in g  
a h e a d  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t ly  d e c l in in g  to  b e  n o m in a te d  O n ly  w h e re  th e  re s u lt  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  p re d ic t  i s  a n  a lte rn a t iv e  c a n d id a te  l i k e ly  to  e m e rg e  T h i s  is  
o n e  p o s s ib le  c re d ib le  e x p la n a t io n  H o w e v e r , w e  fo u n d  n o  e v id e n c e  to
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su g g e st th a t a  c a n d id a te  w h o  w a s  u n o p p o se d  w a s  le s s  l i k e ly  to  b e  m o re  
a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  o p p o s it io n  p a rt ie s
H3 T h e  e m p ir ic a l  e v id e n c e  to  su p p o rt o u r  th ird  h y p o th e s is  a p p e a rs  at f i r s t  
to  b e  a  l i t t le  w e a k  C e r t a in ly  i t  i s  tru e  th a t m  the  v a s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  c a s e s  the  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  c a m e  f ro m  th e  r a n k s  o f  th e  in c o m in g  c o n t ro l l in g  fa c t io n  
H o w e v e r  in  10 o f  th e  2 8  c a s e s  th is  w a s  n o t th e  r e s u lt  - th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  c a m e  f ro m  th e  o p p o s ite  s id e  o f  th e  h o u se  T h i s  w a s  p u z z l in g  i f  
w e  b e lie v e  th a t a  p a r ty  w i l l  w a n t  to  c o n tro l th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  fo r  i t s  o w n  
p o l it ic a l  a d v a n ta g e  S h o r t  o f  th in k in g  th a t a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  o p p o s it io n  
w o u ld  in  so m e  w a y  sell h im s e lf  o r  h e r s e l f  to  th e  c o n t r o l l in g  fa c t io n , i t  is  
h a rd  to  u n d e rs ta n d  w h y  an  o p p o s it io n  m e m b e r  w o u ld  be  se le c te d  i f  th e  
p o s t o f  s p e a k e r  w a s  a  p a r ty  p r iz e
T h e  tru e  a n s w e r , a s  w e  d is c o v e re d , la y  w it h  H4 w h ic h  s ta te s  th a t  p a r t ie s  in  
a  n o n - m a jo r ity  p o s it io n  b u t w h o  s t i l l  h a v e  a  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  e n te r in g  
g o v e rn m e n t  w i l l  s e le c t  a  S p e a k e r  f ro m  th e  o p p o s it io n  s id e  o f  th e  c h a m b e r  
T h e  d e s ire  to  e n te r g o v e rn m e n t  e x p la in s  a  n u m b e r  o f  th e  c a s e s  w h e re  th e  
S p e a k e r  c a m e  f ro m  th e  o p p o s it io n  b e n c h e s  H a v in g  s a id  th is ,  h o w e v e r , o n  
so m e  o c c a s io n s  th e  S p e a k e r  s t i l l  c a m e  f ro m  th e  o p p o s ite  s id e  o f  th e  
c h a m b e r , e v e n  th o u g h  th is  w a s  n o t n e c e s s a ry  fo r  th e  p o te n t ia l e n t ry  in to  
an d  s u r v iv a l  in  p o w e r  o f  a n y  p a r ty
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T h e s e  c a s e s  a l l  o c c u r re d  w h e re  a n  in c u m b e n t  w a s  a v a i la b le  a n d  w i l l in g  to  
s ta n d  a g a in  A s  th is  i s  th e  s u b je c t  o f  h y p o th e s is  n in e , w e  w i l l  n o t c o m m e n t 
fu r th e r  h e re  S o  w h a t  c a n  w e  co nc lud e*? In  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  in s ta n c e s  it  is  
c le a r  th a t th e  S p e a k e r  w a s  se le c te d  e ith e r  b e c a u se  h e  o r  sh e  c a m e  f ro m  th e  
sa m e  s id e  o f  th e  h o u se  a s  th e  in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t o r  e ls e  th e  
S p e a k e rs h ip  is  s a c r i f ic e d  to  th e  o p p o s it io n  in  th e  a im  o f  s tre n g th e n in g  the  
r e la t iv e  v o t in g  p o w e r  o f  th e  in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t T h e  la t te r  i s  a ls o  
o b s e rv e d  in  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  so m e  p a r t ie s  in  r e fu s in g  to  a l lo w  th e ir  
m e m b e rs  s e rv e  a s  S p e a k e r , k n o w in g  th a t to  do  so  w o u ld  e n h a n c e  th e  
fo rtu n e s  o r  at th e  v e r y  le a s t  m a k e  l i f e  e a s ie r  fo r  th e ir  o p p o n e n ts  e n te r in g  
g o v e rn m e n t
H5 T h e  e m p ir ic a l  d a ta  fa i le d  to  v e r i f y  o u r  f i f t h  h y p o th e s is  W e  h ad  
p re d ic te d  th a t in  th e  le a d  u p  to  th e  fo rm a t io n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t th e  a l lo c a t io n  
o f  S p e a k e r  w o u ld  b e  a n  is s u e  to  be  n e g o tia te d  b e tw e e n  p a r t ie s  H o w e v e r , 
w e  fo u n d  l i t t le  e v id e n c e  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  o n  th e  is s u e  o f  w h o  w o u ld  b e c o m e  
S p e a k e r  - th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  w a s  n o t a  p o r t fo lio  to  be  a llo c a te d  in  th e  m te r-  
p a r ty  b a rg a in in g  ro u n d s  T h i s ,  d e sp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t s u c h  b a rg a in in g  o v e r  
c a b in e t  an d  ju n io r  m in is t r ie s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  n e a r ly  a l l  g o v e rn m e n ta l 
a p p o in tm e n ts  se e m s  to  b e  w it h in  th e  re m it  o f  re c e n t  c o a l it io n  a g re e m e n ts  
(M it c h e l l  1 9 9 9 )
T h e  p u z z le , th e n , i s  w h y  i f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  a  p a r t is a n  p r is e  it  i s  n o t 
fo u g h t o v e r  at th e  c o a l it io n  b a rg a in in g  s tag e  T h e  a n s w e r  w e  su g g e ste d  is
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th a t  th e  t im e f ra m e  is  in a p p ro p r ia te  fo r  th is  to  h a p p e n  e m p ir ic a l ly  i t  s e e m s  
th a t , in  I re la n d  a t le a s t , th e  re a l b u s in e s s  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  w i l l  h a v e  h a r d ly  
b e g u n  b y  th e  t im e  th e  D a i l  c o n v e n e s  fo r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  fo l lo w in g  a  g e n e ra l 
e le c t io n  I t  m a y  be  th e  c a se  th a t p a r t ie s  a re  u n w i l l in g  to  p u t a l l  th e ir  c a rd s  
o n  th e  ta b le , p la y  h a rd b a l l ,  a t s u c h  an  e a r ly  s tag e  - th u s  e n s u r in g  the  
S p e a k e rs h ip  i s  n o t d e c id e d  in  th e  n e g o t ia t in g  ro o m s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  
c o a l it io n  d is c u s s io n s  I t  se e m s to  be  a  c a se  o f  a l lo w  th e  D a i l  to  m e e t , s e le c t  
a  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  an d  th e n  le t  b a rg a in  o v e r  g o v e rn m e n t  fo rm a t io n  I t  
w o u ld  c e r t a in ly  h a v e  b e en  n ic e  i f  w e  c o u ld  h a v e  fo u n d  e v id e n c e  o f  th e  
S p e a k e rs h ip  b e in g  b a rg a in e d  o v e r , n ic e  in  so  m u c h  a s  i t  w o u ld  h a v e  ad d e d  
to  th e  c r e d ib i l i t y  o f  o u r  th e s is  N e v e r th e le s s , g iv e n  th e  ru le s  o f  th e  
g o v e rn m e n t fo rm a t io n  p ro c e s s , w e  su g g e st th a t th e  e v id e n c e  m u s t  b e  se en  
a s  n e ith e r  s u p p o rt in g  n o r  o p p o s in g  o u r th e o ry
H 6  R e a l i t y  w a s  m u c h  k in d e r  to  o u r  s ix th  h y p o th e s is , w h ic h ,  a s  th e  re a d e r  
w i l l  r e c a l l ,  su g g e ste d  th a t th e  p e rso n  se le c te d  a s  S p e a k e r  w i l l  n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  h a v e  c a m e  f ro m  th e  b a c k b e n c h e s , h a v in g  s e rv e d  in  th a t ro le  fo r  
a  c o n s id e ra b le  p e n o d  o f  t im e  - in  e f fe c t  w e l l  re m o v e d  f ro m  f ro n t- l in e  
p a r t is a n  p o l it ic s  O u r  f in d in g s  in d ic a te d  th a t n o  s u c h  n o rm  e x is t s  in  th e  
I r i s h  p o l it ic a l  s y s te m  In d e e d , o n  the  c o n t ra r y  th e  e s ta b lis h e d  p a tte rn  i s  fo r  
th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  to  h a v e  h e ld  so m e  fo rm  o f  m in is t e r ia l  o f f ic e ,  o n  
o c c a s io n s  e v e n  a  f u l l  c a b in e t  p o r t fo lio  W e  fo u n d  o n ly  o n e  o c c a s io n  w h e n  
th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  c o u ld  be  d e s c r ib e d  a s  h a v in g  c o m e  f r o m  th e  
b a c k b e n c h e s  A s  w e  h a v e  a rg u e d , i t  se e m s q u ite  d i f f i c u l t  to  r e c o n c i le  th e
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id e a  o f  a  S p e a k e rs h ip  b a se d  o n  n o n -p a rt is a n s h ip  an d  p o l ic y  n e u t ra l i t y  w it h  
th e  r e c ru it s  to  th e  o f f ic e  c o m in g  f ro m  th e  c a b in e t  ro o m  o r  f ro m  o th e r  
fro n tb e n c h e r  p o s ts  A s  w e  h a v e  s h o w n  a ls o , th e  u lt im a te  e v id e n c e  to  v e r i f y  
o u r  h y p o th e s is  p re se n ts  i t s e l f  in  the  fo rm  o f  a  C a b in e t  M in is t e r  re s ig m n g  
fro m  h is  m in is t e r ia l  d u t ie s  o n ly  h o u rs  b e fo re  h e  is  s u c c e s s fu l ly  n o m in a te d  
to  th e  p o s t  o f  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le
H7 & H8 O u r  se v e n th  an d  e ig h t h y p o th e s e s  fo c u s e d  o n  th e  d e g re e  o f  
in te r -p a r ty  d e m o c ra c y  in  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  a  p a r ty  n o m in e e  E v e n  i f  th e  
S p e a k e rs h ip  is  a  p a r t is a n  a n im a l ,  th e re  is  s t i l l  an  is s u e  a s  to  d e g re e  to 
w h ic h  h e  is  an  a n im a l o f  th e  le g is la t iv e  p a r ty  a s  a  w h o le  a s  d is t in c t  f ro m  
b e in g  th e  a n im a l o f  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  Y e t ,  f ro m  th e  q u a l ita t iv e  an d  
q u a n t ita t iv e  e v id e n c e  p re se n te d , i t  is  c le a r  th a t , a s  w it h  so  m u c h  o f  m te r-  
p a r ty  d e c is io n  m a k in g , th e  e f fe c t iv e  d e c is io n  a s  to  w h o  d o e s  o r  d o e s  n o t 
r e c e iv e  a  p a r ty  n o m in a t io n  re s ts  w it h  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  O n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d , th e re  is  n o th in g  to  su g g e st th a t i f  th e  b a c k b e n c h  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  
p a r ty  a s  a  w h o le  a re  d e e p ly  u n h a p p y  w it h  th e  c h o ic e  o f  th e  le a d e rs h ip  th e y  
m ig h t  n o t re b e l H o w e v e r , th e  b la c k  b o x  o f  I r i s h  le g is la t iv e  p a r t ie s  i s  a  
r e la t iv e ly  u n e x p lo re d  a re a  an d  s u g g e s t io n s  m u s t  be  le f t  a t th e  h y p o th e t ic a l 
le v e l  - g iv e n  th a t  w e  h a v e  n e v e r  o b s e rv e d  s u c h  b e h a v io u r
M o r e o v e r , i t  is  n o t im p la u s ib le  to  su g g e st th a t th e  le a d e rs h ip  w i l l ,  in  
s e le c t in g  th e  p a r ty  n o m in e e , ta k e  c o g n is a n c e  o f  th e  l i k e ly  re a c t io n  o f  th e  
p a r ty  I f  th e  le a d e rs h ip  is  a w a re  o f  th e  o p in io n s  w it h in  th e  p a r l ia m e n ta ry
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p a r ty  th is  w o u ld  c e r t a in ly  w e a k e n  o u r  a rg u m e n t th a t th e  d e c is io n  re s ts  
f i r m ly  w it h  th e  le a d e r  F o r  th is  re a s o n , i t  is  b e s t to  th in k  o f  th e  le a d e r  
m a k in g  th e  d e c is io n  k n o w in g  th a t he o r  sh e  is  b o u n d e d  b y  th e  l i k e ly  
re a c t io n  o f  p a r ty  c o lle a g u e s  Y e t ,  w ith o u t  re s o r t in g  to  to o  g la r in g  a  
g e n e ra lis a t io n , c r i t ic is m  w it h in  th e  le g is la t iv e  p a r ty  o f  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  
i s  g e n e ra l ly  re s e rv e d  fo r  a  s m a ll  n u m b e r  o f  p o l ic y  b a t t le s  In  s u m m a ry , 
w h a t  is  c le a r  a b o u t th e  ro le  o f  th e  p a r ty  an d  th e  p a r ty  le a d e rs h ip  is  th a t 
th e re  is  n o  m e c h a n is m  b y  w h ic h  c a n d id a te s  e m e rg e  an d  th e n  s e e k  th e  
s u p p o rt o f  th e ir  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  p a r ty  c o lle a g u e s  T h e  a b se n c e  o f  s u c h  a  
m e c h a n is m , w e  fe e l ,  u lt im a te ly  s ig n a ls  th e  fa c t  th a t th e  d e c is io n  re s ts  
e f f e c t iv e ly  w it h  th e  le a d e rs h ip  o f  th e  p a r ty
H 9  O u r  a tte m p ts  to  e m p ir ic a l ly  v e r i f y  th e  c la im  th a t th e  o u tg o in g  S p e a k e r  
w i l l  n o t  n e c e s s a r ily  be re -se le c te d  a s  S p e a k e r  w h e re  th e  b a la n c e  o f  p o w e r  
in  th e  c h a m b e r  h a s  s w itc h e d  re c e iv e d  m ix e d  re s u lt s  T h e r e  w e re  o c c a s io n s  
w h e re  i t  w a s  o b v io u s  th a t  th e  in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t  h a d  a g re e d , fo r  n o  
o b v io u s ly  ra t io n a l re a s o n , to  a l lo w  th e  o u tg o in g  S p e a k e r  c o n t in u e  in  
o f f ic e  N e v e r th e le s s , w h i le  re c o g n is in g  th a t  c o n t in u a t io n  in  s u c h  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  h a s  o c c u r re d  o n  o c c a s io n s , o u r  h y p o th e s is  o th e rw is e  
r e c e iv e d  s tro n g  p r o o f  th a t  n o  n o rm  o f  re - s e le c t io n  e x is t s  M o r e o v e r , w e  
a rg u e d  th a t i t  w o u ld  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  be  th e  c a s e  th a t  a n  o u tg o in g  an d  
a v a i la b le  S p e a k e r  w o u ld  be  re -s e le c te d , ra th e r  th a n  c la im in g  i t  w o u ld  
a lw a y s  b e  th e  c a se
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W e  m u s t  b e  c o n s c io u s  th a t a n  in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t  m a y , f o r  re a s o n s  o f  
p o l it ic a l  re p u ta t io n , f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  re m o v e  a  p o p u la r  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
o r  th a t d o in g  so  m a y  b e  a g a in s t  th e  ju d g e m e n t  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  
le a d e rs h ip  W h a t  w e  w e re  lo o k in g  fo r ,  an d  w h a t  w e  c e r t a in ly  fo u n d  fro m  
th e  1 9 3 0 s  to  th e  1 9 8 0 s , w e re  in s ta n c e s  w h e re  it  w a s  q u ite  o b v io u s  th a t a  
c h a n g e  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  b ro u g h t a  c h a n g e  o f  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le ,  e v e n  th o u g h  
th e  o u tg o in g  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w o u ld  h a v e  b e en  h a p p y  to  c o n t in u e  in  
o f f ic e  W e  w e re  e v e n  a b le  to  re p o rt in s ta n c e s  o f  d e b ate  in  D a i l  E i r e a n n  
w h e re  s u p p o rte rs  o f  th e  o u tg o in g  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  b e m o a n e d  th e  a c t io n s  
o f  th e  in c o m in g  g o v e rn m e n t  in  re p la c in g  h im  T o  o u r  m in d , th e se  
in s ta n c e s  ju s t i f y  o u r  c la im  th a t th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  c a n  b e  d e se le c te d  
b e c a u se  a  n e w  fa c t io n  w a n ts  th e  c h a ir  fo r  i t s e l f  an d  fe e ls  c o n f id e n t  e n o u g h  
to  p u rsu e  th e  m a tte r
H 1 0  &  H l l  H y p o th e s e s  te n  an d  e le v e n , d e a lin g  w it h  th e  in te r- re la te d  
is s u e s  o f  th e  s e c u r it y  o f  te n u re  f o r m a lly  an d  e f fe c t iv e ly  e n jo y e d  b y  th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  p ro v id e d  a t t im e s  c o n tra d ic to ry  e v id e n c e  W e  w e re  a b le  
to  s h o w  th a t  fo r m a lly  th e  r ig h t  to  te n u re  o f  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  is  n o t 
v e r y  s tro n g  In  th e  a b se n ce  o f  p ro te c t io n  in  o f f ic e  it  i s  a s su m e d  th a t a  
s im p le  m o t io n  to  th e  e f fe c t  th a t  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  i s  to  b e  re m o v e d  
c o u ld  b e  p u t a n d  c a r r ie d  b y  a  p lu r a l i t y  o f  m e m b e rs  p re s e n t T h e  a b se n c e  o f  
a n y  s u c h  a rra n g e m e n ts  to  m a k e s  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  re m o v a l m o re  d i f f i c u l t  
v e r i f ie d  o u r  c la im  th a t th e  G o v e rn m e n t  c o u ld  re m o v e  r e la t iv e ly  e a s i ly  an  
u n h e lp fu l S p e a k e r  Y e t ,  th is  p o s it io n  is  c o n tra d ic te d  b y  th e  in c o n c lu s iv e
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r e s u lt s  re la t in g  to  o u r  a rg u m e n t th a t a  g o v e rn m e n t m a y  a c t u a l ly  p u rs u e  th is  
l in e  N o  g o v e rn m e n t  h a s  su c c e e d e d  in  h a v in g  a  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  re p la c e d  
H o w e v e r ,  a s  w e  h a v e  p o in te d  o u t , r e m o v in g  a  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  h a s  b e e n  
c o n s id e re d  o n  a t le a s t  o n e  o c c a s io n
O n e  c a n  e x p la in  th e  e f fe c t iv e  s e c u r it y  o f  te n u re  e n jo y e d  b y  th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  in  o n e  o f  tw o  w a y s  T h e  f i r s t  is  to  a rg u e  th a t th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  i s  n o t a  p o s it io n  w h ic h  a  p a r ty  w a n ts  to  b e  se e n  to  be p la y in g  
w it h ,  a g a in  fo r  re a s o n s  o f  p o l it ic a l  re p u ta t io n  T h e y  do  n o t w h a t  to  b e  s e e n , 
a n d , th u s , r i s k  b e in g  c r it ic is e d  fo r ,  t a k in g  h ig h  o f f ic e s  a s  p r iz e s  T h e  
se co n d  p o s s ib le  e x p la n a t io n , an d  th e  o n e  th a t c o n fo rm s  s t ro n g ly  to  o u r  
v ie w  o f  th e  o f f ic e ,  is  th a t g o v e rn m e n ts  h a v e  b e en  q u ite  h a p p y  w it h  th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  In  e f fe c t , th e  im p o rta n t  p o in t  i s  th a t th e  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  w i l l  a c t  in  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  to  h a v e  the  c o n t in u e d  su p p o rt o f  th e  
G o v e rn m e n t  R e m e m b e r  th a t th e  o n ly  t im e  w e  w e re  a w a re  o f  a  p a r ty  
w a n t in g  to  re m o v e  a  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  d u r in g  a  te rm  w a s  w h e n  th e  
g o v e rn m e n t  i t s e l f  c h a n g e d
H12 H y p o th e s is  tw e lv e , r e la t in g  to  h o w  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  e x e r c is e s  
h is  d u ty  to  b re a k  a  t ie  in  a  le g is la t iv e  v o te , p ro v id e d  e v id e n c e  th a t  th e  
S p e a k e r  u s u a l ly ,  th o u g h  n o t a lw a y s ,  v o te s  in  su p p o rt o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  I t  
i s  c le a r  f ro m  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  v o t in g  b e h a v io u r  th a t th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
h a s  f r e q u e n t ly  p ro p p e d  u p  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  - p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  m id - to - la te  
19 8 0 s  M o r e o v e r ,  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  f r e q u e n t ly  v o te d  in  s u c h  a  w a y  a s
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to  m a k e  it  im p o s s ib le  to a s s o c ia te  th e  v o te  c a s t  w it h  a n y  n o t io n  o f  
p re c e d e n t In d e e d , th e  a b se n ce  o f  p re c e d e n t b e in g  u se d  a s  a  to o l in  
d e te rm in in g  h o w  to  v o te  w a s  e v id e n t  f ro m  th e  o n e  o u th n e r  w h e re  th e  
S p e a k e r  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  g o v e rn m e n t R e c a l l  th a t o n  th a t o c c a s io n  in  th e  
e a r ly  19 8 0 s  th e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  e x p la in in g  
th a t h e  d id  n o t l ik e  th e ir  d e c is io n  n o t to  a p p o in t  a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  
o p p o s it io n  a s  d e p u ty  S p e a k e r  T h i s  c a n n o t b e  e x p la in e d  b y  p re c e d e n t a n d , 
a s  s u c h , su p p o rts  fa r th e r  th e  h y p o th e s is
H I3 W e  p ro v id e d  e x a m p le s  an d  in s ta n c e s  o f  w h e re  m e m b e rs  o f  th e  
c h a m b e r  o p e n ly  s h o w  th e ir  d is re s p e c t  fo r  th e  C h a i r  In  a d d it io n  to  th e se  
a c c o u n ts , w e  a ls o  p ro v id e d  m o re  q u a lita t iv e  e v id e n c e , u s in g  th e  n u m b e r  o f  
s u s p e n s io n s  o f  m e m b e rs  a s  a  p r o x y  fo r  th e  le v e l  o f  d is re s p e c t  W e  a rg u e d  
th a t m e m b e rs  w o u ld  n o t be  su sp e n d e d  i f  th e y  re sp e c te d  th e  c h a ir ,  y e t  
th ro u g h o u t th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  D a i l  th e  n u m b e r  o f  s u s p e n s io n s  h a s  b e e n  
r e la t iv e ly  c o n s ta n t , i f  n o t e x c e s s iv e ly  h ig h , an d  o n  th e  n s e  m  m o re  re c e n t  
d e c a d e s  T h e r e  w a s  a ls o  c le a r  e v id e n c e  th a t c r i t ic is m  an d  s u s p e n s io n s  
c o m e s  f ro m  th e  o p p o s it io n  b e n c h e s  ra th e r  th a n  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  s id e  o f  th e  
H o u s e  I t  i s  ra re  m  th e  e x tre m e  to  h e a r  a  g o v e rn m e n t  m e m b e r  o r  
b a c k b e n c h e r  c r i t ic is in g  th e  c h a ir  T h u s ,  in  v e r i f y in g  h y p o th e s is  1 3 , w e  
c a m e  a c ro s s  fu r th e r  e v id e n c e  o f  p a r t is a n  b ia s  in  h o w  th e  S p e a k e r  is  
v ie w e d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  s id e  in  th e  c h a m b e r  do  n o t h a v e  a n y  c r i t ic i s m , o r  
at th e  v e r y  le a s t  c h o o se  n o t to  a i r  s u c h  c r it ic is m  O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  s e e m s  th e  s u b je c t  o f  m u c h  c r i t ic i s m  f ro m  th e  o p p o s it io n
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s id e  o f  th e  h o u se  an d  in d e e d  fro m  o u ts id e  th e  c h a m b e r  i t s e l f  F o r  th e se  
re a s o n s , w e  c o n c lu d e d  th a t th e  e v id e n c e  re g a rd in g  m e m b e rs  la c k  o f  
re sp e c t  p ro v id e s  a  s ig n if ic a n t  b o o st to  o u r  th e o ry  an d  c le a r ly  c o n tra d ic t s  
th e  im a g e  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  a s  a  n o n -p a rt is a n , w e ll- re s p e c te d  a rb ite r
H I 4  O u r  f in a l  e m p ir ic a l  te s t o f  o u r  th e s is  c o n c e rn e d  h o w  C e a n n  
C o m h a ir le  b e h a v e  o n ce  th e y  h a v e  le f t  th e  o f f ic e  A g a in  th e  e v id e n c e  
c le a r ly  v in d ic a te d  o u r  p re d ic t io n  th a t fo rm e r  S p e a k e rs  w o u ld  n o t a lw a y s  
a b s ta in  f ro m  p o l it ic s  an d  re t ire  to  a  n o n -p a rt is a n  b a c k g ro u n d  T h a t  so m e  
do  c o u ld , p e rh a p s , b e  e x p la in e d  b y  ag e  an d  a d e s ire  to  le a v e  p o l it ic s  I t  i s ,  
h o w e v e r , im p o s s ib le  to  k n o w  w h y  e x a c t ly  so m e  c h o se  to  le a v e  p o l it ic s  
w h i le  o th e rs  do  n o t T h e  fa c t  th a t o th e rs  fo l lo w  a  p a r t is a n  c a re e r  p ro v id e s  
e v id e n c e  th a t i t  i s  n o t e x p e c te d  b e h a v io u r  M o re o v e r , w e  w e re  a b le  to  
p ro v id e  e x a m p le s  o f  w h e re  so m e  fo rm e r  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  q u ic k ly  r e ­
e s ta b lis h e d  th e m s e lv e s  a s  p a r t is a n  a n im a ls , an d  s e n io r  p a r t is a n  a n im a ls  a t 
th a t , w it h  o n e  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  e v e n  b e c o m in g  s u b s e q u e n t ly  a  c a b in e t  
m im s te r  T h e  a b i l i t y  o f  S p e a k e rs  to  b e c o m e  p a r ty  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  a n d  
g o v e rn m e n t  m in is te r s  w ith o u t  a n y  q u e s t io n  m a k e s  u s  b e lie v e  th a t  w e  a re  
ju s t i f ie d  in  c la im in g  th a t th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  u n l ik e ly  to  b e  a  n o n -p a r t is a n  
o f f ic e
O v e r a l l ,  w e  e x p e c t , o r  a t le a s t  h o p e , th a t the  re a d e r  c a n n o t  b u t be  a  l i t t le  
a c c e p t in g  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l  a c c u ra c y  o f  th e  m a jo n ty  o f  o u r  h y p o th e s e s  W e  
h a v e  a tte m p te d  to  s u m m a r is e  th e  f in d in g s  in  a s  n e u tra l a  w a y  a s  p o s s ib le
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O u r  m o t iv a t io n  th ro u g h o u t h a s  b e e n  to  o p e n ly  an d  c le a r ly  se t o u t the  
e x p e c ta t io n s  an d  su b se q u e n t e m p ir ic a l  fa c t s  in  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  to  be 
s u s c e p t ib le  to  th e  s c ru t in y  o f  th e  re a d e r  an d  to  a n y  re s e a rc h e r  w h o  m a y  
w is h  to  r e p lic a te  th e  d a ta  A lth o u g h  th e  o b s e rv e d  a c t io n s  an d  b e h a v io u r  
w e re  n o t a lw a y s  p e r fe c t ly  a l ig n e d  w it h  o u r  e x p e c ta t io n s , w e  a re  h a p p y  
w it h  th e  th e o ry -d a ta  f i t  W e  n o w  m o v e  to  e x p la in  w h y  w e  fe e l th a t o u r  
n o w  v e r i f ie d  th e o ry  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  i s  o f  so m e  s ig n if ic a n c e
111 Implications
W h a t  d if fe re n c e  d o e s  o u r  th e o ry  o f  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  m a k e  to  th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  le g is la t iv e  p o l it ic s  an d  th e  w id e r  f ie ld  o f  p o l it ic a l  
a n a ly s is ?  W e  c e r ta in ly  h a v e  s y m p a th y  fo r  th o se  w h o  w o u ld  a rg u e  th a t th e  
e m p ir ic a l  c o n f irm a t io n  o f  a  th e o ry  is  w e l l  an d  g o o d  b u t th e  u lt im a te  te s t  o f  
a  th e o ry  is  e x p la in  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  a n y  s u c h  c o n f ir m a t io n , a b o v e  an d  
b e y o n d  a s im p le  'w e  w e re  r ig h t ' c o n c lu s io n  O v e r  th e  n e x t  p a g e s  w e  
s k e tc h  o u t fo r  th e  re a d e r  w h a t  w e  c o n s id e r  to  b e  th e  m o s t  im p o rta n t  an d  
in te re s t in g  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  th e  ra t io n a l S p e a k e r s h ip  W e  b e lie v e  th re e  
d if fe re n t  a u d ie n c e s  s h o u ld  be  in te re s te d  in  o u r  f in d in g s  an d  c o n s e q u e n t ly  
th e  a n s w e r  to  th e  'so  w h a t ' q u e s t io n  m u s t  s a t is f y  th e se  th re e  v e r y  d if fe re n t  
a u d ie n c e s
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T h e  f i r s t  o f  th e se  is  th e  s c h o la r  o r  o b s e rv e r  o f  I r i s h  p o l it ic s  T o  th e m , th e  
c o n c lu s io n  th a t th e  I r i s h  s p e a k e r  is  a  p a r t is a n  a n im a l m a y  se e m  o b v io u s , 
o n  th e  b a s is  o f  th e ir  c a s u a l o b s e rv a t io n s  o f  h o w  h e  o r  sh e  b e h a v e s  in  th e  
c h a ir  an d  p o s s ib ly  ( f o r  w e ll- a g e d  o b s e rv e r s )  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  s e le c t io n  
p ro c e s s  1 T o  so m e  o f  th e m , o u r  c o n c lu s io n  m a y  b e  e v e n  s o m e w h a t  t r iv ia l
P e rh a p s  w e  h a v e  t r a v e lle d  a  lo n g  ro a d  to  re a c h  a  p re t ty  in t u it iv e  
c o n c lu s io n  O u r  ta s k  is  to  s h o w  th is  p a r t ic u la r  a u d ie n c e  th a t w h a t  w e  h a v e  
p re se n te d  is  in d e e d  a  v e r y  d if fe re n t  p ic tu re  o f  a  S p e a k e rs h ip  th a n  e x is t s  in  
th e  lite ra tu re  T h i s ,  o f  c o u rs e , s h o u ld  be  o b v io u s  fo rm  o u r  r e v ie w  o f  th e  
c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  W h a t  w e  h a v e  p ro v id e d  is  a  v e r y  d if fe re n t  w a y  o f  
lo o k in g  at S p e a k e rs  f ro m  the  t ra d it io n a l B r i t i s h  p e rs p e c t iv e
M o r e o v e r , w e  h a v e  id e n t if ie d  th e  S p e a k e r  in  th e  I r i s h  c a s e  a s  a  p a r t is a n  
o f f ic e  a n d  h a v e  e x p lo re d  th e  p ro c e s s  b y  w h ic h  h e  is  se le c te d  an d  h is  
b e h a v io u r  in  an d  a fte r  o f f ic e  in  a  m u c h  m o re  s y s te m a t ic  w a y  th a n  r e ly in g  
o n  p e rs o n a l o p in io n s  o r  ju d g e m e n ts
T h e  se c o n d  a u d ie n c e , w h o m  w e  b e lie v e  w i l l  be  in te re s te d  in  o u r  f in d in g s , 
a re  th o se  s c h o la r s  o f  le g is la t iv e  in s t itu t io n s  an d  le g is la t iv e  b e h a v io u r  W e  
h o p e  th a t th is  g ro u p  w i l l  f in d  o u r  r e - a n a ly s is  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  in te re s t in g  
an d  i l lu m in a t in g  H o w e v e r ,  w e  a lso  b e lie v e  th a t th e  c o n c lu s io n s  w e  h a v e  
re a c h e d  ab o u t th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  h a v e  m o re  g e n e ra l c o n s e q u e n c e s  fo r  th e
11 use the word 'casual' in the absence of any academic research on the Irish Speakership
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  h o w  le g is la tu re s  w o r k  In  p a r t ic u la r ,  w e  a rg u e  th a t the  
S p e a k e rs h ip  c a n  be  se en  a s  a  n e w  d im e n s io n  in  th e  a rg u m e n ts  a s  to  th e  
c a u s e  an d  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  th e  im b a la n c e  o f  p o w e r  b e tw e e n  th e  e x e c u t iv e  
an d  le g is la t iv e  b ra n c h e s
O u r  th ird  a u d ie n c e  a re  th o se  p e o p le  w h o  h a v e  n o  p a r t ic u la r  in te re s t  in  
e ith e r  I re la n d  o r  a n y  a sp e c t o f  le g is la tu re s , e v e n  th e  a x is  o f  e x e c u t iv e -  
le g is la tu re  re s e a rc h  P a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s , le g is la t iv e  
s c h o la r s h ip  h a s  h a d  a  m a jo r  im p a c t  o n  th e  s tu d y  o f  p o l it ic s  m o re  g e n e ra l ly  
(G a m m  &  H u b e r , fo r th c o m in g )  L e g is la t iv e  s tu d ie s  m a y  le a d  in  te rm s  o f  
m e th o d o lo g ic a l s o p h is t ic a t io n , b u t it  a lso  m a k e s  c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  the  
s u b s ta n t iv e  k n o w le d g e  b ase  o f  p o l it ic a l  a n a ly s is  W e  n ee d  o n ly  th in k  o f  
th e  w o r k  o f  p e o p le  s u c h  a s  D ic k  F e n n o  o n  th e  U S  C o n g re s s  an d  h o w  h is  
w o r k  h a s  im p a c te d  so  s ig n if ic a n t ly  o n  p o l it ic a l  s c h o la r s h ip  m o re  g e n e ra lly  
( F e n n o , 1 9 7 8 ) W h a t  w i l l  th e y  f in d  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  o u r  c o n c lu s io n s 7 
W h y  s h o u ld  th e y  b e  in te re s te d ?  W ith  th is  g ro u p  in  m in d  w e  e x p la in  w h y  
a n d  h o w  w e  th in k  o u r  re s e a rc h  h a s  im p lic a t io n s  fo r  p o l it ic a l  in s t itu t io n s  
m o re  g e n e r a l ly ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  th o se  c o m in g  fro m  a  ra t io n a l- c h o ic e  
p e rs p e c t iv e  o n  th e  n a tu re  o f  in s t itu t io n s  W e  p ro c e e d  b y  lo o k in g  a t  w h a t  
w e  c o n s id e r  to  b e  th e  in te re s t in g  im p lic a t io n s  o f  o u r  re s e a rc h  fo r  e a c h  o f  
th e s e  g ro u p s  in  tu rn  S o m e  o f  o u r  a rg u m e n ts , w e  s u s p e c t , w i l l  be  r e a d i ly  
a g re e a b le  to  m o s t , w h i le  o th e r  o f  o u r  c o n te n t io n s  w e  th in k  m a y  b e  m o re  
c o n t ro v e r s ia l  an d  n o t a s  e a s i ly  d ig e ste d
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T h e  f i r s t  a n d  m o s t  o b v io u s  im p lic a t io n  o f  o u r  f in d in g s  is  th a t  th e  e x is t in g  
b o d y  o f  k n o w le d g e  re la t in g  to  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  in  p la c e s  fu n d a m e n ta lly  
f la w e d  I t  is  f la w e d  m  a t le a s t  tw o  im p o rta n t  re s p e c ts  F i r s t l y ,  n o t a l l  
S p e a k e rs h ip s  a re  b ase d  o n  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  n o n - p a r t is a n s h ip  an d  
n e u t ra l i t y  T o  th e  c o n t ra ry , w e  h a v e  s h o w n  th a t th e re  a re  g o o d  re a s o n s  to  
s u s p e c t  th a t th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  w i l l  be  a  p a r t is a n  h o ld  ra th e r  th a n  a n y th in g  
e ls e  W e  h a v e  a lso  s h o w n  th a t , in  th e  c a s e  o f  I re la n d  a t le a s t , it  is  p o s s ib le  
to  e m p ir ic a l ly  v e r i f y  su c h  a  s ta te m e n t T h i s  w e  b e lie v e  is  s ig n if ic a n t  in  an d  
o f  i t s e l f
W e  m u s t , o f  c o u rs e , c o n s id e r  th e  a rg u m e n t th a t o u r  f in d in g s  a re  a s  a n y o n e  
w o u ld  e x p e c t  B u t  to  th is  w e  p o in t  to  th e  e x is t in g  b o d y  o f  k n o w le d g e  o n  
th e  S p e a k e r s h ip , w h a t  w e  s u m m a r is e d  in  c h a p te r  th re e  a s  th e  c o n v e n t io n a l 
w is d o m  I s  th e  c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  th a t th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  in  B r i t is h - t y p e  
s y s te m s  is  a  n e u t ra l , n o n -p a rt is a n  o f f ic e r  a n y  le s s  in t u it iv e  th a n  o u r  th e o ry ?  
I f  s o , th e  n o n - in tu it iv e  n a tu re  o f  th e  c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  n e v e r  s p a rk e d  
s c h o la r s  in to  d e v e lo p in g  a  m o re  c o m p re h e n s iv e  v ie w  o f  th e  o f f ic e  B y  
p re s e n t in g  w h a t  w e  c o n s id e r  to  b e  a  m o re  c o m p re h e n s iv e  v ie w  o f  a  su b - 
m s t itu t io n  o f  th e  le g is la tu re , w e  h o p e  w e  h a v e  re m o v e d  o n e  o f  th e  
a c c e p te d  c a n n o n s  o f  le g is la t iv e  s c h o la r s h ip  n a m e ly , th a t  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  
s e rv e s  to  b a la n c e  th e  in te re s ts  a l l  m e m b e rs  e q u a l ly  W e  h a v e  s h o w n  th a t  
s u c h  an  e q u a l b a la n c in g  is  n o t a lw a y s  th e  c a se
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F u r t h e r  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  th is  p a r t is a n s h ip , o f  th e  S p e a k e r  b e in g  an  a sse t to  
th e  g o v e rn in g  s id e , w i l l  b e  d e v e lo p e d  in  a  m o m e n t b u t w e  w a n t  to  c o n s id e r  
a n o th e r im p o rta n t  im p lic a t io n  o f  o u r  re s e a rc h  S c h o la r s  o f  I r i s h  p o l it ic s  
sh o u ld  b e  a w a re  th a t th e  o f f ic e  c a n  be  v ie w e d  in  s u c h  a  w a y ,  ra th e r  th a n  be 
ig n o re d  a s  an  in s t itu t io n  n o t w o r th  in v e s t ig a t in g  W e  n o w  k n o w  th a t the  
C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  is  a  p la y e r  in  th e  le g is la t iv e  g a m e , th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
o f f ic e  h a s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  fo r  a re a s  s u c h  a s  g o v e rn m e n t  s u r v iv a l  an d  the  
o rg a n is a t io n  o f  th e  O ire a c h ta s  m o re  g e n e ra l ly  A s  w e  w i l l  a rg u e  b e lo w , a  
p a r t is a n  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w i l l  m a k e  d if fe re n t  d e c is io n s  to  a  n e u tra l 
S p e a k e r  an d  th e se  d e c is io n s  h a v e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  fo r  th e  I r i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  
p ro c e s s
S e c o n d ly , th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  th a t e m e rg e d  in  th e  W e s tm in s te r  s y s te m  h a s  n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  c o p ie d  i t s e l f  in  th e  le g is la t iv e  in s t itu t io n s  th a t h a v e  b e e n  b ase d  
o n  th e  W e s tm in s te r  m o d e l I t  i s ,  th e re fo re , in c o r re c t  to  th in k  o f  a  g e n e ra l 
S p e a k e rs h ip  b a se d  o n  th e  e a r ly  o n  g in  o f  th e  o f f ic e  in  B r i t i s h  p o l it ic a l  
h is to ry  O u r  a n a ly s is  h a s  s h o w n  th a t  th e  I r i s h  p a r l ia m e n t , o n e  w h ic h  
c o p ie d  so  m a n y  o f  th e  a sp e c ts  o f  B r i t i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  fo rm , d id  n o t ta k e  
w it h  i t  a  S p e a k e rs h ip  b a se d  o n  s u c h  n o t io n s  a s  n e u t r a l i t y ,  n o n -b ia s  an d  
n o n - p a r t is a n s h ip  T h e  h ig h  o f f ic e  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  S p e a k e r s h ip , i f  i t  d o e s  o r  
h a s  e v e r  e x is te d , w a s  n o t p a tte rn e d  in  I re la n d  an d  w e  w o u ld  h a z a rd  a  g u e ss  
th a t th is  m a y  a ls o  b e  tru e  o f  a  n u m b e r  o f  C o m m o n w e a lth  p a r l ia m e n ts
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A g a in ,  o u r  a n a ly s is  h a s  c o n fo u n d e d  y e t  a n o th e r  c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m , 
n a m e ly  th a t o f  A m e r ic a n  e x c e p t io n a l is m  W e  h a v e  s h o w n  th a t i t  is  w ro n g  
to  t a lk  o f  tw o  m o d e ls  o f  S p e a k e rs h ip  th e  n e u tra l B r i t i s h  S p e a k e r  an d  th e  
c o m p le te ly  p a r t is a n  S p e a k e r  o f  th e  U S  H o u s e  o f  C o n g re s s  T h a t  th is  c le a r  
d ic h o to m y  b re a k s  d o w n , w h e n  o n e  c o n s id e r  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  in  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s , i s  im p o r ta n t  T h i s  m o d e l o f  tw o  S p e a k e r s , f r e q u e n t ly  th e  o n ly  
th in g  w r it te n  ab o u t th e  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  in  c o m p a ra t iv e  le g is la t iv e  
s c h o la r s h ip  (s e e , fo r  e x a m p le , B a c h , 1 9 9 9 ) ,  h a s  b e e n  s u c c e s s fu l ly  
c h a lle n g e d  W e  su g g e st , a lb e it  w ith o u t  a n y th in g  o th e r  th a n  v e r y  l i t t le  
e v id e n c e , th a t o u r  th e o ry  w o u ld  e x p la in  b e tte r  th e  n a tu re  o f  a  la rg e r  
p ro p o rt io n  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  th a n  e ith e r  o f  th e  e x is t in g  v ie w s
S o , e v e n  i f  w e  ag re e  th a t an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  a s  a  p a r t is a n  
o f f ic e  is  im p o rta n t  in  i t s e l f ,  w h a t  e ls e  d o e s  it  t e l l  u s  o f  in te re s t  to  
le g is la t iv e  s c h o la r s ?  W e  fe e l th a t  o u r  c o n c lu s io n  ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
S p e a k e rs h ip  s h o u ld  be  o f  m te re s t  b e c a u se  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  
h a s  c o n se q u e n c e s  fo r  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  w id e r  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  in s t itu t io n  th a t 
th e y  le a d
T h e  S p e a k e r  is  u lt im a t e ly  im p o r ta n t , a n d  o u r  c o n c lu s io n s  u lt im a t e ly  
in te re s t in g , b e c a u se  th e  O f f ic e  is  in te g ra l to  th e  w o r k in g s  o f  th e  le g is la tu r e , 
an d  th e  le g is la tu re  in  tu rn  is  a n  in te g ra l p a r t  o f  th e  o v e r a l l  p o l it ic a l  s y s te m  
in  n e a r ly  a l l  d e m o c ra t ic  s ta te s  A n  a s s u m p t io n  o f  th is  w o r k  is  th a t  th e  
in s t itu t io n  o f  S p e a k e r  m a tte rs  H o w  it  m a tte rs  i s  s o m e th in g  w e  n e e d  to
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a d d re s s , h o w e v e r  b r ie f ly ,  i f  w e  a re  to  s h o w  h o w  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  o f f ic e  
im p a c ts  o n  p o l it ic s  an d  o u tc o m e s  T h e  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  im p o r ta n t  w it h in  th e  
le g is la tu re  fo r  a  n u m b e r  o f  re a s o n s , so m e  o b v io u s , o th e rs  le s s  o b v io u s  b u t 
n e v e r th e le s s  e q u a l ly  im p o rta n t
I t  i s  p e rh a p s  a s to n is h in g , b u t v e r y  l i t t le  a tte n tio n  h a s  e v e r  b e e n  g iv e n  to  the  
p o w e r  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  a s  p re s id in g  o f f ic e r  o r  a s  th e  e f fe c t iv e  h e a d  o f  th e  
p a r l ia m e n t  B u t  i f  w e  lo o k  a t so m e  o f  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  w e  c a n  
se e  w h y  th e  o f f ic e  is  im p o rta n t , an d  b y  e x te n s io n  w h y  a  p a r t is a n  s p e a k e r  a s  
d is t in c t  f ro m  a  n e u tra l S p e a k e r  le a d s  to  a  w h o le  se t o f  d if fe re n t  o u tc o m e s  
T h e  S p e a k e r 's  fu n c t io n  o r  p o w e r  is  in  h is  o r  h e r  a b i l i t y  to  b a la n c e  in te re s t s  
an d  p ro m o te  th e  p o te n t ia lly  in c o m p a t ib le  in te re s ts  o f  d if fe re n t  p la y e r s  in  
th e  le g is la t iv e  g a m e  S u c h  c o n f l ic t s  o f  in te re s t  c o u ld  a r is e , fo r  e x a m p le , 
b e tw e e n  th e  r ig h ts  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l m e m b e r  as d is t in c t  f ro m  th e  p o l it ic a l  
p a r ty  T h e  c o n f l ic t  w h ic h  w e  o b se rv e  is  n o t u s u a l ly  b e tw e e n  in d iv id u a l  
m e m b e rs  b u t b e tw e e n  o rg a n is e d  fa c t io n s  T h e s e  fa c t io n s  a re  a l ig n e d  m o s t  
c o m m o n ly  in to  tw o  g ro u p s  th e  g o v e rn in g  p a r ty  o r  p a r t ie s  in  a  c o a l i t io n  
s y s te m  a n d  th e  o p p o s it io n  p a r ty  o r  p a r t ie s
T h e  b a la n c e  o f  p o w e r  b e tw e e n  th e se  tw o  g ro u p s  - th e  g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  
g o v e rn m e n t  p a r ty  o r  p a r t ie s  o n  th e  o n e  h a n d  an d  th e  o p p o s it io n  g ro u p in g  
o n  th e  o th e r  s id e  - i s  o n e  o f  th e  m o st s tu d ie d  a sp e c ts  o f  c o n te m p o ra ry  
le g is la tu re s  W ith o u t  d o in g  ju s t ic e  to  th a t b o d y  o f  l ite ra tu re , th e  g e n e ra l 
c o n c lu s io n  i s  th a t le g is la tu re s  in  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  s y s te m s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  a re
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q u ite  w e a k , a t le a s t  r e la t iv e  to  th e  e x e c u t iv e 2 T h e  re a s o n s  fo r  th is  
w e a k n e s s  o f  p a r l ia m e n t  h a s  a lso  e x e rc is e d  th e  m in d  o f  m o re  th an  a 
g e n e ra t io n  o f  s c h o la r s  E x p la n a t io n s  a s  to  w h y  p a r l ia m e n ts  a re  w e a k  h a v e  
ra n g e d  f r o m  th e  e le c to ra l s y s te m  an d  e le c to ra l in c e n t iv e s  w h ic h  fa c e  
in d iv id u a l  le g is la to r s  to  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  d is c ip lin e d  le g is la t iv e  p a r t ie s  to  
th e  o rg a n is a t io n a l a d v a n ta g e s  o f  a  w e l l  re s o u rc e d  e x e c u t iv e  ( s e e , fo r  
e x a m p le , B a i l e y ,  1 9 6 4 , C o p e la n d  &  P a tte rs o n , 1 9 9 4 , N o r to n , 1 9 9 3 , 
B o w le r  e t a l ,  1 9 9 9  an d  in  th e  c a se  o f  I re la n d  G a l la g h e r , 1 9 9 9 )  T h e  
g e n e ra l c o n c lu s io n  o f  s u c h  re s e a rc h  is  th a t th e  g o v e rn m e n t s id e  h a s  c e r ta in  
a sse ts  w h ic h  m a k e  it  h a rd  fo r  a  le g is la t iv e  b o d y  to  b e  a n  e f fe c t iv e  p la y e r  in  
th e  p o l it ic a l  p ro c e s s
O n e  o f  th e  f e w  a s s e ts  w h ic h  th e  le g is la tu re  is  s a id  to  h a v e  in  a t te m p t in g  to 
c o n tro l th e  e x e c u t iv e  an d  d e te rm in e  le g is la t io n  i s  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  T h e  
S p e a k e r  h a s  b e e n  se e n  a s  a  n e u tra l f ig u re , e f f e c t iv e ly  a  re fe re e  b e tw e e n  th e  
o p p o s it io n  a n d  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  T h e  S p e a k e r , i t  w a s  a s s u m e d , a tte m p ts  to  
re p re s e n t  th e  in te re s ts  an d  p o w e r  o f  p a r l ia m e n t  A n  e x a m p le  o f  t h is  in te re s t  
re p re s e n ta t io n  is  w h e re  s u c c e s s iv e  B r i t i s h  S p e a k e rs  h a v e  in  th e  p a s t  
c r it ic is e d  M in is t e r s  fo r  m a k in g  s ta te m e n ts  o n  im p o rta n t  is s u e s  o f  p u b lic  
p o l ic y  a t p re s s  c o n fe re n c e s  ra th e r  th a n  c o m in g  to  th e  h o u se  (B o o th r o y d ,
2 A parliamentary system is one in which the government is made and can be removed by 
the legislature and is generally seen as distinct from a presidential system where the 
executive is elected independent of the legislature and does not require the support of the 
legislature to remain in office It is perhaps a little ironic that parliaments in parliamentary 
systems are generally considered to be much weaker than their counterparts in 
presidential systems
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2 0 0 1 )  T h e  S p e a k e r  is  a  c h a m p io n  o f  th e  r ig h ts  o f  th e  H o u s e , o r  so  th e  
c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  w o u ld  h a v e  u s  b e lie v e
B u t  i f  o ne  a c c e p ts  th e  ra t io n a l S p e a k e r  a s  b e in g  a  p a r t is a n  a n im a l ,  th e n  w e  
h a v e  o n e  m o re  p o s s ib le  e x p la n a t io n  o f  w h y  p a r l ia m e n t  is  w e a k  I f  th e  
S p e a k e r  is  a n  a s se t  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t , th e n , b y  d e f in it io n , th e  S p e a k e r  w i l l  
f a c i l i t a te  th e  im b a la n c e  M o re o v e r , it  c o u ld  b e  a rg u e d  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  is  a  
c a u se  o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e - le g is la t iv e  im b a la n c e  W h a t  w e  se e  is  a  S p e a k e r  
p ro te c t in g  th e  g o v e rn m e n t a g a in s t  th e  o p p o s it io n  P ro te c t io n  m a y  w e l l  
c o m e  in  th e  fo rm  o f  u s in g  h is  o r  h e r  c a s t in g  v o te  to  s a v e  a  g o v e rn m e n t  in  a  
p o o r v o t in g  p o s it io n  H o w e v e r , w e  s u sp e c t  th a t th e  in f lu e n c e  e x te n d s  w e l l  
b e y o n d  b re a k in g  a  t ie
A  c lo s e r  e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs  p o w e rs  th ro w s  u p  a  w h o le  se t o f  
r u le s , re g u la t io n s  an d  p re c e d e n ts  th a t h a v e  th e  e f fe c t  o f  m a k in g  l i f e  le s s  
d i f f i c u l t  fo r  th e  g o v e rn in g  p a r ty  o r  p a r t ie s  W e  a re  th in k in g  h e re  o f  s u c h  
p ro c e d u re s  a s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  to  c lo s e  d e b a te , to  a d jo u rn  th e  
h o u s e , to  r u le  is s u e s  o u t o f  o rd e r , to  h e a r  o r  re fu s e  to  h e a r  a n  in d iv id u a l  
m e m b e r  T h e s e  e v e ry d a y  p o w e rs  w h ic h  th e  c h a ir  p o s s e s s e s  c a n  im p a c t  
fu n d a m e n ta lly  o n  th e  g o v e rn m e n t 's  a b i l i t y  to  c o n tro l th e  c h a m b e r  an d  th e  
o p p o s it io n 's  a b i l i t y  to  h o ld  th e m  to a c c o u n t  O n e  n ee d  o n ly  t h in k , fo r  
e x a m p le , o f  h o w  m u c h  e a s ie r  l i f e  w o u ld  be fo r  a  c o rp o ra te  C h ie f  
E x e c u t iv e  O f f ic e r  w h e re  th e  C h a irm a n  o f  th e  b o a rd  i s ,  a s  i t  w e r e , o n  s id e  
C o m p a re  th is  to  a  s itu a t io n  w h e re  th e  C h a irm a n  is  n e u t ra l o r  e v e n  b ia s e d
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a g a in s t  th e  C E O  T h e  a n a lo g y  c a n  b e  t ra n s fe r re d  e a s i ly  to  th e  le g is la t iv e  
a re n a  to  p ro d u c e  a  p ic tu re  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  a s  a  m a jo r  a s se t  fo r  th e  
g o v e rn in g  p a r ty
B u t  th e  p o w e r  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  is  n o t ju s t  e v id e n t  in  te rm s  o f  th e ir  ro le  a s  
c h a ir  o f  p le n a ry  s e s s io n s  S p e a k e rs  a re  th e  e f fe c t iv e  h e a d  o f  th e  le g is la t iv e  
b o d y  (B a c h ,  1 9 9 9 ) 3 H o w  th e y  p e rc e iv e  p a r l ia m e n t  h a s  an  im p o rta n t  
c o n se q u e n c e  fo r  th e  sh a p e  an d  in te rn a l o rg a n is a t io n  o f  th e  le g is la tu re  
C o n s id e r , fo r  e x a m p le , th e  re fo rm s  a  p ro -o p p o s it io n  S p e a k e r  c o u ld  
in t ro d u c e  to  re -b a la n c e  th e  b a la n c e  o f  p o w e r  b e tw e e n  th e  le g is la tu re  a n d  
e x e c u t iv e  O n e  o f  th e  re a so n s  le g is la tu re s  h a v e  b e en  s lo w  to  re fo rm  se e m s  
to  u s  to  be d ir e c t ly  re la te d  to  th e  u n w il l in g n e s s  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  to a c t  a s  a 
p ro p o n e n t fo r  re fo rm  I r o n ic a l ly  in  th e  I r i s h  c a se  a n y  m a jo r  re fo rm  th a t h a s  
b e en  in t ro d u c e d  in  an  a tte m p t to  im p ro v e  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  an d  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  
o f  th e  p a r l ia m e n t  h a s  c o m e  f ro m  th e  g o v e rn m e n t - an d  in  p a r t ic u la r  th e  
g o v e rn m e n ts  m a n a g e r  m  th e  le g is la tu re  ( C h ie f  W h ip )
O v e r a l l ,  th e n , w e  fe e l th a t  w e  m a y  h a v e  o b s e rv e d  a n o th e r  p o s s ib le  
e x p la n a t io n  fo r  le g is la t iv e  w e a k n e s s  T h a t  th e  S p e a k e r  is  a  p a r t is a n  a n im a l 
a n d  c o n s e q u e n t ly  an  a sse t o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n t m e a n s  th a t  th e y  w i l l  a c t  to  
a s s is t  th e  g o v e rn m e n t , to  th e  c o s t  o f  th e  o p p o s it io n  T h e  e f fe c t  is  a  w e a k e r  
le g is la tu re  th a n  w e  w o u ld  e x p e c t  i f  th e  S p e a k e r  w a s  a  t r u ly  n e u tra l f ig u re  
I t  i s  u n d o u b te d ly  th e  c a s e  th a t th is  v a r ia b le  (th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip )
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h a s  to  c o m p e te  w it h  o th e r  p o w e r fu l a rg u m e n ts  in c lu d in g  the  u n w il l in g n e s s  
o f  in d iv id u a l  le g is la to r s  to  b re a k  p a r ty  l in e s
A s  w e  h a v e  s a id , w e  do  h o p e  th a t o u r  re s e a rc h  w i l l  be  o f  in te re s t  to a  w id e r  
a u d ie n c e  a n d , in  p a r t ic u la r ,  to  th o se  in te re s te d  in  th e  is s u e  o f  in s t itu t io n a l 
o r ig in  W e  o p ted  fo r  a  r a t io n a l- in s t itu t io n a l f r a m e w o r k  In  s e le c t in g  th e  
ra t io n a l p a ra d ig m  as  th e  to o l w it h  w h ic h  to  ta k e  a  f re s h  lo o k  a t the  
S p e a k e rs h ip  w e  k n e w  w e  w e re  e n te r in g  th e , a t t im e s , u n c e r ta in , a re a  th a t i s  
r a t io n a l c h o ic e  in s t itu t io n a lis m  T h is  a p p ro a c h  h ad  it s  d a n g e rs , p a r t  o f  th e  
d is c ip l in e ,  w e  e x p e c t , w o u ld  be  q u ic k  to  d is m is s  a n y  w o r k  b ase d  o n  a  
ra t io n a l f r a m e w o r k  B u t  th e se  d a n g e rs  a re  w o r th  ta k in g  b e c a u se  i f  o u r  
th e o ry  c o u ld  b e  v e r i f ie d ,  a s  w e  h a v e  a c t u a l ly  d o n e , th e n  w e  c o u ld  m a k e  a 
p o s it iv e  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  th e  ra t io n a l c h o ic e  in s t itu t io n a lis t  l ite ra tu re  S o  
w h a t  e x a c t ly  i s  th a t c o n tr ib u t io n ?
T h e  c o n tr ib u t io n  w e  fe e l  is  to  u se  th e  ra t io n a l in s t itu t io n a lis t  p a ra d ig m  to  
re a c h  e x p e c ta t io n s  ab o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  an  in s t itu t io n , te s t th e m  an d  f in d  
th a t th e  e m p lo y m e n t  o f  th e  p a ra d ig m  e n h a n c e s  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  a  
s u b s ta n t iv e  th e m e  m  th e  p o l it ic a l  re a lm  I t  i s  a  r e la t iv e ly  n e w  f ie ld  in  
E u r o p e  a n d  w e  h o p e  th a t  th o se  o u ts id e  th e  p a ra d ig m  m a y  se e  w h a t  ra t io n a l 
c h o ic e  h a s  to  o f fe r
3 In the Irish case the relationship of the Ceann Comhairle to the Irish Parliament is the
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îv Prospects for further research
A t  th is  p o in t  w e  h a v e  p re se n te d  o u r  f in d in g s  an d  e x p la in e d  w h y  w e  th in k  
th o se  f in d in g s  m a y  be  o f  in te re s t  T h e  c o n v e n t io n  is  to  tu rn  to  th e  is s u e  o f  
w h a t  c o u ld  be d o n e  n e x t  G e n e r a l ly ,  th is  fo l lo w s  the  fo rm a t  w h e re b y  th e  
a u th o r  g iv e s  so m e  h in t  a s  to  h is  o r  h e r  o w n  c o n c e rn s , p o in t in g  o u t th a t  
th e se  c a n  b e  o v e rc o m e  b y  fu tu re  re s e a rc h  W e  w i l l  c e r t a in ly  t r y  n o t to  do  
th a t  H o w e v e r ,  w e  do  p re se n t w h a t  w e  c o n s id e r  to  be p o s s ib le  e x te n s io n s  
o f  th is  re s e a rc h  o n  tw o  fro n ts  - o n e  e m p ir ic a l  an d  o ne  th e o re t ic a l W h y  w e  
p re s e n t th e m  in  th is  o rd e r  sh o u ld  b e c o m e  e v id e n t  a s  w e  p ro g re s s
W e  h a v e  d e ta ile d  w h a t  w e  h a v e  c la im e d  to  a  n e w  w a y  o f  lo o k in g  a t th e  
S p e a k e r s h ip  T h i s  th e o ry  w a s  th e n  a p p lie d  to  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e rs h ip  T h e r e  
is  h o w e v e r  n o  g o o d  re a so n  w h y  o th e rs  c o u ld  n o t p ic k  u p  th is  m o d e l o f  th e  
o f f ic e  an d  se e  h o w  w e l l  i t  a p p lie s  to  o th e r le g is la tu re s  A  th e o ry  b y  
d e f in it io n  is  a  g e n e ra l ly  a p p lic a b le  m o d e l, th e  g re a te s t te s t  o f  th e  o n e  
p re se n te d  in  th e se  p a g e s  is  n o t th e  e m p ir ic a l  c o n f irm a t io n  w it h  re s p e c t  to  
th e  I r i s h  c a s e  I f  th e  m o d e l i s  a  m o d e l, th e n  th e  ra t io n a l S p e a k e r  s h o u ld  
f in d  re s o n a n c e  in  o th e r le g is la tu re s  a s  w e l l  H o w  th e  th e o ry  t r a v e ls  w i l l  be  
in te re s t in g  W e  c a n  p ro v id e  o n ly  a  v e r y  n o n - s c ie n t if ic  o p in io n  o n  th e  
e m p ir ic a l  f i t  in  o th e r  le g is la to r s  b u t w e  b e lie v e  th a t th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  
S p e a k e r s h ip  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  is  n o t v e r y  d is ta n t  f ro m  th e  I r i s h  s itu a t io n
same as that of a Government Minister to his Department
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O u r  f i r s t  h o p e  th e n , i s  th a t th is  f r a m e w o r k  w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  c a r e fu l  re- 
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  in  o th e r p a rts  o f  th e  w o r ld  I t  i s  o v e r  fo r t y  y e a rs  
s in c e  th e  la s t  b o o k - le n g th  s tu d y  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  S p e a k e rs h ip  T h e  a p p ro a c h  
to  an d  to o ls  fo r  p o l it ic a l  s c h o la r s h ip  h a s  c h a n g e d  s in c e  th e n  an d  it  w o u ld  
b e  in te re s t in g  to  r e - e x a m in e  th e  m o th e r  S p e a k e rs h ip  u s in g  th e  f r a m e w o r k  
h e re  T h e  o th e r  fo rm e r  c o lo n ie s  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  e m p ire , s u c h  a s  C a n a d a , 
In d ia ,  A u s t r a l ia  an d  N e w  Z e a la n d , w h ic h  o n  in d e p e n d e n c e  ad o p ted  th e  
p a r l ia m e n ta ry  fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t , w o u ld  w e  fe e l m a k e  e x c e lle n t  c a s e s  fo r  
e x te n d in g  th e  re s e a rc h  B u t  w h a t  w e  s u s p e c t  o ne  w o u ld  f in d  in  a  la rg e  N  
s tu d y  o f  S p e a k e rs  le a d s  u s  to  a  se co n d  d ire c t io n  fo r  th is  re s e a rc h
T h e  se co n d  d ir e c t io n , i t  s h o u ld  b e  a c k n o w le d g e d , is  a s  a p p lic a b le  to  a n y  
in s t itu t io n a l a n a ly s is  a s  i t  is  to  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip , b u t , fo r  re a s o n s  w h ic h  w e  
w i l l  e x p la in  b e lo w , th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  p ro v id e s  a  u n iq u e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  te s t 
m o d e ls  o f  in s t itu t io n a l d e s ig n  an d  c h a n g e
F r o m  a  c u r s o ry  lo o k  a t S p e a k e rs  in  a  m o re  c o m p a ra t iv e  se t t in g  w e  g e t th e  
f e e l in g  th a t a n y  c o m p a r is o n  b e tw e e n  c o u n tr ie s  i s  l i k e ly  to  p ro d u c e  a  se t o f  
in s t itu t io n s  th a t  b o th  lo o k  v e r y  s im i la r  b u t a re  a ls o  d if fe re n t  in  so m e  
im p o rta n t  re s p e c ts  O n e  o f  th e  is s u e s  w h ic h  m o t iv a te d  u s  to  ta k e  a  lo o k  a t 
th e  S p e a k e r s h ip , an d  th e  I r i s h  S p e a k e rs h ip  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  w a s  a  fa s c in a t io n  
w it h  s im i la r i t y  an d  d iv e r s i t y  in  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  p a r l ia m e n ts  T h e  
S p e a k e r s h ip  is  an  im p o rta n t  a re a  o f  re s e a rc h  b e c a u se  i t  i s  a n  in s t itu t io n  
c a p a b le  o f  b e in g  s tu d ie d  w ith o u t  h a v in g  to  w o r r y  to o  m u c h  a b o u t h o ld in g
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e x o g e n o u s  v a r ia b le s  c o n s ta n t I t  h a s  p ro v e d  a lm o s t  im p o s s ib le  to  c o n d u c t  
la rg e - s c a le  s tu d ie s  o f  le g is la tu re s  m  a  c o m p a ra t iv e  c o n te x t  s im p ly  b e c a u se  
th e  in s t itu t io n a l d e ta ils  o f  e a c h  d if fe r  so  m u c h
v Conclusion
I n  th is  s e c t io n  w e  p ro v id e  a  v e r y  b r ie f  r e v ie w  o f  o u r  c e n tra l th e s is  an d  th e  
e m p ir ic a l  a s s e s s m e n t o f  o u r  a rg u m e n t C o m p a r a t iv e ly ,  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  
m a y  ta k e  v e r y  d if fe re n t  fo rm s  in  d if fe re n t  le g is la tu re s  N e v e r th e le s s , o u r  
a rg u m e n t th ro u g h o u t th is  w o r k ,  is  th a t  th e  e x is t in g  k n o w le d g e  b a se  
re g a rd in g  th e  o f f ic e  in  th e  a c a d e m ic  l ite ra tu re  is  in  n ee d  o f  r e v is io n
W e  se t o u t o n  th e  jo u r n e y  to  re a s s e s s  th e  o f f ic e  in  C h a p te r  tw o  w it h  an  
in i t ia l  fo c u s  o n  th e  th e o ry  o f  in s t itu t io n s  a s  th e  to o l a n d  f r a m e w o r k  w it h  
w h ic h  to  e v a lu a te  a n e w  th e  in s t itu t io n  o f  S p e a k e r s h ip  F r o m  th e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the  ra t io n a l an d  th e  h is to r ic a l/ s o c io lo g ic a l  s tra n d s  o f  n e w  
in s t itu t io n a lis m  w e  se le c te d  a  ra t io n a l c h o ic e -b a s e d  f r a m e w o r k , w h i le  a t  
th e  sa m e  t im e  a c k n o w le d g in g  an d  a tte m p t in g  to  d e a l w it h  th e  v a r io u s  
w e a k n e s s e s  w it h in  an d  c r it ic is m s  o f  th e  ra t io n a l p a ra d ig m  T h e  n e x t  
c n t ic a l  s te p  w a s  to  d e v e lo p  a  ra t io n a l c h o ic e  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  
T h i s  a l lo w e d  u s  to  p ic tu re  a  v e r y  d if fe re n t  o f f ic e  f ro m  w h a t  w a s  p re d ic te d  
an d  c la im e d  b y  th e  p re v io u s  v ie w  o f  th e  o f f ic e
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I n  C h a p te r  th re e  w e  p re se n te d  th is  e x is t in g  th e o ry  o f  th e  S p e a k e r s h ip  T h e  
c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  ( r e c a l l  w e  h ad  a  p ro b le m  w it h  a p p ly in g  th e  te rm  
theory to  th is  p a r t ic u la r  b o d y  o f  w o r k )  s tre sse d  th e  n o n -p a rt is a n  n a tu re  o f  
th e  S p e a k e r , th e  e m e rg e n c e  an d  sh a p in g  o f  th e  o f f ic e  a s  a  re s u lt  o f  a  
s p e c if ic  se t o f  h is to r ic a l  e v e n ts  in  E n g l i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  h is to r y  A  th ird  
k e y  fe a tu re  o f  th is  c o n v e n t io n a l w is d o m  w a s  th e  g e n e ra lit y  o f  the  
W e s tm in s te r - ty p e  S p e a k e rs h ip  w it h  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  th e  S p e a k e r  o f  th e  
U n ite d  S ta te s  C o n g re s s , w h e re , a g a in , it  w a s  h e ld  th a t  p a r t ic u la r  h is to n c a l  
e v e n ts  re s u lte d  in  a  u n iq u e ly  sh a p e d  in s t itu t io n  W e  s h o w e d  h o w  th e se  
c o n c lu s io n s  a re  v e r y  m u c h  in  k e e p in g  w it h  th e  o ld  in s t itu t io n a l a n d  
b e h a v io u ra l e ra s  m  th e  s tu d y  o f  p o l it ic s
H a v in g  d e v e lo p e d  o u r  o w n  a c c o u n t , w it h  th e  fo c u s  o n  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  a s  a  
p a r ty  a s se t an d  s h o w n  h o w  th is  d if fe re d  to th e  e x is t in g  a c c o u n ts , w e  th e n  
se t o u t to  se e  i f  o u r  a c c o u n t  c o u ld  b e tte r  e x p la in  th e  a c tu a l in s t itu t io n  o f  
S p e a k e r s h ip , w it h  p a r t ic u la r  re fe re n c e  to  th e  I r i s h  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
R a th e r  th a n  p re s e n t a  g e n e ra l a c c o u n t  o f  th e  o f f ic e  w e  ad o p ted  th e  
m e th o d o lo g y  c h a m p io n e d  b y  K in g ,  K e o h a n e  an d  V e r b a  (1 9 9 4 )  an d  se t o u t 
th e  o b s e rv a b le  im p lic a t io n s  o f  o u r  th e o ry  in  a  se t o f  e m p ir ic a l ly  te s ta b le  
h y p o th e s e s
O u r  e m p ir ic a l  te s ts  o f  th e se  h y p o th e s e s  w a s  p re se n te d  in  C h a p te r s  F i v e  
a n d  S i x  w it h  a  s u m m a ry  o f  o u r  e v id e n c e  p ro v id e d  e a r l ie r  in  th is  c h a p te r
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O v e r a l l  w e  c o n c lu d e d  th e  e m p ir ic a l  s c ru t in y  c o n fe r re d  a h ig h  le v e l  o f  
s u p p o rt  w h ic h  o u r  h y p o th e s is  h a v e  p ro v id e d
W e  a ls o  se t o u t w h a t  w e  c o n s id e re d  to  be  th e  m a jo r  im p lic a t io n s  o f  o u r  
f in d in g s  T h e s e  in c lu d e d  th e  fa c t  th a t w e  p re se n te d  a n  e m p ir ic a l ly  so u n d e r  
a c c o u n t  o f  th e  S p e a k e r
In  f r a m in g  an d  u n d e r ta k in g  th is  re s e a rc h  th e  a im  th ro u g h o u t h a s  b e e n  to  
p ro v id e  a  th e o r e t ic a l ly  an d  e m p ir ic a l ly  so u n d  a c c o u n t  o f  th e  S p e a k e rs h ip  
I n  th is  w e  b e lie v e  w e  h a v e  su c c e e d e d  N e v e r th e le s s  w e  do  a c k n o w le d g e  
th e  n eed  fo r  fu r th e r  re s e a rc h  in  th is  a re a , b o th  a t a  th e o re t ic a l a n d  e m p ir ic a l  
le v e l
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Postscript
I f  th e  tru e  m a r k  o f  a  th e o ry  is  th e  a b i l i t y  to  p re d ic t  th e  fu tu re  th e n  the  
th e o ry  o f  th e  ra t io n a l S p e a k e r  h ad  a lre a d y  h ad  so m e  s u c c e s s  S in c e  th e  
c o m p le t io n  o f  th e  f i r s t  d ra f t  I re la n d  h a s  e x p e r ie n c e d  a  g e n e ra l e le c t io n  
T h a t  g e n e ra l e le c t io n  c h a n g e d  th e  b a la n c e  o f  p o w e r  w it h  th e  o u tg o in g  
m in o r it y  c o a l it io n  re tu rn in g  w it h  a  m a jo r i t y  R e c a l l  th a t th e  in c o m in g  
m in o r it y  g o v e rn m e n t in  1 9 9 7  h ad  n o m in a te d  a  m e m b e r  f ro m  th e  
o p p o s it io n  b e n c h e s  (S e a m u s  P a t t is o n )  S o  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  w h e n  th e  D a i l  
re c o n v e n e d  o n  6  Ju n e  2 0 0 2 ?
A s  o u r  th e s is  p re d ic te d  th e  c h a n g e  in  g o v e rn m e n t m a k e u p  ( f r o m  a 
m in o n t y  to  m a jo r i t y  s itu a t io n )  re su lte d  in  th e  in c u m b e n t  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
lo s in g  o u t to  a  m e m b e r o f  th e  g o v e rn in g  c o a l it io n  D e p u ty  R o r y  O ’H a n lo n  
w a s  n o m in a te d  a s  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  w it h  S e a m u s  P a t t is o n  d e m o te d  to  th e  
p o s t  o f  D e p u ty  S p e a k e r  ( L e a s - C h e a n n  C o m h a ir le )  D e s p ite  th e  p a r t is a n  
n a tu re  o f  th is  d e v e lo p m e n t  the  a p p o in tm e n t i t s e l f  c a u s e d  l i t t le  c o n t ro v e r s y  
w it h  th e  o p p o s it io n  n o t e v e n  c r it ic is in g  th e  g o v e rn m e n t  fo r  th e  m o v e
In te r e s t in g ly  ru m o u rs  ab o u n d e d  b e fo re  th e  g e n e ra l e le c t io n  th a t  a  c a b in e t  
m in is t e r ,  M a r y  O ’R o u r k e , w a s  t ip p e d  fo r  th e  o f f ic e  o f  C e a n n  C o m h a ir le  
s h o u ld  th e  o u tg o in g  m in o n t y  g o v e rn m e n t b e  re tu rn e d  w it h  a  m o re  
c o m fo r ta b le  v o t in g  p o s it io n  in  th e  c h a m b e r  T h i s  w a s  n o t to  h a p p e n ,
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h o w e v e r , a s  M in is t e r  O 'R o u r le  fa i le d  to  re ta in  h e r  se a t a t th e  g e n e ra l 
e le c t io n
F o r  h is  p a r t , th e  n e w  a p p o in te e  to  th e  c h a ir  o f  D a i l  E i r e a n n  f i t s  o u r  
e x p e c ta t io n  a s  to  p o l it ic a l  b a c k g ro u n d  U p  to  th e  d a y  o f  h is  a p p o in tm e n t 
O 'H a n lo n  s e rv e d  a s  C h a irm a n  o f  th e  F ia n n a  F a i l  P a r l ia m e n ta r y  P a r t y  In  
a d d it io n  to  th is  h e  h ad  se rv e d  p r e v io u s ly  a s  a  c a b in e t  m in is te r  in  th e  1 9 8 0 s  
an d  1 9 9 0 s
T h is  c a s e  o f  th e  tw o  sa m e  p o l it ic a l  p a r t ie s  re tu rn in g  to  o f f ic e ,  b u t n o w  w ith  
a  m a jo r it y  ra th e r  th a n  m in o r it y ,  an d  n o t re - n o m in a t in g  th e ir  p re v io u s  
n o m in e e  in  fa v o u r  o f  so m e o n e  f ro m  th e ir  o w n  s id e  o f  th e  h o u se  su g g e sts  
th a t th e  p a r t is a n  S p e a k e r  is  a l iv e  an d  w e l l
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